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ABSTRACT
Private investments for independent power producers (IPPs) in developing countries have
grown substantially since 1990s as public utilities were unable to keep pace with the
countries' electricity demand. The private investors' experiences, however, have not
been as smooth as expected with the possibility of deterioration of relationship between
the investors and the host governments. The investors' tendency to get high returns to
compensate for the risks they perceive as high when investing in developing world
sometimes supercedes the main concern of the host government, which is to satisfy the
public demands with as low a cost as possible. Some agreements between the investors
and the public entity that are crafted to stabilize returns to investors regardless the
economic conditions of the host country have been ineffective when the initially
anticipated conditions change sharply.
The thesis develops a risk-sharing framework between private investors and host
governments or public entities to provide mechanisms when the initially anticipated
economic condition turns adverse. The framework is developed as a modification of the
current model of agreements, with a particular focus being on power purchase
agreements (PPAs). The Paiton I project, a coal-fired power generation project in
Indonesia, serves as a case study. The Paiton I model PPA have been ineffective in
dealing with the inability of the Indonesian public utility to honor the contract when the
mid-1997 Asian crisis occurred.
Several key lessons arise from the case analyses. The take-or-pay level in the tariff
structure is high while the demand projection is over optimistic; the risk arrangement is
imbalanced, with the public utility assuming the majority of market risks, currency risks,
and force majeure risks; the politically well-connected local participant turned out to be
liabilities when government changes; efforts to pursue settlement in the international
arbitration resulting in decisions favorable to investors have been difficult to implement
in times of crisis. Certain analyses and recommendations covering lessons for better
arrangements are outlined. Competition, transparency, and appropriate risks mitigation
efforts are the key factors. The thesis closes with a tariff benchmarking analysis to aid
the contracted parties in the tariff renegotiation process.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Massood V. Samii
Title: Lecturer, Center for Construction Research and Education
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Thesis Motivation
Private, and mostly foreign, investment in the infrastructure of developing
countries has grown substantially since 1990 as a result of the boom of the countries'
economies in the late 1980s. Billions of dollars are being committed to finance projects
in the areas of power, telecommunication, transportation, and water, with electricity
becoming one of the leading sectors in attracting private investment. In fact, there is a
massive need for infrastructure projects, particularly in the East Asian countries. The
World Bank's 1995-2004 projection of required investment for infrastructure in this area
amounts to a total of US$ 1.5 trillion, with the power sector accounting for one third of
the amount'. This phenomenon translates into an explosive demand for project financing
because traditional sources of financing such as public and corporate financing alone
cannot meet such a high level of financing needs2.
The increasing need for project financing has raised an even more interesting
issue concerning the risks of investing in developing world. This concern is particularly
important because of the complexity of project-financing structure involving a worldwide
collaboration of sponsors, governments, financial institutions, and multilateral
institutions, among other entities. Indeed, even well crafted arrangements between
private investors and the host government could unexpectedly turn into conflicts when
situation changes sharply from that initially anticipated. Louis T Wells, in his article on
The World Bank, "Infrastructure Development in East Asia and Pacific: Towards a New Public-
Private Partnership", Washington D.C., 1996.
2 Lang, Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998.
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risk in infrastructure, provides various examples of arrangements that turned sour in
previous decades3 . Despite the experiences of the previous decades, private investors in
recent years seem to hold the assumption that it is unlikely they will end up with such an
adverse outcome because they believe they are in a better bargaining position with the
host government. However, the history repeats itself as conflicted relationships between
the public and private parties also occur recently4. There seem to be no convincing proof
of why this repeated history is likely to change in the near future.
Despite the benefits such as large cash and sophisticated technology that the
foreign investors bring to developing countries, which might not be available otherwise,
private investment in the infrastructure of developing countries seems to create a new
financial burden for the host governments. Investors tend to get high returns to
compensate for the risks that they perceive as high when investing in emerging markets.
The tendency to get high returns sometimes supersedes the main concern of the host
government, which is to satisfy the public demands for infrastructure with as low a cost
as possible. These conflicting perspectives have raised a new concern: whether the
current practice of private foreign investment, which will be explored in later chapters, is
3 Wells, Louis T, Eric S. Gleason, "Is Foreign Infrastructure Investment Still Risky?", Harvard
Business Review, September-October 1995, page 4-12. Wells provides a thorough analysis of foreign
investments that turned into conflicts with the host government. Among other examples, in the 1960s, the
Latin America holdings of American and Foreign Power, a subsidiary of General Electric (GE) that held
the common stock of GE's overseas utilities, disappeared because of expropriations by the host
governments. Another incident occurred in 1979 when the Indonesian government demanded that
International Telephone and Telegraph Company sell its telecommunication system to the government.
4 Wells, Louis T., "Private Investment in Infrastructure: Managing Non-Commercial Risk", Private
Infrastructure for Development: Confronting Political and Regulatory Risks, 8-10 September 1999, Rome,
Italy. In analyzing the reemergence of instability that characterizes earlier private investments in the
infrastructure of developing countries, Wells cites recent events including Pakistan's unilateral cancellation
of electric power arrangements, the renegotiation of the Dabhol power agreement in India, the dispute over
the nationalization of a toll road in Bangkok, Thailand, and recent conflicts over power purchase
agreements in Indonesia.
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a sustainable approach to answer the necessities for infrastructure projects in developing
countries.
Another paramount concern that has led to the deterioration of relationship
between foreign investors and host governments is agreements that are crafted to stabilize
the returns to investors regardless the economic condition of the host country. Usually,
such agreements contain terms that are "inappropriately" favorable5 to the investors,
transferring most, if not all, of the commercial risks to the host government or state-
owned entities. When unexpected events occur and the country's economic condition
changes sharply to an adverse direction, the parties assuming the associated risks would
likely be unable to honor the initially agreed terms. Louis T Wells perfectly expressed
this phenomenon as "the efforts by private firms to shed commercial risks [that, in times
of economic crisis, eventually] lead to political risks for the investors"6 .
A perfect illustration would be the experience of P.T. Perusahaan Listrik Negara
(PLN), the Indonesian state-owned electric utility. The contract terms agreed upon in the
Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) entered into in 1994 by PLN and the Paiton Energy
Company (PEC) with respect to the Paiton I - generated power are "inappropriately"
favorable to PEC, providing the project sponsors with a highly secured revenue streams.
The initially agreed contract terms effectively transfer all of the market risks and
currency risks to PLN. Therefore, when the Asian monetary crisis in the mid-1997
occurred, PLN fell into a severe financial strain. The depreciation of the Indonesian
Rupiah resulted in the inability of PLN to generate enough cash flow from its local-
s For the origin of the terms "investor-friendly" and "inappropriately favorable" deals, see Louis T
Wells, 1999. These two terms are frequently cited throughout this thesis.
6 Wells, Louis T., "Private Investment in Infrastructure: Managing Non-Commercial Risk", Private
Infrastructure for Development: Confronting Political and Regulatory Risks, 8-10 September 1999, Rome,
Italy.
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currency revenues to meet the local-currency obligations that were translated from the
fixed dollar obligations under the agreed upon PPA. The corporate finance of PLN
became greatly imbalanced, with the payment obligations-not only to the one relating to
the Paiton I project, but also to other Independent Power Producers (IPPs)-under the
PPAs agreed upon prior to the crisis accounting for the majority of PLN's financial
burden. The results are apparent: PLN's default leading to disputes and contract
renegotiation.
The above illustration indicates the existence of imbalanced risk sharing in some
of the current contract models that has been ineffective in times of crisis, the times when
the provisions should actually be in a full force. A substantial amount of risks is
transferred to the public utility, assuring the investors the same net return, as they would
have had in the absence of such unexpected event. These "investor-friendly" contract
provisions are proved insufficient to equip the contracted parties and provide a solution
when unexpected events actually materialize.
To sum up, the increasing needs for private investment in the infrastructure
projects of developing countries have fueled the emergence of project financing structure
involving worldwide project participants. The experience of private investors in previous
and recent decades, however, has not been smooth as expected with the possibility of
deterioration of relationship between the private investors and the host governments, the
trend of which is unlikely to change in the near future. These undesired experiences
resulted from the conflicting perspectives of the foreign investors and the host
government, and the ineffective imbalanced risk-sharing provisions in recent contracts
have motivated the development of a better risks-sharing framework to achieve a long
-20-
term and sustainable solution when the initially anticipated economic condition changes
sharply. This framework is intended to better equip the contracted parties when
renegotiation efforts are inevitable.
1.2. Thesis Objectives
The thesis's main objective is to develop a better risk-sharing framework between
the foreign investors and the host government or public entities to achieve a long term
and sustainable solution when the initially anticipated economic condition in the host
country turns adverse. The framework is developed as a modification of the current
model of agreements that are "inappropriately" favorable to the foreign investors to
include more appropriate contract provisions with more balanced terms and conditions.
When unfavorable event occurs, the provisions should serve as a guidance to assess the
associated risks and a basis to negotiate an approach for remedy.
A case study is considered the most appropriate method to arrive at a practical
recommendation in satisfying the thesis's main objective. The Paiton I project, a 2x615
MW coal-fired power generation project in Indonesia, fits this purpose very well. As
previously mentioned, the Paiton I project perfectly addresses issues relating to the
imbalanced risks-sharing provisions that are greatly favorable to the foreign investors,
putting the contracted public entity in a huge disadvantage. The Paiton I PPA model has
proved to be ineffective in dealing with PLN's inability to honor the contract when the
Asian crisis occurs. Further, the conflicting perspectives between the two contracted
parties have prolonged the contract renegotiation process. Facing with these issues, the
Paiton I project is well thought-out as an ideal case study to achieve the thesis's main
-21-
objective. The analysis of the case study would lead to a proposed modification of the
current PPA model as well as a proposed approach for renegotiation. Even though the
renegotiation mechanism itself is beyond the scope of this thesis, an approach for a long-
term commercial solution is suggested to the extent of developing a comprehensive
analysis of the Paiton I electricity tariff, referred to as tariff benchmarking analysis, the
analysis of which is expected to aid the contracted parties in the renegotiation process.
The outcomes should accommodate the respective interests of the foreign investors, the
public entity, and most importantly, the Indonesian electricity consumers.
In short, the thesis synthesizes lessons of the Indonesia's electricity sector out of
the experience of the Paiton I project. Two main practical results are expected: a
modification of the current PPA model, and a long-term commercial approach with
respect to the negotiation of the Paiton I electricity tariff, the problem of which, at the
time the thesis was final, was in await for solution. Even though the focus of this thesis is
the Indonesia's electricity sector, private investments in other developing countries
should take the lessons to avoid the same mistakes and be more prepared in undertaking
similar deals. Further, the salient features developed out of the Paiton I experience is
applicable not only to IPP practices, but also to other types of infrastructure projects that
have been experiencing similar difficulties with respect to the "inappropriateness" of
investor-friendly contract arrangements.
1.3. Thesis Scope
The thesis limits the analysis to a specific type of infrastructure, which is the
independent power producer, with the Paiton I power generation project in Indonesia
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being the case study. A review of the Indonesia's electricity sector, especially its IPP
program, is conducted. Most importantly, an evaluation of the contract provisions of the
Paiton I PPA model provides deep insights that would point to the core problems. This
evaluation, supplemented with an overview of the business environment in Indonesia,
would lead to a proper development of the intended framework. In addition, even though
the renegotiation process and mechanism are beyond the scope of this thesis, an approach
for a long-term commercial solution is suggested to the extent of developing electricity
tariff benchmarking for the Paiton I project.
Among other IPPs in Indonesia, the Paiton I project is chosen as a case study for
two reasons. First, the project is the first private power producer in Indonesia and is one
of the largest IPPs in Asia. Prior to this project, the country's power sector had had no
experience of private investments in power generation, thereby having no template for
IPP practices. Indeed, the Paiton I project, especially its PPA model, was expected to be
the template for the IPPs that follow. Second, the project addresses issues relating to the
imbalanced risks-sharing provisions that are inappropriately favorable to the foreign
investors. By the time the thesis was final, the PPA contracted parties were still
renegotiating the contract intensively. The renegotiation brought up issues relating to the
conflicting perspectives between foreign investors and the host government, the impact of
the 1997 Asian crisis, and inefficiency issues, the difficulties of which are often
encountered in the project financing practices in developing countries.
In addition to the detailed analysis of the Paiton I project, to provide a coherent
approach and a wide spectrum of the application of the recommendation, the project will
be evaluated using a review of academic literature as basic references. A comparison of
-23-
the project with its counterparts in other developing countries is limited to certain
financial aspects.
The thesis is limited to the scope explained above. The main obstacle of the
research effort was, unfortunately, the reluctance of the public and the private parties of
the Paiton I project to assist in the development of the case study. They had been
unwilling to share essential information especially with respect to financial information
such as project cost structure and financial parameters. Confidentiality and proprietary
materials were their main reasons despite the fact that the case study was, indeed, a
controversial case. The case study was, therefore, developed from the publicly available
information and intensive interviews with a key personnel7 who was actively involved in
the renegotiation process.
1.4. Methodology
The thesis uses the following methodologies:
1) An extensive review of literature around the themes of project financing for IPP,
risks analysis, and privatization, to provide basic references for the case study
analysis;
7 The intensive assistance of Dr. Hardiv Situmeang for the analysis and the write up of this thesis
was gratefully acknowledged. Dr. Situmeang was the Director of Planning of PLN and the Chief of PLN
contract renegotiation team during the early stage of PPA renegotiation process, up to January 2000. He
had been actively involved in the Paiton I contract renegotiation; the different renegotiation approach
between the government of Indonesia and the PLN renegotiation team was the basis of his "stepping back"
from the renegotiation effort. At the time this thesis was final, Mr. Situmeang served as a senior advisor to
the CEO of PLN while finalizing the write up of his book, the theme of which is the IPP renegotiation
mechanism.
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2) A case study analysis around the Paiton I project. Aligned with the thesis's
objectives, the analysis focuses on risks profile, financial scheme and tariff
structure, and contractual aspect of the project;
3) A comparative analysis of the case study with academically recommended IPP
practices from the literatures; and
4) A comprehensive tariff benchmarking analysis to develop an approach to arrive at
a long-term commercial solution with respect to the Paiton I tariff renegotiation.
1.5. Thesis Outline
Chapter 1 provides the introduction of the thesis, outlining the research
motivation, objectives, scope, and methodology. The chapter serves as a general
overview covering the whole purpose of the thesis.
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background of project financing practices for
IPPs in developing countries. This chapter basically consists of four main parts: 1) an
overview of project financing, 2) project finance for IPPs, 3) the emergence of IPPs in
developing world, and 4) the salient features of best practice for IPP development. The
first and the second parts provide a brief introduction for readers who are not familiar
with the idea of non-recourse project financing (as opposed to full-recourse corporate
financing) and with the typical IPP structure. Since readers are usually familiar with
these two issues, they might skip these two parts. The third part serves as a quick
overview of IPP growth in developing countries and the associated problems. Reviewing
this part is optional since the problems defined here are explored in details in chapter 4 as
well; however, the informative explanation, supplemented with some statistical data,
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provides a well-thought wrap-up about the growth of IPPs in emerging markets. Reading
the fourth part, however, is essential since it serves partly as academic references for the
case study analysis in the chapters that follow.
Chapter 3 presents the thesis case study, which is the Paiton I power generation
project in Indonesia. The chapter consists of seven subchapters, which mainly explain
the entire project: project background, project description, bidding process, project
participants, and project finance structure. Moreover, several sections of the Paiton I
model PPA are highlighted to provide basic understanding to the mechanism of risk
sharing between the power purchaser and the seller of the Paiton I - generated power.
The chapter closes with the explanation of the prevailing situation covering the
Indonesian economic overview, political overview, the electricity industry, and the Paiton
I project status, which is the evolving relationship between PEC (the private investors)
and PLN (the public entity). This chapter aims to familiarize the readers with the issues
and concerns in the case study. Reading this chapter is mandatory to fully understand the
case study analyses in the chapters that follow.
Chapter 4 presents the risk analysis. The chapter consists of two parts: the
theoretical background of the IPP project risks, and the evaluation of the Paiton I project
risks and hedging mechanisms. The first part aims to familiarize the readers with typical
project risks in an IPP while the second part evaluates the Paiton I project risks and
hedging mechanisms. Readers might skip the first part if they are already familiar with
IPP project risks. The second part, however, is important to fully understand the analysis
presented in chapter 5. Chapter 4 closes with risk matrices summarizing the project risks.
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Chapter 5 presents the analysis of the Paiton I project deal. This chapter consists
of two parts: the IPP key success and best practice analysis with respect to the Indonesian
private power industry in general and the Paiton I project in particular, and the analysis of
the Paiton I project arrangement covering the imbalanced arrangement issue in the tariff
structure, the risks mitigation efforts, and the "mistakes" of IPPs in Indonesia with
respect to electricity market projection and equity arrangement. Reading chapter 5 is
essential since they explore the issues addressed in the thesis's main objectives and the
concerns briefly outlined in subchapter 2.3. Chapter 5 closes with recommendation for
practices that the author perceives as better arrangements, given the assessments in the
entire chapter.
Although chapter 5 provides analyses and recommendations for certain
phenomenon relating to IPPs in developing countries, many contracted parties
undertaking renegotiation are, indeed, in an urgent need for a long-term commercial
solution. As mentioned earlier, even though the entire renegotiation mechanism itself is
beyond the scope of this chapter, the three chapters following chapter 5 provide a
comprehensive tariff benchmarking analysis, with the Paiton I project still being the case
study. The benchmarking analysis is expected to aid the contracted parties in the tariff
renegotiation process.
Chapter 6 presents the tariff benchmarking analysis. The chapter consists of five
parts: 1) the tariff benchmarking approach, 2) the definition of financial parameters used
in the thesis's financial model, 3) the tariff benchmarking methodology, 4) the project
cost analysis, and 5) the tariff benchmarking analysis for a 2x615 MW coal-fired power
plant, of the same size to the Paiton I project. The first through the third parts are the
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theoretical background of the tariff benchmarking analysis while the fifth part is the case
study. The benchmarking analysis is conducted in order to derive a possible range of
market-based tariff for a 2x615 MW power plant of the same size to the Paiton I project,
with a report on benchmark EPC cost estimate by a Canadian engineering and
construction company, SNC-Lavalin Group8, being the EPC cost for this tariff
benchmarking purpose. The benchmark tariffs derived could be used either during the
initial PPA negotiation or during the renegotiation process when renegotiation is
eventually inevitable. The use of the benchmarking depends on the purpose of the
negotiation: an ROE-based negotiation or a wholesale-utility-tariff-based negotiation. In
addition, since the resulted tariffs are for a 2x615 MW power plant of the same size to the
Paiton I project, these tariffs are intended to serve as a comparison to the agreed upon
PPA tariff of the Paiton I power. The comparison is further explored in chapter 8.
Chapter 7 consists of two parts. The first part provides an approximation of the
financial analysis specific for the Paiton I project; a financial model is developed for this
purpose. The financial parameters derived from the financial model include IRR, ROE,
average levelized cost, and average levelized tariff. A sensitivity analysis is also
conducted, with respect to the tariff, average levelized cost, the utility's payment
obligations, and the percentage of the capacity charge to the total payments. The second
part provides an analysis of the trend of the increasing competition in the electricity
generating business. This increasing competition is likely to result in a decrease in the
private investors' expectation on ROE. The tariff benchmarking analysis in chapter 6 and
8 The audit was conducted in late 1999; it priced the Paiton I EPC cost at US$ 1.033 billion (with a
+ 20% tolerance), sharply lower than the EPC Cost of US$ 1.772 billion cited by PEC. Taufiqurohman,
M., Dewi Rina Cahyadi, I.G.G. Maha Adi, "Two Steps Forward, Three Steps Back", Cover Story Tempo
No. 29/XXIX/Sept. 18-24, 2000. See also Solomon, Jay, "Indonesian Audit Uncovers Inflated Cost of
Power Plant", The Wall Street Journal, December 26, 2000.
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the trend of declining ROE in chapter 7 are used in developing an approach for
commercial solution in chapter 8.
Chapter 8 outlines an approach to arrive at a long-term commercial solution with
respect to the Paiton I tariff renegotiation process. The chapter proposes a renegotiation
approach with respect to how to fulfill PLN's payment obligations, taking into account
PLN's affordability and following the trend of the increasing competition in the
electricity generating business. The approach outlined in this chapter is limited to the
purpose of tariff renegotiation: 1) how to determine a reasonable market-based tariff to be
renegotiated, and 2) what the contracted parties should do to arrive at this renegotiated
tariff. In order to arrive at a single market-based tariff, the benchmark tariffs in chapter 5
are used. Following, the steps that the project parties should do in order to arrive at the
renegotiated tariff are outlined by analyzing tariff sensitivity on factors such as coal price,
debt structure, and EPC cost. The mechanisms to arrive at this tariff include coal price
reduction, and debt restructuring, among others. This renegotiation approach is expected
to provide a long-term commercial solution. The idea is very simple: unless the IPP's
tariff is reduced to the level affordable to the public utility, and the utility itself is willing
to increase its tariff to the end consumers, the renegotiation would not come to an end.
Chapter 9 provides the conclusion, briefly outlining the thesis's results and
recommendations.
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Chapter 2: Project Financinig for IPPs
2.1. An Overview of Project Financing
Project Financing is one of the techniques to structure the financing aspects of
large infrastructure projects. Although the term "project financing" has been broadly
used over a wide range of project structures describing all types of projects with and
without recourse, as the term evolves in recent years, project-financing experts have
introduced definitions of project financing more precisely9. Two definitions that well
represent project financing are as follows:
A financing of a particular economic unit in which a lender is satisfied to look
initially to the cash flows and earnings of that economic unit as the source of
funds from which a loan will be repaid and to the assets of the economic units as
collateral for the loan (Nevitt, 1996).
Project financing may be defined as the raising of funds to finance an
economically separable capital investment project in which the providers of the
funds look primarily to the cash flow from the project as the source of funds to
service their loans and provide the return of and a return on their equity invested
in the project (Finnerty, 1996).
In simple words, project financing is basically an independent project entity, namely
Project Company, which serves three primary purposes:
1) To generate cash flows and earnings for debt service and repayment;
2) To provide financial returns on equity invested in the project; and
3) To stand, together with its entire assets, as collateral for loan.
To understand the idea of project financing more fully, it is important to differentiate
project financing from company financing or conventional direct financing.
9 Nevitt, Peter K., "Project Financing Success: Keyed to Non-Recourse Structuring", Private Power
Executive, July-August 1996.
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Company financing, namely Corporate Finance, is the financing technique where
the main source of debt repayments of a project is the sponsoring company. The project
is backed by the company's balance sheet, not on the project's assets alone. In other
words, company financing is an "on-balance sheet" financing. Lenders look to the
company's entire assets portfolio to justify whether the company will be able to generate
cash flows to service debt requirements. Insights into the company's financial statements
and business reputation will significantly influence the lenders' decision. If the project
fails, lenders have full recourse to the other available assets of the company, rather than
recourse only to funds related to the particular project. As long as the company owning
the project remains financially strong, the lenders do not necessarily suffer' 0 .
Project financing is an "off-balance sheet" financing. It is a distinct legal entity
whereby project assets, project-related contracts, and project cash flow are segregated to
a substantial degree from the sponsoring company". Because of the independent nature
of a project under project financing structure, if the project fails, lenders can expect
significant losses as well. Therefore, a project can obtain financing and proceed further
only if it is technically feasible and economically viable.
There are two basic types of project financing: non-recourse project financing and
limited-recourse project financing' 2 , as follows:
1) Non-recourse project financing, namely Project Finance, is the project financing
structure whereby the entire project's assets and cash flows, not the project
sponsoring companies' other available assets, are the collateral for the project
10 IFC, "Project Finance in Developing Countries," Washington D.C., 1998.
"1 Finnerty, John D, "Project Financing: Asset-based Financial Engineering", John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., New York, 1996.
12 IFC, "Project Finance in Developing Countries," Washington D.C., 1998.
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loans. Lenders do not have any recourse to the sponsoring companies; rather,
lenders rely solely on earnings generated from the project's assets to meet debt
requirements. Neither the sponsoring companies nor any third parties such as
governments provide loan guarantees. Therefore, the project company usually
arranges some mechanisms for project protection including private insurance and
guarantees.
2) Limited-recourse project financing, is the project financing structure that permits
lenders to have recourse, not only to the individual project, but also to the project
sponsoring companies' other available assets to some extent.
Figure 2.1 positions both company financing and project financing techniques on
a spectrum. Corporate finance and Project finance are located on the two extreme sides
of the spectrum, while limited-recourse project financing, depending on the extent of the
recourse, is in between these two extremes.
4 N
Full-Recourse Limited Recourse Non-Recourse
Company Financing Project Financing Project Financing
(Corporate Finance) (Project Finance)
Figure 2.1. The position of the financing techniques on a spectrum
The main difference between the two financing techniques--company financing
and project financing-is the arrangement of loans and equity financing, either to the
sponsoring company or to the project company, as shown in Figure 2.2.
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Project Equity Project
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Figure 2.2: Company Financing vs Project Financing13
Project finance, the non-recourse type of project financing, implies that a project
should be entirely self-supportive, with its cash flows being the sole source for debt
requirements and equity returns; third party guarantees and undertakings are not
required. Unfortunately, lenders are reluctant to assume such a high level of risk
especially when the uncertainty level is high. Peter K. Nevitt suggested that although
lenders are willing to look initially to the cash flows of a project as the source of funds
for loan repayments, the lenders must also feel comfortable that even in the worst case,
the loan will, in fact, still be paid15. Lenders may want this extra comfort to be in the
form of limited recourse to the sponsoring companies' assets or direct or indirect
13 Samii, Massood V., "Project Finance Notes", Readers for Course Construction Finance, MIT,
Fall 1999.
14 Lang, Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998.
15 Nevitt, Peter K, "Project Financing Success: Keyed to Non-Recourse Structuring", Private Power
Executive, July-August 1996.
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guarantees by third parties1 6 . Therefore, limited-recourse project financing is usually
preferred than non-recourse project financing.
A critical element of project financing success is the project risk profile. Since
for both types of project financing, the loan repayments are primarily dependent on the
project success, lenders pay close attention to the risk profile. Project risks should be
mitigated using the possible risks hedging tools17. The remaining risks after the
mitigation efforts should be properly distributed among the project parties in such a
manner that each particular risk is borne by the parties best able to manage the risk. The
objective of structuring risk profile is to lower down the risks to a level that is mutually
acceptable, reducing the overall collective risks and financial burdens for those assuming
the risks.
The challenge of project financing is how to structure the financing aspects of a
project in such a manner that the risks and rewards are properly allocated through a
combination of various guarantees and supports of the involved parties in a mutually
acceptable arrangement.
2.2. Project Finance for IPPs
Independent Power Producers (IPP) are typically structured on a project finance
basis, the non-recourse type of project financing. Loan guarantees to the lenders are on
the project account rather than on the sponsoring companies' other available assets. The
16 Lang, Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998.
17 For further description of risks and hedging tools in project finance, readers should review Lang,
Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998, pages: 78-79. For further description of risk
mitigation analysis, readers should review the World Bank discussion papers, "Submission and Evaluation
of Proposals for Private Power Generation Projects in Developing Countries", Washington, D.C., 1994,
pages: 63-66, and International Finance Corporation, "Project Finance in Developing Countries",
Washington, D.C., 1999, pages: 38-58.
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main participants typically involved in an IPP project are project sponsors, host
government, lenders, EPC contractors, suppliers, and power purchasers or off takers. The
challenge of structuring an IPP project is how to combine different interests of the
numerous parties involved in the project. The first step to simplify the complexity is by
clearly separating the different interests and defining roles and responsibilities of each
project participant. Properly assigning the right responsibilities to the right participant(s)
will ease the next step: the risk allocation and the risk mitigation18 . The task would have
been very simple if the roles and responsibilities of the parties remain constant; however,
this is not always the case. As the project evolves, the roles and responsibilities of each
party need to be redefined 19. Figure 2.3 shows the typical structure of IPP.
18 Project Risks, including risk hedging tools and mechanisms for remedy, are covered in Chapter 4
of this thesis: Risks Analysis. Chapter 4 includes not only the theoretical background of IPP project risks,
but also the analysis of risks involved in the Paiton I project.
19 Potash, Daniel A. "Project Participants: Roles and Responsibilities Defined". Private Power
Executive. May-June 1996.
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Figure 2.3: The typical structure of IPP
The critical roles and responsibilities of the key participants are summarized as
follows:
1. Project Sponsors
The role of project sponsors is to establish a Project Company, with a distinct
legal entity such as joint venture or partnership, for the purpose of developing an IPP
project. The sponsors, typically consisting of several companies forming a consortium,
assemble the nuts and bolts to develop the project to be a successful business enterprise.
The main purpose of forming the consortium is to share the project risks. The sponsors
20 For the definition of Project Company, readers should review subchapter 2.1. An Overview of
Project Financing.
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contribute equity that usually serves as up-front cash during the project development
stage. This equity contribution represents their interests and commitments to the
project , convincing lenders that the project is worth undertaking.
The sponsors may play several roles in the project22. Despite their initial
involvement in the pre-construction stage, they may also involve in the construction
stage, the operational stage, and sometimes in the purchase of the project output23 .
Therefore, a consortium usually brings together many different expertise, technologies,
experiences, and resources. They are responsible for completing the project and for
making available all funds necessary to achieve completion. They are responsible for
making sure that after completion occurs and operation starts, the project will generate
sufficient cash to meet its operating expenses, debt requirements, and equity returns. If
the project fails to perform as expected because of disruption in operation, force majeure
or some other accounts, depending on the cause of the disruption, the sponsors are
responsible to restore the project back to normal condition2 4 .
In short, because of their extensive roles and responsibilities, the sponsors will
develop a project if they believe it will provide an attractive return on equity. The higher
the risks involved in the project, the higher their expectation for the return on equity.
21 A Shareholders Agreement, entered into by the sponsors, states the equity contribution and
ownership interest of each sponsor and specifies each sponsor's rights and responsibilities in the Project
Company; the agreement may also describe the necessary undertakings in the event of project failure
(Lang, 1998).
22 Potash, Daniel A., "Project Participants: Roles and Responsibilities Defined", Private Power
Executive, May-June 1996.
23 If the sponsors have extensive involvement in many project stages, they are likely to be more
committed to the project (Potash, 1996).
24 The sponsors usually arrange hedging tools such as insurance recoveries, future deliveries, or
some other means.
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2. Host Government
The role of the host government is to give permission and to provide supports
necessary to the project sponsors for the IPP project development 5 . Such supports could
be in the form of guarantees (i.e. sovereign guarantee) and necessary supports (i.e. tax
holiday, a letter of support), among others, and most importantly, a clear legal and
regulatory framework of the country's privatization effort that assures a level playing
field for the private sector.
The guarantees could be indirect or direct government guarantees. Indirect
guarantees are the government backings of multilateral and bilateral agencies that enable
the agencies to absorb risk not acceptable to private insurers or guarantors 26. An example
would be the guarantee programs offered by the World Bank Group-the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation
(IFC), and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)-that mitigate non-
commercial risks facing private sector activities in the agencies' member countries27
Political risks are also covered by agencies of a particular nation to promote international
investment by their own nationals. Such agencies include Export Credit Agencies (ECA)
such as Japan Export-Import Bank (JEXIM) and the United States Export-Import Bank
(USEXIM), and other national agencies such as Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) of the United States and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
of Japan. The arrangement is usually backed by bilateral agreement between the project
25 Lang, Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998. The government enters into a
Concession Agreement with the Project Company to grant the company the right, for a certain time period,
to develop the project under a specified delivery method, for example, the build-own-operate (BOT)
structure.
26 IFC, "Project Finance in Developing Countries", Washington, D.C., 1999.
27 Ibid
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host government and the agencies' national government. Figure 2.4 shows the simplified
arrangement for the indirect host government guarantees.
HOST COUNTRY GUARANTORS
GOVERNMENT:
Payment Multilateral Agencies
MIGA membership 
- i.e. MIGA
Bilateral agreement Payment Bilateral Agencies
with the US Pi.e. USEXIM
Political Rij Guarantee
INDEPENDENT POWER
PRODUCERS
Figure 2.4: Indirect Host Government Guarantees
The direct host government guarantee is a direct financial responsibility for
payment obligation if certain agreed upon conditions occur. In most developing
countries, the guarantee usually covers demand risk, foreign exchange risk, and political
risk including change of law risk and expropriation2 8 . When IPPs enter into an
agreement with state-owned entities, the sponsors usually ask for direct government
guarantee on the utilities' payment obligation, which means that the government would
be financially responsible when the party primarily liable fails to perform. For example,
when the power purchaser is a state-owned utility, the host government may guarantee
that the utility make the agreed upon PPA payment to the Project Company; in case of the
28 The coverage types of various government guarantees are explored in Chapter 4. Risks Analysis.
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utility's default, the government would be responsible to make the payment. Figure 2.5
shows the mechanism of the direct government guarantee.
GUARANTOR: A Guarantee INDEPENDENT POWERHost Country ------------------------- P
Government Financially Responsible PRODUCERS
Utility s Default PPA pa t obligation
PUBLIC UTILITY
Figure 2.5: Direct Host Government Guarantee
In many cases, governments refuse to provide guarantees 29. Instead, they issue a
letter of support30 . A quite different understanding occurs, that is, the sponsors interpret
that the letter provides the same assurance as a guarantee; however, from the
government's viewpoint: unlike a guarantee, under a support letter, the government
would not be financially responsible in case of the utility's default. In case of dispute, the
strength of this letter from the legal point of view remains unclear. Indeed, a support
letter is not a guarantee, but only a letter supporting the country's privatization effort.
The support letter provides a "comfort" to the private sector that the project company will
29 Theodore H. Moran, "Political and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment in Developing
Countries: Introduction and Overview", Private Infrastructure for Development: Confronting Political and
Regulatory Risks, 8-10 September 1999, Rome, Italy. Moran points out some examples of government
refusals to provide guarantees (Wells, 1999).
30 In the case of the Paiton I project, the Indonesian government did not issue a guarantee; it issued a
letter of support saying that the government would "cause" PLN to "discharge" its financial obligations.
This support letter is further discussed in chapter 4 of the thesis.
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be run in a sound business manner; however, the letter provides no guarantees by any
means, as shown in Figure 2.6.
Host Country A Support Letter
Government Financially NOT Responsible
INDEPENDENT POWER
PRODUCERS
PPA t obligation
PUBLIC UTILITY
Figure 2.6: Letter of Support: the host government support
3. Lenders
The role of lenders is to provide debt financing3 for the project. Among others,
lenders can be commercial banks, multilateral funding institutions, the central bank of the
host country, and governments' Export Credit Agency (ECA) . Multilateral funding
institutions include the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the European Investment Bank (EIB). The ECAs
include JEXIM and USEXIM.
Since the debt repayment is dependent on the project success, lenders pay close
attention to the project risk profile. There has been a tendency to delay debt financing
31 Potash, Daniel A, "Project Participants: Roles and Responsibilities Defined", Private Power
Executive, May-June 1996: Debt financing is usually confused with debt investment; therefore, it is
important to differentiate these two terms. Debt investment is an investment with a fixed return and a fixed
date for repayment. In this case, the sponsoring company's assets are the collateral for the loan. Debt
financing is the debt borrowed by a Project Company. In debt financing, there is no recourse to the
sponsors' other available assets if the loan goes bad; instead, the independent project entity stands together
with its entire assets as collateral for the loan.
32 Lang, Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998.
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until some
resolved.
transferring
project risks have been proved lower and some uncertainties have been
Lenders usually defer the debt financing during the project's early stage,
the risks of pre-completion stage to the project sponsors and contractors.
4. Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC) Contractors
The role of EPC contractors is to design and construct the IPP project. They
design the project, buy the equipments, arrange for the delivery to the site, construct and
supervise the building of the project's facilities and system installation34 .
The project sponsors usually transfer construction risks35 to EPC contractors. The
Project Company enters into a fixed-price turnkey construction contract with the
contractors, which states that the contractors agree to build the project for a fixed price
and they will deliver working commercial power plants by specified dates. If the plants
are delivered late or under-performed, the contractors will have to pay liquidated
damages to the Project Company since delay in project completion will delay the revenue
stream as well.
5. Suppliers3 '
The role of suppliers is to supply
the construction and operation stages.
equipment suppliers and fuel suppliers.
equipments and materials for the plants during
Two important suppliers in IPP projects are
Equipment suppliers take orders from EPC
Potash, Daniel A, "Project Participants: Roles and Responsibilities Defined", Private Power
Executive, May-June 1996.
Lang, Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998.
Risks during the project construction stage are further explained in Chapter 4. Risks Analysis.
36 Potash, Daniel A, "Project Participants: Roles and Responsibilities Defined", Private Power
Executive, May-June 1996.
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Contractors, and deliver and place the equipments in the project. Such equipments
include not only those to generate electricity such as turbine and generator, but also other
equipments needed for operating the plant such as compressors, transformers, and coal-
handling equipment. Fuel suppliers enter into a Fuel Supply Agreement with the Project
Company to provide fuel for the plants under a certain pricing mechanism.
It is not uncommon that EPC contractors, equipment companies, and fuel
companies together form a consortium to bid on a power project. In this way, even
though the consortium assume higher risks, they are likely to be more committed to the
project, and, as a result, get higher compensation.
6. Off-taker / Power Purchaser
The role of power purchaser is to purchase the IPP-generated power. The power
purchaser enters into a PPA with the Project Company by which the purchaser agrees to
purchase a minimum amount of the power produced by the IPP37 . The agreement is
either on a take-or-pay or take-and-pay basis. The former is an agreement whereby the
purchaser agrees to make an agreed upon payment regardless the delivery of the power,
but subject to the availability of the plants; even if there is no delivery, the purchaser is
still obligated to make a certain level of capacity charge payment. The take-and-pay PPA
is an arrangement whereby the payment will be made only upon the actual delivery of the
power.
In most developing countries, the power purchaser is usually a state-owned
electric utility entering into a take-or-pay PPA. The critical issues being discussed during
the initial PPA negotiation process between the utility and the IPP are the level of the
37 Lang, Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998.
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take-or-pay and the pricing formula. The take-or-pay level represents the demand risk to
be assumed by the utility while the pricing formula represents the allocation of
commercial risks such as exchange rate risk and inflation risk, either to the utility or to
the IPP. The payment level becomes crucial when the actual demand of electricity is far
more less than that of the projection. When the demand is weak, the public utility would
end up paying fixed capacity charges for the unnecessary IPPs-generated power. As
previously mentioned, there has been no effective mechanism to deal with such a huge
disadvantage of the utility's position. Instead, PPA provisions have been crafted in such
a way that protects the revenue stream of IPPs to a great extent on the expense of the
public entities, leaving the project sponsors assuming almost no risks. When the
economic condition of the host country changes sharply, as has happened during the
Asian crisis, the impacts of such provisions of the current PPA model become apparent.
2.3. The Emergence of IPPs in Developing Countries
Power projects were traditionally built on a full-recourse basis. Until the late
1980s, power sector in developing countries was a public sector's monopoly; funds for
investment in this sector were provided only by or through government or public utility 8 .
Since early 1990s, the formation of project financing as an alternative financing method
38 Razavi, Hossein, "Financing Energy Projects in Emerging Economies", Pennwell Books.
Oklahoma, 1996. Razavi provides an example of the construction of a new power generation plant as a
public project. As a public project, the required funds would be provided from either one or the
combination of the available public sources: the internal funds of the public utility, the government's
budget, and the official borrowing from multilateral institutions and bilateral sources. The capital
investment and borrowing, therefore, would not be on the project account. Instead, the public utility would
be responsible for the debt. In other words, the project would be built as an extension of the assets of the
utility. Lenders would have full recourse on all assets and revenues of the utility, not just those related to
the new plant.
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has emerged in the power sector as the private involvement has been increasing39. The
power sector in developing countries has been growing rapidly due to the boom of the
countries' economy in the late 1980s. The countries' public utilities were unable to keep
pace with the increasing demand. The lack of financial resources has made the condition
even worse. Faced with serious capacity and energy shortages that cannot be remedied
from public sources, many developing countries turned to private investors. In addition,
the positive results of the early experiments with private participation in Chile4 0 and the
United Kingdom4 ' convinced many developing countries that the private sector
involvement is a feasible approach.
Electricity has predominated the growth of private activities in power sector.
More than 600 private electricity projects-which consist of generation, transmission,
and distribution projects, and represent investment of US$ 160 billion-reached financial
closure in seventy developing economies during the 1990s 2 . Most of the private
participation in electricity has been through IPPs, which generally involve investors who
build a power plant and sell the electricity wholesale either to an existing utility or to one
or several large consumers. While IPPs now account for about half of all new generating
39 Izaguirre, Ada Karina, "Private Participation in the Electricity Sector-Recent Trends", Public
Policy for the Private Sector, the World Bank Group, September 1998: the investments in electricity
projects with private participation amounted only to US$3.6 billion (in 1997 US Dollars) between 1984 and
1989 (Source: the World Bank PPI Project Database).
40 Izaguirre, Ada Karina, "Private Participation in the Electricity Sector-Recent Trends", Public
Policyfor the Private Sector, The World Bank Group, September 1998: before 1990 private participation in
electricity in developing countries was limited to Chile and a few isolated experiences in other countries.
Chile introduced comprehensive reforms in the 1980s to create a competitive private market.
41 Besant-Jones, John E., "The England and Wales Electricity Model--Option or Warning for
Developing Countries", Public Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank Group, June 1996. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, the United Kingdom power supply industry underwent the most radical
transformation of the industry: it went from being a state-owned, state-controlled, integrated structure to
being a privately owned, autonomously regulated, unbundled structure.
42 Izaguirre, Ada Karina, "Private Participation in Energy", Public Policyfor the Private Sector, The
World Bank Group, May 2000.
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capacity in the US4 3, greenfield expansion-the source of IPP-in developing countries
accounted for 56% of the US$ 131 billion private investments contracted in 1990-1997,
most of it for generation 4. From 1991 through 1997, contracts brought to a closure for
large greenfield IPPs reached 137 projects for 67 gig watt (GW) of capacity worth US$65
billion, with IPPs mobilizing US$51 billion of private funds 5. Figure 2.7 shows the
distribution of IPP investment among selected developing countries.
The IPP Market in Selected Developing Countries
13% 14% N Indonesia
* China
10% OThailand
O Turkey
8% N Malaysia
32% U Pakistan
7% 0 India
M Philippines
5% 4% U Other
Note Data are as of end-December 1998 and cover only IPP projects of more than 100 megawatts.
Other Argentina (3%), Chile (2%), Colombia(2%), Morocco(2%), Czech Republic (1%), LaoPDR(l%),
Mexico(1%), and Peru(l%).
Source World Bank, Energy, Mining, and Telecommunication Department, Knowledge Management Database.
Figure 2.7: The IPP market in selected developing countries, 19974.
In general, IPPs have made positive contributions to the developing economies.
The most important one is that IPPs have helped developing countries governments to
meet their large financing needs and capacity shortages; the governments, as a result, can
43 Bond, James, "Risk and Private Power-A Role for the World Bank", Public Policy for the
Private Sector, The World Bank Group, March 1994.
44 Izaguirre, Ada Karina, "Private Participation in the Electricity Sector-Recent Trends", Public
Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank Group, September 1998
45 Albouy, Yves, and Reda Bousba, "The Impact of IPPs in Developing Countries-Out of the Crisis
and into the Future," Public Policyfor the Private Sector, The World Bank Group, December 1998.
46 Ibid
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allocate public sources to other priorities such as health and education. Yves Albouy and
Reda Bousba of the World Bank's Energy, Mining, and Telecommunications
Department, agree at this point. However, they observed a drawback: when the IPP
program eventually grows quickly to a large size relative to the host country's grid
capacity, the negative effects become significant, as has actually happened in a few Asian
countries47 . Albouy and Bousba's observation regarding the impacts of IPPs in
developing countries are summarized as follows:
1) IPPs have allowed the transfer of significant project risks-mostly construction,
operating, and fuel availability risks-to the private sector. However, most IPPs
are compensated for fuel price variations, and are protected against market risks
by take-or-pay contracts; these risks are eventually passed on to the power
purchaser. IPPs are also protected against political risks, often by government
guarantees.
2) IPPs have generally caused the country's electricity sector exposure to foreign
exchange risks to increase or at least stay the same. In few countries, the
exposure is likely to be higher with IPPs than that under expansion plans by
public utilities.
3) Without IPPs, the capacity shortages would have gone unmet. On the other hand,
the IPPs built as a response to an overoptimistic demand has led to an excessive
supply of electricity. Without the IPPs, most of the overcapacity would have not
existed.
4 Albouy, Yves, and Reda Bousba, "The Impact of IPPs in Developing Countries-Out of the Crisis
and into the Future," Public Policyfor the Private Sector, The World Bank Group, December 1998.
-48-
4) Capacity costs of IPPs have varied widely, even for similar technologies. For
example, the price of gas turbines in China is 40 percent of that in Indonesia. The
capacity costs of IPPs are sometimes higher than those of public utilities with
World Bank financing. Further, most PPAs are on take-or-pay basis, a costly
straightjacket that protects the project's revenue stream when demand is weak.
5) Transaction costs for IPPs have tended to be high, and elapsed time to financial
close have been generally more than two years. Moreover, unclear rules for the
bidding process and contract awards, accompanied by allegations of corruption,
have been perceived as unfair by project sponsors losing the bid.
These observations reveal negative impacts of the IPP boom to the host country's
electricity sector. Particularly in a few Asian countries, the mid-1997 Asian crisis has
further triggered these impacts, placing the host government and the state-owned utilities
in a huge disadvantage since they assume most, if not all, of the commercial risks under
PPAs agreed upon prior to the crisis. Certain "investor friendly" provisions to stabilize
returns to investors have proved to be inappropriately favorable to the investors. These
provisions may initially be intended to attract private investment; however, they are
proved ineffective to be fully forced in times of crises. While respect for contracts is
critical for private sector development, IPPs in trouble may have to be restructured.
Given these observations, the development of a better risk-sharing framework-by
improving on the current IPP practice, with restructuring PPA being the particular
emphasis-is an urgent need, not only for renegotiation purpose but also for future IPP
deals.
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2.4. Key Success and Best Practice for IPPs
There have been efforts to provide best practice manuals as well as guidance for
IPPs by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank48 and the Asia Pacific
Economic Corporation (APEC) 49. A number of essential principles must be incorporated
into the private power development to properly satisfy the respective interests of the
governments, the private investors, and the electricity consumers. Although these
essential principles can be differently formulated5 0 , research and case study work to date
as well as various literature references lead to three key success factors for IPP:
Competition, Risks Mitigation, and Transparency. These three factors can be formulated
around three main themes:
1) Legal and regulatory framework for private power development;
2) Procurement process; and
3) Power purchase agreement.
48 The World Bank discussion papers, "Submission and Evaluation of Proposals for Private Power
Generation Projects in Developing Countries", Washington, D.C., 1994. The report has been prepared to
help governments of developing countries address some of the constraints that have impeded development
of private power generation projects. It discusses, in particular, how to prepare bidding documents and
undertake effective technical and commercial evaluation of bids.
49 APEC Energy Working Group, "Manual of Best Practice Principles for Independent Power
Producers", The APEC Energy Working Group Secretariat: Energy Division, August 1997.
50 Price Waterhouse LLP, "Review of Indonesian Power Sector Development Issues", Energy
Project Development Fund, USAID, May 1995, recommended that the conditions for a successful IPP
program include: a clear legal and regulatory framework, maintenance of a healthy power purchaser, a
transparent bidding process, a competitive market for project components, discrete project facilities for
each IPP project, and a new power purchase contract based upon the lessons of the Paiton I PPA model.
APEC Energy Working Group, "Manual of Best Practice Principles for Independent Power
Producers", August 1997, formulated four critical success factors: transparency, predictability, reduction of
risk, and encouragement of competition; and four principles of best practice for IPPs: institutional and
regulatory structures, tender/bid processes and evaluation criteria, power purchase agreements and
associated tariff structures, and financing and its implications.
Price Waterhouse Coopers, "Best Practice for Promoting Private Sector Investment and
Competition in the Power Sector", Asian Development Bank, March 1999, formulated the best practice,
according to the five stages of restructuring: establishing the structure of the power industry, preparing the
market for private sector investment and competition, opening the market and carrying out privatization,
and implementing the changes effectively.
-50-
2.4.1. Legal and Regulatory framework
Initially, the government owns public utilities. However, many countries have
moved towards privatizing these assets51. Dr. Hardiv Situmeang of PLN synthesized
quite different objectives of privatization in four South East Asian countries, as shown in
Table 2.1, based on the different perspectives5 and definitions5 3 of privatization of each
country.
Potash, Daniel A. "Project Participants: Roles and Responsibilities Defined". Private Power
Executive. May-June 1996. Potash suggested two reasons behind the electricity business privatization
efforts: the fresh capital available from private sources, and the "pressure" by the World Bank and other
international organizations to privatize the electricity business, or at least ask the government to get out of
the generating business.
52 Perspectives: Indonesia: Privatization is not only about selling public assets but is also a tool for
economic reform to achieve several objectives (Master plan, 1998). Malaysia: the transfer to the private
sector the activities and functions traditionally rested with the government, bringing about positive changes
to the organization, management, and the performance of the public enterprises. Brunei Darussalam: A
new kind of development strategy whereby growth will no longer be driven by the government; rather, by
the capital market i.e. the private sector. Philippines: A tool for economic growth. (Situmeang, 2000).
53 Definitions: Indonesia: The transfer to the private manager and private owner the effective control
previously rested with a state-owned company, the objective of which could be achieved when the majority
of ownership has been transferred or shortly will be sold to the private sector (Master plan, 1998).
Malaysia: The transfer to the private sector the activities and functions traditionally rested with the public
sector. Brunei Darussalam: The transfer to the private sector the activities and functions traditionally
vested in the government. Philippines: an explicit definition is not available, but the understanding is
similar to that of Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. (Situmeang, 2000).
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Table 2.1: The objectives of Privatization in four South East Asian countries5 4
The Objectives of Privatization Indonesia' Malaysia Brunei Phillippines
Darussalam
Facilitate/Improve Sustainable X X X X
Economic Growth
Improve Efficiency X X X X
Improve Productivity X X X X
Increase Revenue X X X
Increase Quality of Service X X X X
Relieve the financial and administrative X X X X
burden of the govemment
Development of the Private Sector X X X X
Distribution of resources/capital X
Diversify Company Ownership X X X
Strengthen the Capital Market X X
Support the Government Program: X X X X
sector reform, restructuring, etc.
Improve Business Climate X X
Product and Technical Innovation I I X
Note: 1 Master plan for the reform of Indonesia's state-owned
X : the objectives that apply to the associated country.
companies, September 1998.
Towards these privatization efforts, particularly with respect to the electricity
sector, the government has the authority to create and control the legal and regulatory
framework of the country's private power industry, with the best practice including the
following features:
1) Create a stable framework for power sector development toward competitive
market, through such mechanisms as power sector reform and restructuring.
2) Establish a clear legal and regulatory framework, which provides transparent
ground rules and assures a level playing field for the private participants (Price
Waterhouse LLP, 1995).
54 Situmeang, Hardiv, "The objectives of Privatization", The International BIMP (Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Philippines) EAGA (East Asian Gross Area) Conference on Privatization, International
Convention Center Brunei, an unpublished synthesis of the conference papers, Brunei, May 3-4, 2000.
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3) Establish a complete set of laws and regulations specifically relating to the private
power industry including the foreign investment law, and the regulations
applicable to foreign borrowings, taxation, and foreign exchange regimes;
environmental and other public policy objectives should also be well
incorporated.
4) Encourage competition in the electricity business through separation between
regulator and public utility, and through unbundled structure of generation,
transmission, and distribution function.
5) Restructure the power sector by clearly separating the sector's commercial
objectives from the social objectives. Publicly owned utilities should function as
commercially viable entities working under a set of commercial performance
targets.
6) Simplify the approval process for IPP projects to reduce uncertainties and delays
under a clear, published, and transparent approval procedures (APEC, 1997).
7) Create security over project assets that applied fairly to all project participants
under enforceable legal frameworks.
8) Maintain a healthy power purchaser (Price Waterhouse LLP, 1995).
9) Implement policies to encourage the development of domestic capital markets and
institutions and diversify the sources of domestic capital such as pensions and
insurance funds available for equity investment in electricity projects (APEC,
1997).
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2.4.2. Procurement Process
Procurement process is a starting point of the relationship between the private
investors and a host government. The process includes the description of the project
scope, selection and solicitation process, preparation and award of contract, and all
phases of contract administration. The entire process should be well crafted to encourage
competition and to assure a level playing field for the private participants. The
government is responsible to assure that the appropriate procurement process is in place,
with the best practice including the following features:
1) Identify the appropriate projects: the projects selected should match the power
development planning and the industry and environmental policies.
2) Define the project scope and requirements. The government should at least
provide the basic specifications and minimum requirements of the project. In
other words, the government, not the private participants, is the party which is
55
responsible for defining the project scope
3) Formulate and publish objective evaluation criteria that assure a head-to-head
competition among bidders. The evaluation criteria should have a comparison
framework-which could be on price, on qualifications, and on combinations of
55 An example of private-participants-defined project is the construction of a power plant project
whereby the government provides very little information on the planned project; for example, even the
required capacity and the contract period are not defined by the government. The private participants, then,
prepare their bids based on their own perceived required capacity and their own assumption on contract
period; these two factors would be obviously assumed differently by one participant to another. As a result,
it would be difficult for the government to evaluate their proposals. Unless the evaluation criteria are the
factors that vary, the proposals submitted by the participants are, indeed, crafted for a "different" project.
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qualifications, among other factors-as a basis to choose the best bidder to be
awarded the contract56 .
4) Formulate and publish tender/bid procedures that fairly treat the private
participants. The procedures may be structured to include bidding stages such as
pre-qualification of bidders on the course of financial or technical qualification,
among others. When public utilities should compete with private participants, all
the exclusive attributes of the utilities should be taken away to assure the fair
treatment.
5) Publish in advance the full tender/bid information packages including the
evaluation criteria, and apply the rules of the game during the competition.
6) Ensure transparency in the whole process: the potential competitors should be
able to see and understand the process prior to making commitment to
participate 57. The overall procurement system should be reliable and predictable.
7) Provide benchmarking by an independent engineering peer to ensure cost-
effective development based on the market price of the project. For example,
independent engineering review must assure that the project cost offered by the
bidders is not exceptionally high if compared to other similar projects.
56 Competitive bid procedures should be implemented for selected projects to be awarded to the
private sector, recognizing that alternative procedures, including the consideration of unsolicited bids, may
be appropriate in certain circumstances (APEC, 1997). Even though for the best practice, competitive
bidding would be the rule, there are certain circumstances where competitive bidding are not possible, for
example, when the interested parties are too small.
57 If prospective private participants view the bidding process as lack of competition, they may
decide not to bid for the project, or in case they are already involved, they may withdraw their bids. This
action, however, is sometimes practically difficult since some potential competitors may perceive an
uncompetitive procurement system as an opportunity to find some other ways around the formal rules to
win the project.
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2.4.3. Power Purchase Agreement
As mentioned earlier, PPA is an agreement between an IPP and a power purchaser
for the power purchaser to buy the IPP-generated power under an agreed upon set of
pricing formula, either on a take-or-pay basis or on a take-and-pay basis. Critical aspects
in PPA negotiation process include tariff structure, pricing mechanism, force majeure,
and dispute resolution. The best practice features are as follows58 :
1) Use the wholesale electricity tariff, rather than the rate of return on equity, as the
basis for negotiating PPAs.
2) Formulate tariff structure that promotes competition among generators of both
IPPs and utilities on cost-effective development. The structure should incorporate
mechanisms that allow smooth transition to competitive electricity markets.
3) Structure a balanced risks profile under PPA. The risks should be allocated to
parties that are in the best position to control and manage the risks59 . The risks
include market risks, foreign exchange rate risks, currency
convertibility/availability and transferability, changes in fuel prices, costs due to
change in law, and political risk.
4) Include provision for payments on termination to cover debt/equity/ return on
equity.
5) Accommodate effective dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms.
58 APEC Energy Working Group, "Manual of Best Practice Principles for Independent Power
Producers", The APEC Energy Working Group Secretariat: Energy Division, August 1997.
59 The commercial risks that are difficult to manage, for example demand risk and exchange risk,
should be negotiated properly. An imbalanced transfer of these commercial risks to be mostly assumed by
the power purchaser may lead to political risks for the investors (Wells, 1999). Unlike the current PPA
model, demand risk, for example, should be partly allocated to IPPs by arranging long-term contracts only
for part of the capacity with the balance to be sold at spot prices (Albuoy and Bousba, 1998).
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The success of the implementation of the key success and best practices for IPPs
is basically dependent on the three project main parties: the project sponsors, the host
government, and the power purchaser. The three key success factors-competition, risk
mitigation, and transparency-should be embodied in the legal and regulatory
framework, procurement process, and PPA. The goal is a stable and competitive private
power development strategy that produces better service, higher quality, and lower costs
to the ratepayers.
2.5. Chapter Summary
Private investments for IPPs in developing countries have grown significantly in
1990s as public utilities lacked the capacity and financial resources to keep pace with the
countries' increasing electricity demand. Despite the IPPs' positive contributions to the
countries, the drawbacks have become apparent when the IPP program eventually grows
quickly to a large size. The negative impacts include the electricity overcapacity and the
high IPP transaction costs. The most important concern, however, is the highly secured
IPP deals under take-or-pay PPA with public electric utilities, either with or without
government guarantees. While government usually provide guarantees that protect
investors against political risk or the utility's default risk, the take-or-pay arrangement,
which obligates the utilities to pay fixed capacity charges, protects the IPPs' revenue
stream when demand is weak. The pricing formula transferring most of the inflation risk
and currency risks to the government or the utilities have increased the country's
electricity sector's exposure to the exchange risks and have placed the public entities into
a severe financial strain when the economic situation changes sharply, as is the case with
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the Asian crisis. Therefore, the IPP deals, particularly its PPA arrangements, that are
inappropriately favorable to the investors and ineffective in times of crisis, should be
modified.
Despite the inappropriateness of the IPP deals, the entire IPP program of a
country is actually a part of the country's effort towards privatizing the electricity
business. A number of essential principles that must be incorporated into the private
power development can be summarized in one sentence: the key success factors-
competition, risk mitigation, and transparency-should be embodied in the legal and
regulatory framework, procurement process, and PPA arrangement. These best practice
features may serve the country privatizing its electricity business as a checklist for its
private power development effort.
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Chapter 3: The Paiton I Project in Indonesia
3.1. Project Background
The Indonesian power sector had been growing rapidly 62, with PT. Perusahaan
Listrik Negara (PLN), the Indonesian state-owned electricity company, accounting for the
major part of this growth. These rapidly expanding power needs were due to the boom of
the country's economy in the late 1980s, resulting from the rapid growth of industrial and
transportation sectors as well as the increasing prosperity of the population63 . PLN's
supply of electricity, however, was unable to keep pace with the increasing demand 4.
Faced with this growing demand and PLN's inability to meet the demand, the
Government of Indonesia (GOI) turned to private sector.
60 The thesis author prepared this case under the supervision of Professor Massood V. Samii as the
basis for the thesis discussion, and not to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of infrastructure
development related issues. Data presented in the case analysis might have been altered to simplify, focus,
and to preserve individual confidentiality. The assistance of Dr. Hardiv Situmeang-the Planning Director
of PLN (July 31, 1998 - December 31, 1999) and later, the senior advisor to the PLN CEO-in the
preparation of this case is greatly appreciated. The remarkable contribution of Dr. Situmeang in the case
analysis is gratefully acknowledged.
61 Indonesia is an archipelago nation comprised of five large islands, with a population of about 224
million (July 2000 est.), the world's fourth largest populous country. Indonesia's economy had
demonstrated a strong and sustainable growth. In 1990s, the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was
US$ 880, and the real GDP was around 7%. Following the sharp contraction and high inflation during the
Asian crisis of 1997-1998, in 1999, the Indonesian economy stabilized with a modest recovery. The per
capita GDP was US$ 2,800 (1999 est.); the real GDP for the whole 1999-year, however, showed 0%
growth rate (The CIA World Factbook, 2000).
62 The World Bank projected that of the US$ 192 billion required infrastructure investment in
Indonesia from 1995 to 2004, power plants accounts for more than 40%.
63 Technology Indonesia, Pusat Informasi Business dan Pembangunan Indonesia, P.T. Wahyu Promo
Citra, "Energy: Technology and Development", 2"d Edition, September 1995, Jakarta, Indonesia.
64 The magnitude of the unmet demand was difficult to measure; however, several indicators can be
a proximity. PLN statistics showed that the waiting list at the end of the 1993/94 fiscal year remained at
48% of PLN's installed capacity. Further, the Indonesian per capita electricity consumption, electricity
intensity (kWh consumed per dollar of GDP) and the percentage of population with access to electricity
were all the lowest in Asia (Source: ADB, Electric Utilities Data Book, 1993).
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In 1990, the GOI announced a policy to encourage private investment in electric
power generation to meet Indonesia's optimistic projection of 19%-24% annual
increase 6 in electricity demand. Following this policy, in 1991, the Indonesian Ministry
of Mines and Energy (MME) invited companies to submit proposals for the Paiton I
project, the first privately financed, owned and operated power generation facility in
Indonesia. In 1992, Presidential Decree 37/1992 was issued to encourage and open the
way for private sector involvement in power generation; it authorizes the MME to be
responsible for regulating private power industry.
In 1993, the MME developed a comprehensive policy framework to guide the
longer-term reform and restructuring of the power sector66. Following this reform and
restructuring effort, in 1994, the GOI changed the legal status of PLN from a state
enterprise to a limited liability corporation, enabling PLN to establish subsidiary
companies and allowing private sector participation in power generation67 . The 1996
National Electricity Plan endorsed the concept that most of the electricity will be
provided by independent power producers (IPPs), which would then sell the power to
PLN under long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs). The Paiton I project is the
first IPP in Indonesia.
65 The 19%-24% annual demand increase was the projection in the 1994 National Electricity Plan.
66 Consultants from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), World Bank, and
ADB were appointed to assist MME in formulating detailed proposals in terms of regulatory, legal, and
institutional arrangements to secure efficient private power mechanisms.
67 US Embassy for Jakarta, Indonesia, "Indonesia: Electricity Sector Update-Focus on PLN",
Energy News, May 1998. http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/econ/electric-pln.html
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3.2. Project Description68
The Paiton I project is located in 140 km south east of Surabaya in East Java and
is part of a power generation complex (the Paiton complex). The project consists of
2x615 MW (net) coal-fired electric generating plants. The Paiton complex is designed to
accommodate eight electric power plants of which the Paiton I project is for units 7 and
8. Units 1 and 2 (2x400 MW), developed and owned by PLN, had been in operation
since 1994. Units 3 and 4 (2x400 MW) and Units 5 and 6 (2x615 MW) would be
privately owned.
Some facilities, eventually required by units 3 through 6, were provided within
the Paiton I project's scope of work. The facilities consisted of the construction of the
switchyard for units 5 and 6, initial site preparation work for units 3 through 6, and civil
works, including the water intake and discharge canals that were being expanded to meet
the requirements of all eight units. After construction, these facilities would be turned
over to PLN for its use in connection with the Paiton complex.
3.3. Consortium Bidding Process
The Paiton I project was solicited under the build-own-operate (BOO) scheme69,
which gives the project developer the authority to build, own, and operate the plants, for a
period of 30 years. Following the GOI's bid invitation for the Paiton I project, a number
68 CS First Boston Chase Securities, Inc., "Confidential Offering Circular for the Paiton I proposed
bond offering", March 21, 1996; OPIC, "Discussion and Recommendation for Approval by the Board of
Directors", OPIC Loan Guaranty, December 6, 1994.
69 The BOO structure is a variant of the build-operate-transfer (BOT) delivery method. Other
variants of the BOT structure include the build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) structure and the build-own-
maintain-transfer (BOMT) structure. Under the BOO structure, however, the project is not transferred to
the host government after the completion of the project (Lang, 1998).
-61-
of Indonesian companies were pre-qualified to bid on the project. At that time, the
Indonesia's Foreign Investment Law required that any private investment group must
have at least 5% Indonesian shareholding.
After being pre-qualified, PT. Batu Hitam Perkasa (BHP)70, together with three
foreign companies-Edison Mission Energy (Mission) of the US, Mitsui & Co., Ltd.
(Mitsui) of Japan, and General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) of the US-formed
a consortium, known as the BMMG7 1 Consortium, to bid on the project.
Despite BHP, only one other Indonesian company was pre-qualified to bid on the
project, which is PT Bimantara Bayu Nusa (BBN). BBN, together with its foreign
partner, Intercontinental Electric Incorporated (IEI) of the US, formed a consortium
known as the BNIE 7 2 Consortium, to bid on the project.
In October 1991, the GOI stated that the Paiton I project would be awarded to the
BNIE Consortium. However, in May 1992, the GOI announced that it had reconsidered
its decision and invited the BMMG Consortium to negotiate for the project73 . This
announcement, noticing the advantages of having a single consortium build units 5
through 8 of the Paiton complex, encouraged the BMMG Consortium to include
members of the BNIE Consortium to achieve a least cost approach in constructing these
four units; however, the discussions about combining the two consortia failed, leading to
70 BHP is an Indonesian company having interests in cement manufacturing, petrochemicals, and
energy associated contracting.
71 BMMG = BHP, Mission, Mitsui, and GECC.
72 BNIE = Bimantara Group and Intercontinental Electric
73 This reconsideration was the result of continuing debate by GOI Ministers about the
appropriateness of the award to the BNIE Consortium. The ministers reportedly believed that the BMMG
Consortium's bid was technologically superior and offered a lower kWh price (Driseoll, 1999).
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discussions between BHP and BBN about BBN's acquiring an interest in BHP-which
also failed 4.
In September 1992, the GOI eventually awarded the Paiton I project to the
BMMG Consortium. Formal negotiations75 over the terms of PPA for the Paiton I-
generated power took place over 18 months, and were reported to receive a high attention
from the US government76, in addition to several meetings being held by the chairman of
BLIP and Suharto, the Indonesian President at that time. In 1994, the BMMG
Consortium formed PT. Paiton Energy Company (PEC), the Project Company for the
purpose of developing the Paiton I project. Figure 3.1 shows the initial contractual
structure of the project participants.
A letter dated May 6, 1999 from Robert E. Driseoll, the Senior Vice President of the Asia Pacific
Region of Edison Mission Energy, to Ralph A. Matheus, the Acting Vice President for Finance of OPIC.
"Paiton Energy Company-Fact Sheet (Paiton Swasta I)", source of information: OPIC. In the
negotiations, the GOI was advised by a team of internationally recognized consultants including three
financial advisors (Lazard Freres, S.G. Warburg, Lehman Brothers), technical advisors (Lahmeyer
International), legal counsel (White & Case) and a senior international power specialist sponsored by the
USAID.
76 The Asian Wall Street Journal, February 14, 1994, stated that "Progress [on the pricing of Paiton
I] may have been helped by the January visit of three U.S. official delegations, including one led by
Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, which talked to Indonesian officials about Paiton." (Wells, 1999). See
also Peter Waldman and Jay Solomon, "US Deals in Indonesia Draw Flak", The Asian Wall Street Journal,
December 24, 1998.
77 The Asian Wall Street Journal, February 14, 1994, reports that the chairman of BHP, who was the
brother-in-law of Suharto's daughter, met several times with Suharto, the Indonesian President at that time,
to expedite the negotiations for the contract (Wells, 1999).
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Mission, Mitsui, GECC, and BHP initially had, respectively 32.5%, 32.5%, 20%, and 15% ownership
interest in PEC. On January 30, 1996, GECC transferred 7.5% of its initial holding to Mission, leaving
GECC with 12.5% ownership interest.
Figure 3.1:Contractual Relationship of the Paiton I project78
3.4. Project Participants
1. Project Sponsors
The Paiton I project is developed by PEC, a joint venture whose sponsors are the
following companies:
1) Edison Mission Energy (Mission)79
78 Lang, Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998; CS First Boston Chase Securities,
Inc., "Confidential Offering Circular for the Paiton I proposed bond offering", March 21, 1996.
-64-
2) Mitsui & Co., Ltd. (Mitsui) 0
3) General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC)8 1
4) P.T. Batu Hitam Perkasa (BLP)8 2
PEC shareholders are BHP and subsidiaries or affiliates of Mission, Mitsui, and
GECC. These subsidiaries were established specially for the purpose of the project. The
subsidiaries with their ownership interests83 in PEC are as follows:
1) Mission Indonesia B.V.84 had 40% ownership interest.
2) Paiton Power Investment Co., Ltd.85 had 32.5% ownership interest.
3) Capital Indonesia Power I C.V. 86 had 12.5% ownership interest8 7.
4) BHP88 had 15% ownership interest.
79 Edison Mission Energy (Mission), formerly named Mission Energy Company (MEC), is a wholly
owned indirect subsidiary of Edison International (formerly Southern California Edison Corporation), a
California corporation which is a US public utility holding company. Mission, through other subsidiaries,
owns an interest in 54 power-generating facilities throughout the world. In 1996, Moody's and S&P rated
Mission's outstanding senior debt Baal and BBB+ respectively. Mission's net income was US$ 64 million
on revenues of US$ 467 million and its outstanding capitalization as of December 31, 1995 was US$ 1,028
million. (Confidential Offering Cicular, 1996).
80 Headquartered in Tokyo, Japan, Mitsui & Co., Ltd. (Mitsui) is a business conglomerate actively
involved worldwide as an organizer of international business ventures designed to link sources of supply
with demand. Mitsui has undertaken various infrastructure and power plant construction projects around
the world. In 1996, Moody's rated Mitsui's outstanding debt Al. Mitsui's net income and outstanding
capitalization as of March 31, 1995 was 21,794 million Japanese Yen and 179,326 million Japanese Yen
respectively. (Confidential Offering Circular, 1996).
81 General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) is involved in various commercial, industrial, and
financial activities. GECC's outstanding senior debt is currently rated Aaa by Moody's and AAA by S&P.
GECC's net earnings were US$ 1,918 million on earned income of US$ 16,923 million. Its outstanding
capitalization as of December 31, 1994 was US$ 99,431 million consisting of debt and equity.
(Confidential Offering Circular, 1996).
82 P.T. Batu Hitam Perkasa (BHP), a limited liability company formed under the laws of the
Republic of Indonesia, is owned by P.T. Tirtamas Majutama (33.33%), P.T. Swara Bumi (33.33%), P.T.
Catur Yasa (22.22%), and P.T. Wahanaputra Aluraya (11.11%). Established in 1989, BHP's primary
activities were related to its role as a shareholder of and fuel supplier to PEC. (Confidential Offering
Circular, 1996).
83 The ownership interests listed are those after January 30, 1996.
84 Mission Indonesia B.V. a limited liability company formed under the laws of the Netherlands, is a
wholly owned indirect subsidiary of Mission.
85 Paiton Power Investment Co., Ltd., a limited liability company formed under the laws of Japan, is
a wholly owned subsidiary of Mitsui.
86 Capital Indonesia Power I C.V., a limited partnership formed under the laws of the Netherlands, is
an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of GE, the parent of GECC.
87 The ownership interest of GE's subsidiary was eventually sold out to Canadian Trans. Pipe
Company.
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The sponsors provided equity contributions and subordinated loans 9. They also
provided the funding of contingencies and cost overruns in the amount of up to US$ 300
million9 0 , which is not included in the total project cost.
To facilitate BHP's 15% equity contribution, the other three sponsors extended
loans to BHP to be repaid out of BHP's dividends from the project. Until loans are
repaid in full, BHP is permitted to receive 35% of the dividends to which it otherwise
would be entitled 91.
2. Host Government
The Paiton I project was built with no guarantees from the Indonesian
government. The GOI, however, issued two kinds of support letter:
1) The PPA Support Letter
The Indonesian Minister of Finance issued a letter of support with
respect to PLN's payment obligation under the PPA entered into by PEC
and PLN. This letter states that the GOI will cause PLN to discharge its
payment obligations under the PPA, which are due and payable and
unsatisfied by PLN92.
88 BHP, a limited liability company formed under the laws of the Republic of Indonesia, is a special
purpose company formed by the Indonesian sponsors of the Paiton I project.
89 In this thesis, both equity contributions and subordinated debt together will be called equity
contributions (or equity) only.
90 The US$ 300 million consists of US$ 175 million overrun equity and US$ 125 million contingent
overrun equity. (Confidential Offering Circular, 1996)
91 A letter dated May 6, 1999 from Robert E. Driseoll, the Senior Vice President of the Asia Pacific
Region of Edison Mission Energy, to Ralph A. Matheus, the Acting Vice President for Finance of OPIC.
92 Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, The Support Letter dated March 2, 1994, the
second paragraph:
"In consideration of Seller entering into the PPA, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
will cause PLN, its successors and permitted assigns, to discharge PLN's payment obligations
under the PPA which are due and payable and unsatisfied by PLN".
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This support letter is actually in accord with a Presidential Decree of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 37 of 19929'. This decree states that
private investment in electric power generation will only be undertaken
with no guarantee from the GOI with respect to the capital invested and
any debt repayment obligation !.
2) The Coal Support Letter
With respect to the Coal Cooperation Agreement"5 , the Indonesian
Directorate of Coal issued a letter to PEC stating (i) that the GOI will not
terminate the agreement with Adaro9 6, due to a default under the
agreement without first giving Adaro, PEC, and BHP an opportunity to
cure the default; (ii) in the event that either the agreement is terminated or
Adaro is replaced, any new company replacing Adaro will honor the Fuel
Supply Agreement 97 and the Coal Purchase Agreement9 8 , and (iii) should
there be a problem in the supply of coal to the project, the GOI will assist
PEC and BHP in obtaining coal supply.
93 Prior to this decree, there was no specific legal authorization for PLN to purchase power from
private suppliers (Gooding, 1995).
94 Dinas Peraturan dan Perundang-undangan: Divisi Humas PLN Pusat. "Keputusan Presiden
Nomor 37 tahun 1992 tentang Usaha Penyediaan Tenaga Listrik oleh Swasta: Pasal 5". July 9, 1992.
95 The Coal Cooperation Agreement is an agreement entered into by P.T. Adaro Indonesia (Adaro)
and PT. Tambang Batubara Bukit Asam (TBA), an Indonesian coal mining company, under which Adaro
has the right to mine the coal reserves found within the Tutupan area in South Kalimantan (Confidential
Circular Offering, 1996).
% P.T. Adaro Indonesia (Adaro), under a Coal Purchase Agreement, sells coal to BHP, the coal
supplier to the Paiton I plants.
97 The Fuel Supply Agreement is an agreement between PEC and BHP, which provides that BIHP
shall be an exclusive coal supplier to the project. (Confidential Circular Offering, 1996)
98 The Coal Purchase Agreement is an agreement between Adaro and BHP, under which Adaro has
agreed to sell to BHP all of the coal BHP is required to deliver under the Fuel Supply Agreement.
(Confidential Circular Offering, 1996)
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3. Project Lenders
Senior debt for the project was provided by lenders consisting of the following
financial institutions 9 :
1) The Export Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM)' 00
The JEXIM credit facility consists of a JEXIM direct loan (the tranche A
loan) and a co-financing by a syndicate of International commercial banks
(the tranche B loan). The tranche B loan is insured for political and
commercial risk by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan
(MITI) and Mitsui. MITI provides political risk insurance on 97.5% of the
principal amount of the tranche B loan. The commercial risk covers 95% of
the principal amount of the tranche B loan (provided 75% by MITI and 20%
by Mitsui)' 01 in case of PLN's default to fulfill its payment obligations under
the PPA.
2) The Export Import Bank of the United States (USEXIM)
The USEXIM credit facility consists of loans funded by international
syndicate of commercial lenders. The facility is guaranteed against certain
political risks by USEXIM on a 100% basis of the loans' principal amount.
3) The Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the US (OPIC)
The OPIC credit facility consists of a direct loan by OPIC, which is
funded from the sale of certificates of participation issued and guaranteed by
99 CS First Boston Chase Securities, Inc., "Confidential Offering Circular for the Paiton I proposed
bond offering", March 21, 1996.
10 JEXIM or Japan's Bank for International Corporation (JBIC).
101 MITI provided only 75% insurance because the Japanese government was unsatisfied with the
lack of guarantee by the GOI, which only provided a support letter; as a result, Mitsui should guarantee the
remaining portion (Lang, 1998).
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OPIC evidencing interests in payments due by PEC in respect of the loan.
The OPIC facility is uncovered for political and commercial risk.
4) Rule 144A'02 Bond financing market.
The initial purchasers of the bonds'03 are CS First Boston Corporation,
Chase Securities, Inc., BA Securities, Inc., Barclays de Zoete Wedd Securities
Inc., Credit Lyonnais Securities (USA) Inc., and UBS Securities LLC. This
financing is also uncovered for political and commercial risk.
5) Commercial Lenders
The commercial bank facility, which is a contingent standby facility in the
amount of US$ 93,750,000, consists of a direct loan provided by a group of
commercial lenders. This facility is available for funding 75% of cost
overruns after the US$ 175 million overrun equity provided by project
sponsors is fully utilized'0 .
The ADB was actually considering a US$ 50 million loan to the project; however,
105
they were cautious about the Indonesian first family involvement in the project
4. Power Purchaser
In February 12, 1994, PEC and PLN signed a PPA for the construction,
ownership, operation, management, and maintenance of the Paiton I project. The PPA
102 Passed in 1990 by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Rule 144A is designed to
provide exemption from the Securities Act's registration requirements for resale of certain restricted
securities to qualified buyers.
103 Moody's and S&P rated the Paiton I bonds Baa3 and BBB respectively.
104 Utilization of this facility is dependent on the GOI's approval to increase non-Indonesian
borrowing above the current approved limit of US$ 1,820 million (the debt-financing amount).
105 Suharto's decond daughter and her brother in law have a combined indirect 2.5% interest in the
project through their investment in BHP. They also have minor ownership in two of the companies
involved in the coal supply chain. (Frederick, 1994).
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was on a take-or-pay basis by which PLN would purchase the Paiton I plants' entire
output for 30 years starting from the plants' commercial operation date, which was May
21, 1999. PLN was the only customer of PEC; therefore, PLN's payments under the PPA
were the sole source of PEC's revenues. The operation and maintenance of the plants,
the debt repayments, and the equity returns were dependent upon PLN's ability to fulfill
its payment obligations. Any occurrence or circumstances that may reduce or suspend
PLN's payments would adversely affect PEC's ability to pay the debt.
PLN's ability to meet its payment obligations generally depended on its financial
condition. As mentioned earlier, the GOI issued a support letter to PEC, which provides
that the GOI would cause PLN to discharge its PPA payment obligations. The letter,
however, is not a guarantee of payment; it did not indicate any financial responsibility of
the GOI in case of PLN's default.
PLN system consisted of two main divisions: the Java-Bali 0 6 grid and the Outer
Islands' 0 7 grid, with the Java-Bali grid accounting for 80% of PLN's total revenue108 and
being consistently profitable; the Outer Islands, however, were uneconomic. The Paiton I
plants would contribute to the Java-Bali grid system via the East Java grid.
5. Contractors
The design, engineering, procurement, construction, start-up, testing, and
commissioning of all of the Paiton I plant facilities were awarded to a consortium of
106 In Java-Bali grid, generation and transmission are managed by two units (Western Java and
Eastern Java-Bali) while distribution is organized into four regions (West Java, Central Java, Jakarta, and
Eastern Java-Bali).
107 The Outer Islands grid consist of hundreds of small and isolated system organized into 11
geographic regions: four on Sumatra, two on Kalimantan, two on Sulawesi, and three representing other
islands or group of islands.
108 The electricity tariffs at which PLN is legally authorized to charge customers are regulated by the
GOI.
-70-
contractors consisting of Mitsui, Duke/Flour Daniel International Services'0 9 (Duke/Fluor
Daniel), and Toyo Engineering Corporation'1 0 (Toyo) under a fixed-price, turnkey
construction contract, with a certain completion date which is May 21, 1999, the
Commercial Operation Date (COD). Under the contract, the consortium was obligated to
pay liquidated damages to PEC in the event of certain delays in completion or the plant's
failure to meet the guaranteed performance levels.
Each consortium member undertook the following responsibilities".:
1) Mitsui is the consortium leader with overall commercial, financial, procurement,
and shipping responsibilities.
2) Duke/Fluor Daniel is responsible for the power block area and overall plant
schedule, coordination, test, start-up, and training. Its obligations are guaranteed
by Fluor Corporation and Church Street Capital Corporation.
3) Toyo is responsible for the non-power block area. It also undertook the
responsibilities of site general sub-contractor.
In addition, Burns and Roe Company1 1 2 carried out the plant conceptual design on behalf
of the consortium.
While the initial site preparation began in September 1994, the project
construction started in April 1995 and was scheduled for completion in 49 months. The
109 Duke/Fluor Daniel is a Nevada general partnership. The partners are Duke Coal Project Services
Pacific, Inc., a Nevada corporation, and Fluor Daniel Asia, Inc., a Californian corporation. Duke/Fluor
Daniel is actively involved in the engineering, construction, operation and maintenance of electric
generation facilities worldwide.
110 Toyo, a corporation under the laws of Japan, specializes in design, equipment procurement, and
construction of processing plants. Toyo is engaged in various plant projects worldwide.
II" CS First Boston Chase Securities, Inc., "Confidential Offering Circular for the Paiton I proposed
bond offering", March 21, 1996.
112 A company under the laws of New Jersey, USA.
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project had been delivered on time; units 7 and 8 had been ready for operation since May
1999 and August 1999 respectively.
For the operation and maintenance of the plants, PEC entered into an Operation
and Maintenance Agreement with P.T. Mission Operations and Maintenance Indonesia
(Mission O&M Indonesia), a subsidiary of Edison Mission Operation and Maintenance,
Inc. (MOMI)"'3 . The obligations of Mission O&M Indonesia under the agreement are
guaranteed by MOMI.
6. Suppliers
1) Equipment Suppliers
The steam generators for this project were supplied by Asea Brown
Bovery- Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) while two identical steam
turbine generators were supplied by GE. Moreover, ABB-Flakt supplied the
seawater scrubbing system for the project, Hitachi supplied generator step-up
transformers, and Cogelex supplied the 500 kW switchyard, among other
suppliers.
2) Fuel Supplier
BHP would supply" 4 the plants' coal requirements pursuant to a 30-year
Fuel Supply Agreement entered into with PEC. BHP would purchase the coal
from PT. Adaro Indonesia" 5 (Adaro) pursuant to a Coal Purchase Agreement
with Adaro. Adaro has the rights to mine coal in the Tutupan area in South
113 MOMI, wholly owned by Mission, operates and maintains projects in which Mission has an
ownership interest.
114 BHP's supply obligation include coal for start-up operation.
115 Established in 1982 as a foreign investment company under the laws of the Republic of Indonesia,
Adaro is a coal mining company.
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3.5.
Kalimantan pursuant to a 30-year Coal Cooperation Agreement (CCA) with
PT. Tambang Batubara Bukit Asam (TBA), the state coal mining company.
As mentioned earlier, with respect to CCA, the GOI issued a coal support
letter.
Financing Structure
The base cost of the project totaled US$ 2.5 billion, with additional US$ 300
million sponsors-provided funding for contingencies and cost overruns, as shown in table
3.1. The base cost was financed on a non-recourse basis with sponsors' equity
contributions and lenders' senior debt.
Table 3.1: The Project Cost Breakdown'16
Project Cost Breakdown IUS$ Million % of Total Base Cost
EPC Construction Contract 1,772.30 70.9%
Value Added Taxes 53.70 2.1%
Interest During Construction 308.20 12.3%
Up-front Financing Fees 144.30 5.8%
MITI Fee 12.30 0.5%
Commitment Fee 29.30 1.2%
Agency Fees 3.70 0.1%
Development Expense 43.20 1.7%
Development Fee 11.80 0.5%
Owner's Engineer 15.00 0.6%
Operation and Maintenance Staffing 15.00 0.6%
Working Capital 25.30 1.0%
Insurance 30.00 1.2%
Administration Cost 26.00 1.0%
Pre-Completion Labor 6.60 0.3%
Contingency 3.30 0.1%
Total Base Project Cost 2,500.00 100.0%
Contingencies and Cost Overruns 300.00 J
Similar with other power generation projects and construction projects in general,
the majority of the base project cost is construction cost, which is around 70% of the total
116 Confidential Offering Circular, 1996
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cost. The second largest expense is financial cost 117, almost 20% of the total cost, while
the remaining 10% includes development expense, insurance, administration cost, and
working capital.
Table 3.2 shows the overall financing plan for the project. 72.80% of the total
base project cost is debt financed while the remaining 27.20% is equity financed. This
financing structure is comparable with other IPP projects, which have been highly
leveraged, with an average debt-equity ratio being 76 to 241.
Table 3.2: The Breakdown of the Project Financing Plan'1 9
Financing Sources Cost Percentage
US$ Million [of Total Base Cost
Senior Debt
JEXIM Facility
Tranche A 540.00 21.6%
Tranche B 360.00 14.4%
USEXIM Construction Facility 540.00 21.6%
OPIC Facility 200.00 8.0%
Bonds 180.00 7.2%
Total Senior Debt 1,820.00 72.8%
Subordinated Debt
Mission 176.00 7.0%
Mitsui 143.00 5.7%
GECC 55.00 2.2%
BHP 0.0%
Total Subordinated Debt 374.00 15.0%
Equity
Mission 122.40 4.9%
Mitsui 99.45 4.0%
GECC 38.25 1.5%
BHP 45.90 1.8%
Total Equity 306.00 12.2%
Total Base Project Equity 680.00 27.2%
Total Base Project Cost 2,500.00 100.0%
117 Financial cost consists of interest during construction and debt instrument fees. For the Paiton I
project, debt instrument fees consist of up-front financing fees, MITI fee, and commitment fee.
118 Albouy, Yves, and Reda Bousba, "The Impact of IPPs in Developing Countries-Out of the Crisis
and into the Future," Public Policyfor the Private Sector, The World Bank Group, December 1998.
119 Confidential Offering Circular, 1996.
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3.5.1. Breakdown of Debt Financing
Table 3.3 shows breakdown of debt financing while table 3.4 shows the
applicable interest rates during the loans' tenor. The debt financing came from multi
sources, of which the ECAs12 0 contributed 79.1% of the total debt: 49.4% from JEXIM
tranche A and B, and 29.7% from USEXIM. The construction contract was financed by
foreign currency loans from these two sources. This was actually the first time that
JEXIM had taken construction risk2 .
Table 3.3: The debt-financing breakdown
Debt Financing Sources Principal Amount Percentage
US$ Million of Total Debt
JEXIM Facility
Tranche A 540.00 29.7%
Tranche B 360.00 19.8%
USEXIM Facility 540.00 29.7%
OPIC Facility 200.00 11.0%
Bonds 180.00 9.9%
Total Debt Financing 1,820.00 100.0%
Table 3.4: Interest rates during the loans tenor1 22
Debt Interest Rates Repayment
Sources PreCompletion Years 1-4 Years 5-8 Years 9-12 Years
JEXIM
Tranche A 9.44% 9.44% 9.44% 9.44% 1999-2011
Tranche B 4.88% 11.13% 11.25% 11.38% 1999-2011
USEXIM 9.38% 11.50% 11.50% 11.50% 1999-2011
OPIC 6.18% 12.29% 12.29% 12.29% 1999-2011
Bonds 10.46% 10.46% 10.46% 10.46% 2008-2014
JEXIM and USEXIM
Lang, Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998.
Confidential Offering Circular, 1996
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3.5.2. Breakdown of Equity Financing
Table 3.5 shows the total equity financing consisting of equity and subordinated
debt, and the percentage of each sponsor's ownership interest. The percentage of
ownership interest is proportional to that of equity alone; however, the percentage is not
proportional to that of subordinated debt since BHP is exempted from providing
subordinated debt.
Table 3.5: The equity financing breakdown.
Project Total Equity Financing Ownership
Sponsors Subordinated Debt Equity Interest
US$ Million % US$ Million % %
Mission 176.00 47.1% 122.40 40.0% 40.0%
Mitsui 143.00 38.2% 99.45 32.5% 32.5%
GECC 55.00 14.7% 38.25 12.5% 12.5%
BHP 0.0% 45.90 15.0% 15.0%
Total 374.00 100.0% 306.00 100% 100.0%
3.6. The Paiton I Model PPA123
The PPA specifies the rights and obligations of PLN and PEC relating to, among
others, the development, financing, construction, testing, and commissioning of the
Paiton I project; the operation and maintenance of the plants; the tariff structure
consisting of capacity and energy payments; the allocation of risks in the event of force
majeure and changes in the regulatory environment; events of default; rights of
termination and the associated consequences; and dispute resolution.
A detailed analysis of the entire PPA provisions is beyond the scope of this thesis.
However, several sections of PPA provide the basic understanding to the mechanism of
risk sharing between PEC and PLN. Most importantly, these sections relate closely to the
123 Confidential Offering Circular, 1996
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issues of the "investor friendly" provisions, the thesis' main concerns discussed earlier.
In the Paiton I model PPA, these "investor friendly" issues are embodied in the
provisions related to the take-or-pay tariff structure, terms of payment, force majeure,
and tariff adjustments. These provisions and the agreed dispute resolution are explained
in this chapter while the detailed analyses are provided in later chapters.
3.6.1. Tariff Structure
The electricity tariff comprises four components consisting of two capacity
components (components A and B) and two energy components (components C and D).
Under the PPA, PLN is obligated to make the capacity payments irrespective of dispatch
levels, but subject to the availability of the plants. This obligation represents the take-or-
pay mechanism of the Paiton I model PPA. Regardless the delivery of power 2 4 , as long
as the plants are able to produce the electricity available to PLN, PLN is obligated to pay
fixed capacity charges. The energy payments, on the other hand, are payable based on
the actual amount of power delivered to PLN.
1. Capacity Component A
Component A provides for debt service requirements, Indonesian taxes, and the
return on equity to sponsors. The capacity charge rates of component A are as follows:
1) Step 1 (Year 1-6) : Rp. 1,092,596 per kW-year
2) Step 2 (Year 7-12) : Rp. 1,065,816 per kW-year
3) Step 3 (Year 13-30) : Rp. 553,439 per kW-year
124 but subject to the plant availability
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Component A is protected in US Dollars term against exchange rate fluctuation by
indexation factors linked to the Rupiah/US Dollar exchange rate; there is, however, no
inflationary increase to this component. The actual value of this component is dependent
on the plant availability according to an annual availability schedule agreed upon in the
PPA. The average annual contracted availability over the 30-year term of the PPA is
83%. If actual availability is less than the contracted level, the component will be
proportionally reduced. However, if actual availability exceeds the contracted level, a
bonus payment of 50% of the incremental value of the component will be given to PEC.
2. Capacity Component B
Component B is set to recover the estimated fixed operation and maintenance
costs that are not dependent on the amount of the electricity generated, such us insurance,
O&M management, and certain labor costs. The capacity charge rates of component B
consist of a local element (Rp. 38,830 per kWh in 1998) and a foreign element (Rp.
38,830 per kWh in 1998). In other words, the foreign element is approximately 50% of
the total value of component B. The local and foreign elements are protected against
inflation rate risk by indexation factors linked to changes, after 1998, in the Indonesian
consumer price index and in the US consumer price index respectively. The foreign
element is protected against exchange rate fluctuation by indexation factors linked to the
Rupiah/US Dollar exchange rate. The total value of component B is adjusted for actual
availability compared to contracted availability in the same way as that for component A.
-78-
3. Energy Component C
Component C is the fuel component, which is calculated, based on the price of
Primary Supply Coal125 (PSC) to be renegotiated annually. The price utilized in the PPA
for calculation during 1997 was Rp 71.126 per kg, which would be adjusted on the first
business day of 1997 to the extent the Rupiah/US$ exchange rate on that day differs from
the PPA agreed base exchange rate of 2,038 Rupiah per US Dollar. After 1997, the coal
price should be re-determined annually. The portion attributable to foreign currency
costs, estimated at 60% of the coal price, is protected against exchange rate fluctuation by
indexation factors linked to the Rupiah/US Dollar exchange rate. The total value of
component C would be adjusted for the variance in actual specific heat rate compared to
the agreed value of specific heat rate at contract capacity, which is 2,447 kcal/kWh. In
the case of a coal supply force majeure event, the coal price and specific heat rate with
respect to the Qualifying Alternate Coal 26 (QAC) will apply.
4. Energy Component D
Component D is to recover the variable operation and maintenance costs of the
plants such as spare parts, chemicals, and other consumables. The variable O&M charge
rates of component D consist of a local element (Rp. 4.356 per kWh in 1998) and a
foreign element (Rp. 1.452 per kWh in 1998). In other words, the foreign element is
approximately 25% of the total value of component D. The local and foreign elements
125 Primary Supply Coal means all coal acquired from BHP pursuant to the Fual Supply Agreement,
provided that in the case of BHP's failure to supply such coal, then Primary Supply Coal shall be the coal
supplied under a modified coal supply plan, which is conditional of PLN's approval pursuant to the PPA.
126 Qualifying Alternate Coal means coal which has quality and chemistry characteristics within
ranges set forth in the PPA available for delivery to the plants in case the Primary Supply Coal, for certain
reasons, is not available.
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are protected against inflation by indexation factors linked to changes, after 1998, in the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) of Indonesia and the US. The foreign element is protected
against exchange rate fluctuation by indexation factors linked to the Rupiah/US Dollar
exchange rate.
3.6.2. Terms of Payment
The tariff payments are denominated and made monthly in Rupiah. As previously
mentioned, certain portion, if not all, of each tariff component is protected against
currency exchange rate movement. With respect to this portion, the amount of Rupiah to
be paid by PLN is determined based on the rate at which PEC is able to enter into foreign
exchange contracts to convert this Rupiah amount into US Dollars. PEC's expense to
settle the contracts is also reimbursed by PLN. In the case that PEC, after a specified
period of time subject to certain condition set forth in the PPA, is unable to enter into
such foreign exchange contracts, PLN ultimately becomes obligated to pay the agreed
portion in US Dollars. As a result, this mechanism fully protects the foreign currency
portion of PEC's tariff components from both exchange rate fluctuation risk and foreign
exchange availability risk, transferring all these risks to PLN.
3.6.3. Force Majeure
Events of force majeure are conditions that are out of the reasonable control of the
affected party. Under the PPA, these events include acts of war, insurrection, violent
demonstration, acts of god, employee strikes or lockouts, governmental action, and a coal
supply force majeure event, among others. While the occurrence of force majeure events
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affecting PEC may reduce payments to PEC, such events do not relieve PLN from
meeting its payment obligations under the PPA. In the case of the occurrence of certain
force majeure events that are not normally insured results in a material delay in
completion and causes material damage to the plants, PEC and PLN should enter into
good faith negotiations regarding tariff adjustment.
In the case that force majeure events affect PLN's ability to receive electricity
from the plants or such events are resulted from governmental action affecting PEC's
ability to deliver electricity to PLN, PLN will remain obligated to make capacity
payments to the extent that PEC would have been able to deliver without such
occurrence.
In the case of coal supply force majeure event, PLN is remain obligated to make
capacity charges to the extent that PEC is required to limit output as a result of using
QAC, or PEC is unable to obtain QAC because of PLN's unapproval, or PLN fails to
deliver coal pursuant to its obligation under the PPA. If a disruption in the supply of
Primary Supply Coal is the result of a Coal Supply Force Majeure Event, not resulting
from a default by any party to any coal-related contracts, the price of QAC would be fully
passed to PLN.
3.6.4. Tariff Adjustments
Under the PPA, tariff components should be adjusted following the occurrence of
a triggering event resulting in material cost or saving to PEC. Such adjustments provide
PEC with the same net, after-tax economic return, as if such costs had not been incurred
and savings realized. Triggering event means: 1) a change in the interpretation or
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application of Indonesian law resulting in environmental requirements different from
those initially agreed in the PPA, 2) other changes in Indonesian law (including changes
relating to taxes, duties or levies), 3) any governmental actions which delay the
equipment and supplies import, or 4) PLN's unexcused delay or default in performing its
PPA obligations resulting in delay in project completion.
3.6.5. Dispute Resolution
Under the PPA, disputes between PLN and PEC, if cannot be settled by mutual
discussions, would then be referred to a single expert (to be appointed by the
International Chamber of Commerce's International Center for Expertise in the event
PEC and PLN cannot agree to an expert).
Disputes that cannot be settled by mutual discussions, and referral to an expert is
not required or elected by the parties, would be resolved by arbitration in Stockholm,
Sweden under the UNCITRAL Rules of International Arbitration. In the arbitration, each
party would appoint an arbitrator who would then jointly appoint the third arbitrator. The
international arbitration decision would be final, binding, and un-appeal-able.
3.7. The Current Situation127
3.7.1. Economic Overview128
The Asian monetary crisis of 1997-1998 brought severe impacts to the Indonesian
economy. The exchange rate of the Indonesian Rupiah to the US Dollars depreciated
127 As of January 2001, the final write-up of the thesis
128 CIA, "The World Factbook 2000: Indonesia".
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sharply and was continuously volatile. To illustrate, the exchange rate prior to the crisis
was hovering around Rp. 2,500 per US Dollar, while that during and after the crisis
fluctuated in the range of 8,000 to 10,000 Rupiah per US Dollar. In response to the fall
of the Rupiah, interest rates increased as high as 70%. Furthermore, in 1998, the real
GDP growth was estimated to have declined by 13.7%, the sharpest decline of any major
East Asian economy, while the inflation spiked up to over 70%.
In the wake of the crisis, the Indonesian economy stabilized in 1999. The real
GDP showed some growth in the second half of 1999, although for the overall year it
experienced a negative growth of -1.1%. The interest rates fell rapidly to the range of
10% to 15%. The high inflation was reduced to 2% by the GOI's implementing tight
monetary policy. Even though the GOI forecasted economic growth1 2 9 of 3.8% for fiscal
year 2000/2001, the continuing uncertainties with respect to overall long-term economic
growth would make it difficult for Indonesia to attract private investment in the near
future.
3.7.2. Political Overview 3
The instability of the Indonesian politics had further complicated the Indonesian
adverse economic condition. In 1998, Soeharto, the Indonesian President who had been
in power for more than three decades, stepped down following a reform towards
democratic and decentralized government. His vice president, Habibie, took over the
position and was in power only for a year, the transition period to an elected government.
Following, Abdurrahman Wahid, the elected president in 1999, had been a legitimate
129 Since the 1970s, the average of Indonesian annual economic growth had been 7%.
130 CIA, "The World Factbook 2000: Indonesia".
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president during the wake of the crisis, not to mention that, similar with the previous two
governances, his governance was confronted by critics and challenges from opposition.
The allegation of cronyism and corruption in the bureaucracies is one of the critical issues
to be resolved.
In addition, Indonesia experienced political turbulence following the religious
ethnic conflicts, the alleged human right violations by the military, and the growing
pressures for independence in certain regions such as Aceh"' and Irian Jaya112 .
Following the 30 August 1999 referendum in which most of the people of East Timor
chose to be independent, the independent status of East Timor was formally established.
In short, the GOI was confronted by the spread of violence as well as separatist
movement, the challenges to be resolved if the country is to realize stability in economics
and politics.
3.7.3. The Electricity Industry
The Indonesian economic downturn significantly reduced demand for exported
products and internal consumption. A large number of industries slowed down and
stopped their operations, resulting in a considerable decline in electricity demand. The
optimistic scenario of a 19%-24% annual increase in electricity demand projected earlier
in the 1994 National Electricity Plan turned out to be only the average of 14%133. Table
3.6 shows the projected and the actual demand during 1994 to 1999 fiscal year.
131 Aceh is an oil ans gas rich province in north Sumatra, which is located in the strategically
important Strait of Malacca.
132 Irian Jaya is a copper and gold rich province in eastern Indonesia, the country border between
Indonesia and the Papua New Guinea.
133 Taufiqurohman, M., Wenseslaus Manggut, Jalil Hakim, "Mengapa Listrik Swasta Jadi Masalah?
(Why do private power producers create problems?)", Tempo, 24 September 2000, page: 117.
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Table 3.6: The projected and the actual demand in electricity, 1994-1999"
Year Projection (MW) % increase Actual (MW) % increase
1994/95 7,427 7,092
1995/96 8,823 19% 8,110 14%
1996/97 10,717 21% 9,228 14%
1997/98 12,084 13% 10,016 9%
1998/99 13,348 10% 9,982 0%
1999/00 14,671 10% 11,356 14%
2000/01 16,037 9% ? ?
Because of the Rupiah depreciation and the demand decline, the US Dollar term
and the magnitude of PLN's revenues (subsidized tariffs), which are earned in Rupiah,
dropped significantly. However, the take-or-pay nature of the PPAs would keep PLN to
remain obligated for making payments to IPPs, the payments of which accounted for the
majority of PLN's financial burden. While the exchange rate that actually materialized
during and after the Asian crisis was hovering around 8,000 to 10,000 Rupiah per US
Dollar, most of the PPAs were signed with the agreed base exchange rate being around
Rp.2,500 per US Dollar. With these large payment obligations and lost of revenues, PLN
faced an option of shutting down some of its own power plants to accommodate the
otherwise wasted IPPs-generated power13 5 . The severe financial constraints and the
dilemmatic problem to shut down its own plants led PLN to renegotiate the PPAs,
namely the IPP Contracts Rationalization program.
The renegotiation program was intended to discuss the PPAs on mutually
acceptable solutions in accord with the following considerations 136: 1) the economic and
social realities, and public acceptance, of the outcomes impacting on PLN and the GOI;
2) an electricity and demand balance consistent with good utility industry practices and
134 P.T. PLN (Persero), Transmission and Java Bali Control Center, March 30, 2000.
135 Taufiqurohman, M., Dewi Rina Cahyadi, I.G.G. Maha Adi, "Two Steps Forward, Three Steps
Back", Cover Story Tempo No. 29/XXIX/Sept. 18-24, 2000.
136 PT PLN (Persero), "Intention of PT. PLN (Persero) to Commence IPP Contracts Rationalization",
Press Release, Jakarta, December 22, 1998.
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system requirements; 3) legal rights and obligation of all parties; 4) Future private
investment and business climate in Indonesia. (PLN Press Release, 1998)
The renegotiation, which was formally started in February 1999, had obviously
been not as smooth as expected. For example, deals with two geothermal-based IPPs, the
60 MW (of 95 MW total) Dieng project and the 4x55 MW Patuha project 3 7 , ended up in
International Arbitration (IA), which then required PLN to pay the IPPs US$ 572
million13 8 in damages for PLN's failure to honor its obligations139. Similarly, Florida
Power and Lights Co., the majority owner of the Karaha Bodas geothermal power plant
in West Java sued PLN for suspending its project 4 0 . Surprisingly, despite the agreed
upon dispute resolution stating that the decision of the international arbitration is final,
binding, and unappealable, the Central Jakarta District Court annulled the arbitration
rulingl4' following PLN's filing the lawsuit142 . Indeed, even if the arbitration decision
were to be followed, PLN cannot afford the obligated payments. As a result, as
demonstrated by these cases, the agreed upon international arbitration mechanism had
failed to provide a mutually acceptable solution for both private and public parties.
137 According to MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co. (formerly known as CalEnergy Company )of the
US, the majority owner of the Dieng project and the Patuha project, when the disputes were filed, the
Patuha project had began construction of an 80 MW power generation unit at its Patuha plant and had
developed proven geothermal resources of at least 170 MW (the Jakarta Post, May 1999)
138 US$ 391.7 million for Himpurna California Energy, the project company of the Dieng project, and
US$ 180.5 million for Patuha Power Ltd., the project company of the Patuha project.
139 The Jakarta Post, "PLN ordered to pay U.S. company $572m in damages", May 06, 1999.
140 In 1997, the GOI announced that of the 27 signed PPAs, only 10 were permitted to proceed.
Those 10 are Pare-pare, Salak (4,5,6), Sengkang, Paiton 1, Paiton II, Dieng (1,2,3), Wayang Windu,
Amurang, Sibolga A, Tanjung Jati B. (Source: PLN).
141 of the Dieng and Patuha project
142 The Jakarta Post, "Court annuls arbitration ruling against PLN", July 23, 1999.
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3.7.4. The Paiton I Project Status
Regarding the unfavorable condition especially with respect to the Asian crisis,
although the Paiton I plants had been completely built and ready for operation, PLN had
not allowed the plants to start the operation, and PLN had made only a small partial
payment of PEC's initial invoices. In line with the renegotiation program, in March
1999, PLN invited Paiton I to renegotiate. Through a letter dated April 22, 1999, PEC
stated that it had agreed to sign the Confidentiality Agreement (CA) as a requirement to
negotiate; however, in August 1999, PEC objected to sign the CA. Instead, PEC sent a
notice of dispute to PLN in August 18, 1999. PLN viewed the issuance of this notice as a
breach of an agreement in July 26, 1999 meeting whereby PEC agreed not to issue any
dispute notice under certain requirements, which had been fulfilled by PLN. In
September 1, 1999, PEC cancelled the dispute notice following the discussion of
requirement for having a Standstill Agreement. Since the requirements were viewed by
PLN as burdensome and not in accord with PLN's public accountability, the discussion
stalled; as a result, in September 27, 1999, PEC re-issued a dispute notice again. (PLN
Press Release, 1999).
In several meetings during October 1-4, 1999, the 30-day discussions under the
dispute notice were postponed from October 5 to October 8, 1999. A meeting in October
6, 1999 was not formally held following PEC's refusal to agree on CA, which had been
previously enforced during the October 1-4 discussions. In accord with the renegotiation
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intentions mentioned earlier, several main concerns that have been discussed include the
following 143:
1) PLN's public accountability under the prevailing social and economic condition
of Indonesia.
2) The actual supply and demand of electricity indicating that the Paiton I-generated
power was, at that time, unnecessary.
3) The Paiton I project cost that is perceived as relatively high if compared to other
IPPs in the country1 44, resulting in a high PPA payment obligations of PLN to
PEC. In other words, the Paiton I project was considered too expensive for the
country.
Despite the discussions, there had been allegations that the high project cost was
the result of cronyism and corruption practices during the Suharto regime. For example,
Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan (BPKP), the state-owned supervisory
board on monetary and development, indicated that the mark-up on the Paiton I project
reached US$602 million, which is 41% of the Paiton I US$ 2.5 billion total project
cost 45. Indeed, there had ever been critics by members of parliament on the price of the
Paiton 1146, the matters of which, after a long time of silent, eventually rose again. While
the Paiton I project with the capacity of 2x615 MW cost a total of US$ 2.5 billion, the
total cost of the 3x660 MW Guangzou project in China is US$ 1.9 billion, and the total
143 These three concerns were synthesized from the author's review of various press releases as well
as other publicly available documents.
144 The Paiton I project would produce significantly more expensive power than PLN does. Thomas,
Eapen, "A Beautiful Place to Develop", Infrastructure Finance, April/May 1995.
145 Taufiqurohman, M., Wenseslaus Manggut, Jalil Hakim. "Dapatkah PLN Lolos dari Jepitan
Paiton?", Tempo, 24 September 2000. p. 117.
146 The Jakarta Post, "PLN Criticized over Pricing of Private Electricity", November 29, 1994; The
Jakarta Post, "PLN Under Fire for Cooperation", February 14, 1995.
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cost of the 2x609 MW Sual project in Pengasinan, Philippines is US$ 1.4 billion147. A
2100 MW power plant, the biggest power plant project in Malaysia, located in Pulau
Lekir was expected to be fully operational by September 2003 with the estimated total
cost of US$ 1.84 billion'48.
Apart from all the allegations, the discussions between PEC and PLN were unable
to reach agreements on the concerns mentioned earlier. Therefore, in October 7, 1999,
PLN149 filed a lawsuit (to the Central Jakarta District Court) contesting the validity of the
Paiton I PPA. In the suit, PLN argued that the contracted electricity price was above
international standards as a result of bribery to politically well-connected people in
Indonesia. An audit, conducted in late 1999 by a Canadian engineering and construction
company SNC-Lavalin Group, priced the Paiton I EPC cost at US$ 1.033 billion (with a
+ 20% tolerance), sharply lower than the EPC Cost of US$ 1.772 billion cited by PEC 5 .
This audit was to be a key evidence in PLN's lawsuit against PEC; however, before PLN
was able to present its case in court, President Wahid demanded PLN to withdraw the
147 Taufiqurohman, M., Wenseslaus Manggut, Jalil Hakim. "Dapatkah PLN Lolos dari Jepitan
Paiton?", Tempo, 24 September 2000, page: 117.
48 Asian Power, "Malaysia Market Report: Restructure, Reform, and Reward", Asian Power,
March/April 2000.
149 Reasoning that the material of the lawsuit is questioning the validity of the PPA rather than
resolving any problems related to the content of the PPA, PLN argued that bringing the case to the
Indonesian national court, instead of International Arbitration, was the right approach since the
international arbitration is a dispute resolution for any problems related to the content of PPA, which is
NOT the case in this matter.
150 Taufiqurohman, M., Dewi Rina Cahyadi, I.G.G. Maha Adi, "Two Steps Forward, Three Steps
Back", Cover Story Tempo No. 29/XXtISept. 18-24, 2000. See also Solomon, Jay, "Indonesian Audit
Uncovers Inflated Cost of Power Plant", The Wall Street Journal, December 26, 2000.
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case15 1. On January 20, 2000, the lawsuit was withdrawn; since then, the dispute
resolution was to be pursued out of the court 5 2
On February 21, 2000, PEC and PLN executed an Interim Agreement (IA)
pursuant to which the PPA would be administered pending a long-term restructuring of
the power purchase agreement15 3 . The IA provided fixed monthly payments to PEC by
PLN, the first of which was received on March 24, 2000, and the standstill of any further
legal proceedings by either party during the IA's term, which run through December 31,
2000 and may be extended by mutual agreement 5 4.
Dr. Hartojo Wignjowijoto 15, the President Director of the Asian Pacific
Economic Consultancy Indonesia, viewed that the Interim Agreement did not provide a
long term and sustainable approach; instead, it only deferred the payment obligation of
PLN 56. In his argument, he presented his two perceptions. His first perception is that
the main missions of foreign investors and international financial institutions in private
electricity business is to gain as much profit as possible by developing two aspects: 1)
political pressures through the gigantic power of the US after the cold war, and 2)
increase leverage during contract negotiation by utilizing financial, legal, and technical
consultants, as well as insurance scheme, among others. His second perception was that
151 Taufiqurohman, M., Dewi Rina Cahyadi, I.G.G. Maha Adi, "Two Steps Forward, Three Steps
Back", Cover Story Tempo No. 29/XXIX/Sept. 18-24, 2000. See also Solomon, Jay, "Indonesian Audit
Uncovers Inflated Cost of Power Plant", The Wall Street Journal, December 26, 2000.
152 President Director of PLN, Adhi Satriya, and Director of Planning of PLN, Hardiv Situmeang
stepped down because of their disagreement with Wahid's approach to resolve the Paiton I problems out of
court settlement.
153 Edison International, "Edison International Announces Interim Agreement on Paiton Power
Plant", March 2, 2000. http://www.prnewswire.com
154 Ibid
155 Hartojo Wignjowijoto holds a PhD in Economics from Harvard University. He served as a
chairman and a senior economist of the Asian Pacific Economic Consultancy Indonesia.
156 Wignjowijoto, Hartojo, "The Roles of Foreign Investors and International Financial Institutions in
Electricity Sector," Session 1: The Roles of International Financial Institutions in Public Investments,
Jakarta, Seminar: Private Power Projects, Indonesian Corruption Watch in cooperation with PLN's Labor
Organization, October 12, 2000.
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the regulations in Indonesia had been crafted to catalyze discretionary behaviors 157, rather
than legal-based behaviors, of governmental actions. Based on these two perceptions, he
viewed the IA of the Paiton I as a tool providing PEC with necessary time to strengthen
its position and increase its leverage while gathering further support from the US as well
as Indonesian institutions5 .
Apart from all the allegations, even though the Paiton I project had all the
characteristics of a textbook finance case' 59 , the arrangements have been proved
inefficient and rigid as to be unable to provide long-term solution in the event the initially
anticipated situation changes sharply, the condition of which is likely to happen in
developing world.
3.8. Chapter Summary
The Paiton I project is an example of private foreign investments that turn sour in
times of crisis. Indeed, it is a perfect example of a well-crafted arrangement that provides
favorable terms and conditions to foreign investors for the purpose of providing the
investors with a stable financial return regardless the economic situation of the host
country. When the economic situation materializes to be sharply adverse, as perfectly
illustrated by the Asian crisis, a lot (emphasis added) of agreements need to be
renegotiated. This phenomenon shows that the current practices have been somewhat
flawed as to be too rigid and inflexible.
157 Discretionary behaviors depend on the level of intelligence as well as honesty of decision makers.
"5 According to Wignjowijoto, the honesty of the Indonesian high level government officials-
including the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Mines and Energy, and the President Director of PLN-
with respect to the private electricity business had been questioned.
159 Lang, Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998.
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With respect to IPP projects, the risk sharing arrangement embodied in PPA
contracts should be appropriately allocated. PPA contracts should not be imbalanced as
to transfer to public parties most of the risks with a great deal of uncertainties. The
analysis of the Paiton I project would lead to a proposed modification of the current PPA
model. Even though the renegotiation mechanism itself is beyond the scope of this
thesis, a proposed renegotiation approach to achieve a long term commercial solution-
for project of similar problems-is developed to a certain extent. The later chapters
would try to provide the answers, hopefully, to the level of our expectations.
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Chapter 4: Project Risks Analysis
4.1. IPP Project Risks: Theoretical Background"
The key to successful project finance is risks management. Project risks should
be properly assessed, allocated, and mitigated. The first step is to identify project risks
(and the risk sources, if possible) that may exist in a particular project; then, the roles and
responsibilities16 1 of each project participant should be determined to figure out which
party is in the best position to manage each type of risk. The next step is to allocate and
mitigate the risks among parties via contractual agreements and hedging tools. The
remaining risks left after the mitigation stage should be distributed to the project
participants with mutually acceptable arrangements. Risks that cannot be allocated can
still be ameliorated by the selection of proper credit enhancement and monitoring
methods162.
Project risks can be grouped into two broad categories, commercial risks and non-
commercial risks or policy risks163 , as follows:
1) Commercial risks consist of project-specific risks and broader economic
environment risks. Project-specific risks are risks related to the development,
construction, operation, and maintenance aspects of the project, including
identifying a market for the project output, while economic environment risks are
10 Synthesized from Ruster, Jeff, "Mitigating Commercial Risks in Project Finance", Public Policy
for the Private Sector, The World Bank Group, February 1996; International Finance Corporation, "Project
Finance in Developing Countries", Washington, D.C., 1999, pages: 38-58; Lang, Larry H.P.,"Project
Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998, pages: 78-79.
161 Subchapter 2.2 discussed the roles and responsibilities of project participants typically involved in
an IPP project , while subchapter 3.4 discussed those of the Paiton I project.
162 IFC, "Project Finance in Developing Countries", Washington, D.C., 1999.
163 Ibid
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risks related to interest rate changes, inflation, currency risk, energy price risk,
and all other risks beyond the control of the project sponsors that have a direct
impact on the project.
2) Non-commercial risks consist of political risks including project-specific policy
risks, and other uncontrollable events not included in political risks. While
project-specific policy risks are risks arising from the actions of host government
or public entities that materially affects the project (i.e. expropriation, regulatory
changes, and failure of the government or public entities to perform contractual
obligations), political risks are the project-specific policy risks and other
uncontrolled political insecurities such as acts of war and civil disturbance. The
other uncontrollable events such as acts of god and natural calamities, and
political risks, both categories are usually referred in contracts as force majeure
risks.
Another common approach to identify project risks is by grouping the risks based
on the project phases. Beidleman, Fletcher, and Vesbosky group risks in general project
finance into four categories, as follows1 64:
1) Development phase risks: technology risk, credit risk, and bid risk;
2) Construction phase risks: completion risk, cost overrun risk, performance risk,
and political risk;
3) Operating phase risks: performance risk, cost overrun risk, liability risk, equity
resale risk, and off-take risk;
164 For detail description of risks associated in general project finance, see Beidleman, Carl L., Donna
Fletcher, and David Vesbosky, "On Allocating Risk: The Essence of Project Finance", Sloan Management
Review, MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, Spring 1-9.
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4) On-going risks: foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, and inflation risk.
Either approach to grouping project risks, many project finance experts have
discussed these risks in great detail including the description of the appropriate hedging
tools to mitigate the risks and the mechanisms to ameliorate the remaining risks. The
thesis, however, discusses only the critical risks typically encountered in an IPP project
and the possible hedging mechanism, some of which are also familiar in general project
finance. Appendix 1 of this chapter provides matrix for project risks and possible
hedging tools for an IPP project.
4.1.1. Development, Design, Construction and Operational Risks
In the development stage, sponsors assess the project scope, seek approval from
governments and authorities, and make attempts to attract financing. In this stage, the
project sponsors are exposed to a high degree of risks since only their up-front capital is
used to finance the initial undertakings of the prospective project. Risks in this phase
arise usually because of unclear processes that may result in delays in project approvals
and may even lead sponsors to abandon an otherwise sound project'65. In this stage, the
primary concerns were bidding risk, financing risk, and approval risk. Bidding risk is the
possibility that the consortium might not win the project. Financing risk is the possibility
that the project might not be able to attract financing from lenders. Approval risk is the
possibility of opposition from both official and unofficial sources of the host country.
Mechanisms used to mitigate these risks are dependent on the sophistication of sponsors
in crafting their proposal. For example, to attract financing, sponsors might allow a
165 IFC, "Project Finance in Developing Countries", Washington, D.C., 1999.
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relatively high interest rate for loan and high equity return for risks that they perceive as
high when investing in developing world.
In the design stage, the main concerns are design risk and technology risk. Even
if the consortium wins the project, there is still a possibility that the project might not be
launched successfully because of unacceptable design (design risk) or unfamiliarity in
technology (technology risk). Sponsors hedge these risks by contracting the project to
contractors that have strong expertise and experience in undertaking similar projects.
The contractors hedge technology risk by using well-proven technology.
In the construction stage, the primary concerns are completion and cost overrun
risks. Completion risk is the risk of unable to complete the project on time while cost
overrun risk is the risk that the actual construction cost becomes unexpectedly higher
than the estimated cost. Delay in completion may lead to increases in interest costs and
construction costs, resulting in construction cost overruns. Also of major concern is plant
performance risk, which is the risk of plant's failure to meet specification at completion.
In an IPP project, sponsors hedge these construction-related risks by entering into a fixed-
price, certain-date turnkey construction contract with contractors that have strong
expertise, experience, and reputation in constructing similar projects. The contract
usually includes provisions for liquidated damages that specify penalties if the contractor
fails to perform, and bonuses for better than expected performance. Project companies
also hedge the cost overrun risk by making available standby financing166 to ensure that
any unexpected costs would not jeopardize the project.
In the operational stage the main concerns are cost overrun risk and plant
performance risk. Cost overrun risk is the risk that the actual operating cost is
166 Standby financing may be provided by sponsors and/or lenders
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unexpectedly higher than the estimated cost while the performance risk is the risk of the
plant's failure to generate the amount of power agreed upon in the purchase agreement.
This failure may result in lower revenue as well as liquidated damages obligation.
During both construction and operational stages, the project faces force majeure
risk, which is the risk of project disruption because of uncontrolled events including acts
of war, public disorders, explosion, and natural calamities, among others. To hedge force
majeure risk-and also other on-going risks and unexpected events-, project company
seeks insurance, which can come from national agencies (such as OPIC of the US and
MITI of Japan), multilateral institutions (such as MIGA of the World Bank), or from
private insurance agencies.
4.1.2. Market Risks
Market risks (or usually referred to as the off-take risk) are the risk that the actual
revenue may not meet projected revenue. Market risks include demand risk and price
risk167. Demand risk is the possibility that the actual demand of the project output, which
is electricity, materializes to be far less than the projected demand, on which the
calculation of the revenue and profitability were initially based on. Price risk is the
possibility that the actual price of the project output-such as electricity-and the project
input-such as fuel and other supplies-vary significantly from projection as a result of
changes in demand for the project input/output as well as vulnerability of the world
market price.
167 Lang, Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998.
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Market risks can be hedged by using such mechanisms as power purchase
agreements, other off-take agreements, and call and put options. A long-term PPA can
well mitigate these risks. However, if an IPP enters into a PPA only with a single power
purchaser, for example a public electric utility, the reliance to a single purchaser is risky
considering the risk of the purchaser's default. Similar to a PPA, an off-take agreement
obligates the off-taker, which is often a sponsor, to purchase all or part of the project
output; such agreements could be to buy up to a certain amount per year at the prevailing
market price, buy enough to ensure debt payment, to provide foreign exchange for debt
service, or to reduce foreign exchange risk 68 . Other market risk hedging tools are call
and put options. A call option gives the project company the option to buy the plant
input, for example fuel, at a fixed price in the future while a put option gives the
company the option to sell its output, the generated power, at a fixed price in the future.
Another commonly used mechanism is the fuel price pass through embodied in the PPA
tariff structure, transferring the risk of fuel price fluctuation to the power purchaser 6 9
4.1.3. Economic Risks
Economic risks include currency risks, interest rate risk, and inflation risk.
Currency risks include currency convertibility/availability risk and exchange rate risk.
Exchange rate risk is the risk of exchange rate fluctuation affecting the magnitude of
local currency-denominated revenue with respect to the dollar-denominated payment
obligation. Convertibility/availability risk is the risk that the local currency cannot be
converted to the foreign currency, either because of unavailability of the currency
16 IFC, "Project Finance in Developing Countries", Washington, D.C., 1999.
169 In the Paiton I model PPA, the fuel price is renegotiated yearly; the fuel price fluctuation risk is
transferred to PLN.
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(availability risk) or because of government policy controlling the matter. Currency risks
can be mitigated by a number of mechanisms17 0 : mix local currency and foreign currency
loans, index output prices to the exchange rate171, swap currency, obtain contingency
sponsor support, establishing an escrow account, and obtain government guarantee of
foreign exchange availability.
Interest rate risk is the risk of unexpected increases in the interest rate during the
maturity period of the project loans. This risk can be mitigated using several
mechanisms 172: negotiate a fixed interest rate, borrow at a floating rate to take the
advantage of a later expected fall in interest rates, and swap interest rates.
Inflation risk is the risk of unexpected increases in inflation rate. The most
effective tool to hedge inflation risk is to sign long-term supply and output contracts with
price schedules173. Another commonly used mechanism is indexation factors linked to
changes in country's CPI.
4.1.4. Political Risks
Political risks are risks related to any government actions, either project-specific
or not, that could interfere the project, resulting in a loss or reduced profitability. Such
actions can be expropriation of project assets, changes in regulations, failure to perform
contract obligations, acts of war, and civil disturbance.
170 See IFC, "Project Finance in Developing Countries", Washington, D.C., 1999.
171 The hedging approach of indexing output prices to the exchange rate had been vulnerable if the
exchange rate changes dramatically, as demonstrated by the Asian Crisis. The government or other
contracting parties such as public utility was unwilling to honor the agreed upon indexing since it meant
passing the currency risk to customers in the form of electricity tariff increases.
172 See IFC, "Project Finance in Developing Countries", Washington, D.C., 1999.
173 Lang, Larry H.P., "Project Finance in Asia", Netherlands, 1998.
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Political risks, and other non-commercial risks, can be managed through insurance and
guarantees, which can come from national agencies (such as OPIC of the US, MITI of
Japan, and ECAs), multilateral institutions (such as MIGA), or from private insurance
agencies 174. The insurance policies usually include other unexpected events such as fire,
acts of god, and natural calamities, the risks of which, together with political risks, are
referred as force majeure risks. Even though insurance and guarantees are available in
private market, the government backing of multilateral and bilateral agencies enables
them to assume risk not acceptable to private insurers or guarantors; this kind of
insurance and guarantees are referred as indirect government guarantees 75 . Whatever the
source is, political risk guarantee is usually limited in its coverage, with the most
commonly available policies being to insure against inconvertibility of earnings, civil
disturbances, and expropriation'76
Therefore, the investors usually ask for government direct guarantees, which is
the government's financial responsibility under certain unexpected conditions. Such
guarantees include government assurances of contractual obligations with financial
responsibilities in the case of the responsible entities' default. For example, when foreign
investors enter into purchase agreements with a public entity, the government would be
responsible to make the agreed upon payments in case of the purchaser's payment
default.
174 For thorough explanation on insurers and guarantors, see Razavi, Hossein, "Financing Energy
Projects in Emerging Economies", Pennwell Books, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 1996.
175 Indirect government guarantees are explained subchapter 2.2. Roles and responsibilities of IPP
project participants: host government. Indirect government guarantees also include government treaties
and international treaties, which are agreements between the host government and the investors'
government(s) to assure political securities for the investors with respect to their investments in the
associated countries.
176 Wells, 1999
-100-
Despite involving international institutions mentioned above, attracting local
participants into the project may also help mitigating political risk. Such participation
can be in the form of sharing equity with local investors, borrowing from local lenders, or
entering into purchasing agreement for with local suppliers 177. Local interest in the
project is believed to significantly reduce political risk.
4.2. The Paiton I Project Risks
Following the explanation of the previous section about risks typically involved in
an IPP project, the following sections analyze the risks and hedging tools specifically
involved in the Paiton I project. Appendix 2 of this chapter provides the risk assessment
matrix and the hedging tools and/or mechanisms for remedy used in the Paiton I project,
while appendix 3 provides the detailed of those risks and hedging tools of the Paiton I
project.
4.2.1. Development, Design, Construction, and Operational Risks
1. Development Stage
Bidding risk, financing risk, and approval risk were assumed by project sponsors.
Bidding risk was moderate. Since only two consortia were participating in the
competition, there was a fifty-fifty chance that a consortium could win the project. This
risk, however, increased with the bidding process lacking competition and
178transparency' .
177 Razavi, Hossein, "Financing Energy Projects in Emerging Economies", Pennwell Books, Tulsa,
Oklahoma, 1996.
178 Subchapter 5.1.2 provides thorough evaluation of the Paiton I bidding process.
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Financing risk was somewhat greater for two reasons. First, even though equity
contributions from the sponsors were assured, debt financing was complicated by country
risk since the project was the first private IPP in the country without a sovereign
guarantee from the GOI. Second, the involvement of the first family might discourage
prospective lenders, which is the case with ADB'79, since the project might be put into
hold in case of government change.
Approval risk was high since the Paiton I project was the first IPP project in
Indonesia. The legal and regulatory framework was still in some respect incomplete18 0
while the approval process was long and complicated 8 1 . A number of ministries-other
than PLN and MME-had a strong interest in power projects, each of which had a
numerous layers of bureaucracies that have to be passed through before any binding
resolutions can be reached8 2 . Indeed, President Suharto's intervention was required
before any agreement could be reached' 83 . Despite the fact that one of BHP's roles was
to fulfill the GOI's requirement of at least 5% local shareholding, BIP 8 4 was expected
to reduce the approval risk; in other words, the sponsors utilized BHP's local network to
reduce the risk. In addition, the risk might also be reduced by the high support from the
179 ADB was actually considering a US$ 50 million loan to the project; however, they were cautious
about the Indonesian first family involvement in the project. (Frederick, 1994).
180 Gooding, Gregory, Debevoise & Plimpton, "Indonesia", Power in Asia, September 1995. A
review of the Paiton I project by the Frankfurt-based engineering firm Lahmeyer International stated that
"The government of Indonesia initiated development of Paiton prior to developing either of these [policy
and regulatory] frameworks" (Thomas, Eapen, "A Beautiful Place to Develop", Infrastructure Finance,
April/May 1995).
181 Gilbert, Edward P.,"Getting Around in Indonesia", Infrastructure Finance, April/May 1995.
182 Ibid
183 Ibid
184 The chairman of BHP was the brother in law of Suharto's daughter. He conducted several
meetings with Suharto to expedite the negotiations for the contract (ASWJ, February 14, 1994)
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US government throughout the negotiation process18 5; the US government was involved
in stressing the importance of the project 86
2. Design Stage
Both the design risk and the technology risk were low. The project company,
PEC, mitigated the risks by transferring the risks to the contractor consortium consisting
of Mitsui, Duke/Fluor Daniel, and Toyo. As previously mentioned, these contractors
have a strong experience and expertise in electric generating facilities worldwide. In
addition to providing design warranty , the contractors allocated segments of these risks
to suppliers, which also have a strong expertise, experience, and reputation. Furthermore,
both the design and technology used in this project are not new; both have been well
proven worldwide.
18 The Asian Wall Street Journal, February 14, 1994, stated that "Progress [on the pricing of Paiton
I] may have been helped by the January visit of three U.S. official delegations, including one led by
Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, which talked to Indonesian officials about Paiton." (Wells, 1999). See
also Peter Waldman and Jay Solomon, "US Deals in Indonesia Draw Flak", The Asian Wall Street Journal,
December 24, 1998.
186 The US Embassy in Indonesia gave extensive supports, especially to Mission, the US sponsor,
through meetings arranged with high-level GOI officers. Ambassador Barry, the US Ambassador at that
time, advocated continuously with various Ministers and Ministries. When negotiation appeared to be
stalled, the Embassy arranged for a visit of the Indonesian Paiton Power Purchasing Negotiation Team to
the US to meet with officials from the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and State, and USEXIM. In
addition, Secretary Brown sent letters to decision makers, and made a phone call in support of the project to
help pushing for final agreement (http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/advocacy/Mission.html).
187 The contractor warrants that the portion of the work constituting the design and engineering of the
facilities will be free from defects and deficiencies, will be suitable for the purpose intended, will be in
accordance with standards of care and diligence, will conform to the construction contract and generally
accepted utility industry codes and standards (Confidential Circular Offering, 1996)
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3. Construction Stage
Site availability risk was low. PLN, with the consent of the GOI, occupied the
Paiton I site, and granted PEC the right to use the site'88 . PLN would also supply power
and other utilities during construction at applicable tariff rates 89 .
PEC allocated completion risk to the contractors by entering into a turnkey
construction contract with a certain completion date'90. The contractors, in turn,
allocated segments of completion risks to the subcontractors and suppliers. The
completion risk was considered moderate because even though the contractors and
suppliers had a good reputation in constructing and servicing power plants worldwide,
there was still certain risk of hidden conditions that may cause delay. The contractors
were also entitled to an extension of the schedule of work in the case of changes
requested by PEC, other PEC's delay or failure to perform its non-payment obligations,
and force majeure events.
PEC hedge completion risk by having liquidated damages provisions embodied in
the construction contract, obligating the contractors to make certain payments to PEC for
certain delays in completion not excused by force majeure. However, if the contractors
successfully completed the Net Dependable Capacity (NDC) Tests prior to the required
completion date, a bonus in the amount of US$ 325,000 per day'' would be payable by
PEC to the contractors. However, if the contractors failed to complete the NDC test prior
to the required completion date, the contractors should make liquidated damages in the
188 Confidential Offering Circular, 1996
189 Ibid
190 The plants should be ready for commissioning by May 21, 1999, the COD.
191 For each day from and including the date on which the contractors completed the Net Dependable
Capacity Tests to but not including the required commission date. (Confidential Offering Circular, 1996)
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amount of US$ 575,000 per day for each day the NDC test for both units were completed
late192
Similar to completion risk, cost overrun risk was considered moderate as well.
PEC hedged this risk by having the turnkey contract arranged on a fixed price basis193 . In
addition to insurance coverage' 94, sponsors provided stand-by financing in the amount of
US$ 300 million' 95 for use in case of unexpected circumstances. A group of commercial
lenders also provided a contingent standby facility in the amount of US$ 93,750,000196
The contractors were also entitled to an increase in the fixed sum in the case of changes
requested by PEC, other PEC's delay or failure to perform its non-payment obligations,
and force majeure events.
Another concern was plant performance risk prior to COD. This risk was
considered low because the project used established design and technology. In addition
to plant general warranties provided by PEC'97 , PEC imposed liquidated damages
payable by contractors for lower than expected performance' 98 .
192 Confidential Offering Circular, 1996
193 PEC agreed to pay a fixed price of US$ 1,772,300,000.
194 PEC was obligated to obtain and maintain insurance policies that cover against physical loss of or
damage to permanent and temporary works under construction, including materials and equipments.
Additional insurance coverage includes cargo insurance, legal liability insurance, and automobile liability
insurance (Confidential Circular Offering, 1996).
195 The US$ 300 million consists of US$ 175 million overrun equity and US$ 125 million contingent
overrun equity. (Confidential Offering Circular, 1996)
196 This facility is available for funding 75% of cost overruns after the US$ 175 million overrun
equity provided by project sponsors is fully utilized.
197 The contractors warrant the work not included in the design warranty and the equipment and
materials used in the work, except that the equipment and materials must be new according to the quality
specified in the construction contract unless otherwise provided by PEC.
198 If the contractors failed to demonstrate that the facilities were in compliance with the requisite
emissions limits with respect to S02 air emissions, the contractors agreed to pay PEC liquidated damages
in the amount of US$ 750,000 for each MW by which the net electrical output must be reduced to comply
with the emission limits (Confidential Offering Circular, 1996).
The contractors agreed to pay PEC liquidated damages in the amount of US$ 5 million for each
MW by which the net electrical output of a Unit falls below 615 MW and US$ 130,000 for each kilo joule
per kWh that the heat rate exceeds 10,088 kilojoules per kWh (Confidential Offering Circular, 1996).
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4. Operational Stage
Cost overrun risk was considered moderate. PEC mitigated this risk by entering
into operation and maintenance agreement with a fixed lump sum fee of US$ 15,000,000
(payable in monthly installments) during the pre-commercial phase' 99, and an annual base
fee of US$ 3,250,000 (payable in monthly installments) after the COD.
Plant performance risk was moderate. PEC imposed bonuses and/or penalties to
the operator for higher and/or lower than expected performance respectively with respect
to the target annual availability factor200. Furthermore, the operator was entitled to a
compensation adjustment in the event that a change in law or other events occur-
thereby increasing or decreasing the operation and maintenance cost to the operator-and
PEC was entitled to an adjustment in tariff pursuant to the PPA.
Another concern was also the operator's performance, which is the possibility that
the operator might not meet quality standards because of lack of technical and/or
managerial skills. Having Mission O&M Indonesia, which had experience in operation
and maintenance of similar plants worldwide, as the plant operator, would minimize this
risk. Moreover, the obligations of the operator, Mission O&M Indonesia, were
guaranteed by its parent company, MOMI.
Coal supply risk was minimal since the coal was provided from reliable coal
reserves in Tutupan area in South Kalimantan. As mentioned earlier, BHP would supply
'9 After the commission date of unit 7 but prior to COD, PEC would pay the operator a fee of US$
135,417 per month.
200 The bonus payments for performance in excess of the target availability factor would be equal to
20% of the bonus payment received by PEC under the PPA, payable on an annual basis. If the annual
availability factor is less than the target availability factor, the operator is responsible for a penalty in the
amount fo 10% of the shortfall in revenues derived from capacity component A pursuant to the PPA
(Confidential Offering Circular, 1996).
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the coal pursuant to the Fuel Supply Agreement201 entered into with PEC, and BHP
would purchase the coal from Adaro, the coal mining company, pursuant to the Coal
Purchase Agreement202. Adaro has the right to mine coal in the Tutupan area pursuant to
the Coal Cooperation Agreement entered into with TBA. As previously mentioned, with
respect to CCA, the GOI issued a coal support letter.
4.2.2. Market Risks
Demand and price risks of the project output were considered moderate. With
respect to demand risk, while PEC might have relied on the Indonesia's optimistic
projection of 19%-24% annual increase203 in electricity demand, the actual increase
materialized to be far more less than the projection, with the average of 14%. With
respect to price risk, PEC might have relied on the possible increase of PLN's electricity
tariffs to the consumers. These tariffs were regulated and subsidized by the GOI.
Unfortunately, PLN was unable to measure and track the level of financial support
actually provided by the GOI; besides, extensive cross-subsidies were embedded in the
tariff structure204 . Therefore, relying on tariff increase projection is very risky.
PEC transferred demand and price risks to PLN using the take-or-pay PPA that
obligated PLN to buy the plant's entire output for the 30-year contract period. The take-
or-pay mechanism set forth in the PPA obligated PLN to pay fixed capacity payments
consisting of component A and component B, irrespective of dispatch but subject to the
201 Under the term of FSA, BlHP would supply coal of 750,000 tons to 1.3 million tons quarterly, and
3 million tons to 4.5 million tons annually.
202 Adaro agreed to dedicate 130 million tons of coal, which satisfies the coal characteristics in the
FSA.
203 The 19%-24% annual demand increase was the projection in the 1994 National Electricity Plan.
204 Price Waterhouse LLP, "Review of Indonesian Power Sector Development Issues", Energy
Project Development Fund, USAID, May 1995.
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availability of the plants. Component A would cover debt service requirements,
Indonesian taxes, and the return on equity to sponsors while component B would cover
the fixed operation and maintenance costs that are independent of the amount of the
electricity generated. Under this arrangement, therefore, the revenues stream payable to
PEC were assured regardless demand condition and vulnerability of the electricity market
price. Most importantly, from the capacity payments, PEC would be able to cover its
basic responsibilities with respect to lenders, project sponsors, and operation and
maintenance of the plants. However, PEC's reliance to a single customer is risky since in
case of the customer's default, PEC's revenue streams would entirely put in a halt unless
alternative customer(s) could be identified.
Fuel price risk was considered moderate. PEC accommodated the fuel price
fluctuation by renegotiating the price with the fuel supplier on an annual basis. However,
PEC transferred this fuel price fluctuation risk to PLN through the pricing mechanism set
forth in the energy component C of the PPA tariff structure, passing this fluctuation risk
to PLN on a 100% basis.
4.2.3. Economic Risks
During the project inception, the currency exchange rate risk might be considered
moderate to low since the exchange rate of the Indonesian Rupiah to the US Dollar had
demonstrated a strong position; this position was projected to be steady in the near future.
However, since the Asian crisis, the Rupiah depreciated sharply and was continuously
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volatile 205 . PEC transferred the exchange rate risk to PLN by indexation factors being
linked to the Rupiah/US Dollars exchange rate and embodied in the tariff structure. The
tariff components that are protected against the exchange rate risk are the portions
attributable to the US Dollar cost, as follows:
1) The entire component A,
2) The foreign element of component B (approximately 50% of the total value of
component B),
3) The foreign element of component C (approximately 60% of the coal price), and;
4) The foreign element of component D (which is approximately 25% of the total
value of component D).
In other words, the foreign currency portion of the tariff components was protected
against the exchange rate risk on a 100% basis.
Currency convertibility risk was low because since 1983, the GOI had had no
currency controls and no limitations on holding or remittance abroad of foreign currency
by Indonesian persons or companies206. Most importantly, the Presidential Approval
Notification Letter (the "SPPP"), which served as the provisional license until a power
plant is commissioned, granted the project company the right to convert Rupiah into
foreign currency and to remit foreign currency to the foreign investors' home countries;
this right should protect investors if the government imposes exchange controls in the
future207
205 To illustrate, the exchange rate prior to the crisis was hovering around Rp. 2,500 per US Dollar,
while that during and after the crisis fluctuated in the range of 8,000 to 10,000 Rupiah per US Dollar.
206 Gooding, 1995
207 Ibid
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Currency availability risk was considered moderate to high since there was a
possibility that the foreign currency needed might not be available. During the Asian
crisis, there were certain times when foreign currency availability was very limited. To
mitigate the currency availability risk, PEC would enter into foreign exchange contracts.
As mentioned earlier, PEC's expenses to settle the contracts is also reimbursed by PLN.
In the case that PEC-after a specified period of time and subject to certain condition set
forth in the PPA-is unable to enter into such foreign exchange contracts, PLN ultimately
becomes obligated to pay the agreed portion in US Dollars. In other words, PEC
transferred the availability risk to PLN.
Except for the USEXIM operation loan and the JEXIM tranche A loan, all of the
debt facilities were variable rate based loans. To mitigate the impact of changes in
interest rates on the floating rate debt, PEC entered into interest rate swap agreements.
Inflation risk was moderate to high. PEC transferred the inflation risk to PLN by
indexation factors being linked to changes, after 1998, in the CPI of Indonesia and the
US. The tariff components that are protected against the inflation risk are the component
B and component D that covered fixed and variable O&M cost respectively.
4.2.4. Political Risk
Change of law risk was moderate. Legal and regulatory regime to support
Indonesia private power were in certain respects incomplete; despite changes in law
specific to private power, there was possibility of law changes in other aspects (i.e.
environmental law) that may significantly affect the project. PEC was entitled to tariff
adjustments in the events of changes in law that materially reduces or increases PEC's
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costs. The adjustments would provide PEC the same net, after-tax economic return, as it
would have had in the absence of such events.
Country risk is risks related to political instability of the host country, either
within or out of the government's control, that materially affects the project. Such risks
include acts of war, civil disturbance, and violent demonstration, among others. Country
risk was considered moderate to high. The risk was included into force majeure events
provisions under the PPA. Such events do not relieve PLN from meeting its payment
obligations under the PPA. In the case that the occurrence of certain force majeure
events that are not normally insured results in a material delay in completion and causes
material damage to the plants, PEC and PLN should enter into good faith negotiations
regarding tariff adjustment.
Expropriation risk was low; expropriation action was unlikely to happen since the
GOI had taken no expropriation in the recent past. Even if the Paiton I project sponsors
were aware of nationalization case in Indonesia such as the nationalization of Indosat, an
ITT208-owned communications company in Indonesia in the late 1970s 209, the sponsors
seem to hold the assumptions that they have better bargaining position than the other
private investors. PEC mitigated the expropriation risk by having a strong local partner,
BHP, as well as attracting international lenders including OPIC, USEXIM and JEXIM,
among other lenders. The involvement of local partner as well as international
institutions is believed to reduce expropriation risk. Finally, the Indonesian Foreign
208 ITT = International Telephone and Telegraph
209 Wells, 1999
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Investment Law grants foreign investors the right to compensation in the event of
nationalization"".
The risk of purchaser's default was high. PLN's ability to meet its payment
obligations generally depended on its financial strength. As a public utility, PLN was
expected to meet both social and commercial objectives. A report stated that these
ambiguous objectives have led to a lack of accountability for commercially oriented
operations since inefficiencies were always be perceived as exigencies to fulfill PLN's
social mission21 . In other words, PLN's financial strength was questionable and likely to
be in an unhealthy condition. Even though the GOI issued a support letter to PEC, which
provided that the GOI would cause PLN to discharge its PPA payment obligation, the
letter was not a guarantee of payment and it did not indicate any financial responsibility
of the GOI in case of PLN's default; in case of disputes, the strength of the letter from
legal viewpoint remains unclear. Indeed, the risk of PLN's failure to perform its payment
obligations is high and certainly has a potential of creating problems.
Overall, force majeure risks, which include the above political risks as well as
other uncontrollable events such as acts of god and natural calamities, were assumed by
PLN under certain terms of PPA contracts. While the occurrence of force majeure events
affecting PEC may reduce payments to PEC, such events do not relieve PLN from
meeting its payment obligations under the PPA. In the case that the occurrence of certain
force majeure events that are not normally insured results in a material delay in
completion and causes material damage to the plants, PEC and PLN should enter into
good faith negotiations regarding tariff adjustment. In the case that force majeure events
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210 Gooding, 1995
211 Price Waterhouse LLP, 1995
affect PLN's ability to receive electricity from the plants or such events are resulted from
governmental action affecting PEC's ability to deliver electricity to PLN, PLN would
remain obligated to make capacity payments to the extent that PEC would have been able
to deliver without such occurrence. In sum, in most, if not all, of the cases, PLN would
remain obligated either under the tariff adjustment resulted from negotiations or the
capacity payments under the PPA.
According to the best available information, even though PEC maintained
insurance policies 2 that cover against physical loss or damages to the maximum
foreseeable loss to the plants and special facilities, the thesis author was not aware of the
existence of any force majeure insurance arrangement that specifically protects PEC (and
the Paiton I project as a whole) against force majeure risks. Given the fact that the Paiton
I project is the first private IPP in Indonesia without a sovereign guarantee, it is risky to
exclude force majeure insurance arrangement.
Some lenders, however, arranged certain insurance to protect their loans against
political and commercial insurance. For example, JEXIM tranche B loan was insured for
political and commercial risk by MITI and Mitsui and the USEXIM credit facility that
consisted of loans funded by international syndicate of commercial lenders was
guaranteed against certain political risks by USEXIM on a 100% basis of the loans'
principal amount.
212 PEC was obligated to obtain and maintain insurance policies that cover against physical loss of or
damage to permanent and temporary works under construction, including materials and equipments.
Additional insurance coverage includes cargo insurance, legal liability insurance, and automobile liability
insurance (Confidential Circular Offering, 1996).
213 MITI provides political risk insurance on 97.5% of the principal amount of the tranche B loan.
The commercial risk covers 95% of the principal amount of the tranche B loan (provided 75% by MITI and
20% by Mitsui) in case of PLN's default to fulfill its payment obligations under the PPA.
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4.3. Chapter Summary
The Paiton I project is a well-crafted textbook project arrangement. Ahnost all
risks were mitigated, providing the project company with high securities over the project
assets, especially the project's revenue stream. The major risks of an IPP, which include
market risks, currency risks, and force majeure risks, were mitigated by transferring all of
these risks to the state-owned utility. Such arrangements are vulnerable given the fact
that the utility itself did not have a strong financial health to accommodate such a high
level of risks. Indeed, the Paiton I project is risky without the GOI's guarantee and, as far
as the author is concerned, without force majeure risk insurance. When the crisis
occurred, the arrangements of the project company's transferring risks to the financially
unhealthy state-owned utility, proved to be ineffective arrangements, which eventually
led to another kind of instability. Chapter 5 further analyzes the ineffectiveness of such
arrangements.
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Appendix 1: Project Risks and Possible Hedging Tools for Independent Power Producers
Project Project Risks Definition Reasons Hedging Tools/ Participants providing Hedge
Phase I Mechanism for Remedy
A. Develo ment, Design, Construction, Operation and Maintenance Risks
Development Bid Risk the risk of unable to win the project unclear scope feasibility study, clarification of RFP sponsors
unclear evaluation criteria well-crafted proposal
Financing Risk the risk of unable to attract financing high uncertainties viability analysis sponsors
well-crafted proposal
attractive financial return
Approval Risk the risk of difficulties in getting permits, licenses, and conditions on approval feasibility study sponsors
approval for the project official/unofficial sources good working relationship with government
lengthy approval process clarification of procedures
Design Design Risk the risk of unable to launch the project succesfully design uncertainty experienced EPC contractors sponsors
due to unacceptable design design warranty EPC contractors
Technology Risk the risk of unable to launch the project succesfully technology uncertainty experienced EPC contractors sponsors
due to unacceptable technology use well-proven technology EPC contractors
Construction Site Availability the risk of unavailability of the project site official/unofficial sources land use agreement authorities on the site
Contractors performance the risk of inability of the contractors to construct lack of experience experienced EPC contractors sponsors
the project successfully within contractors' control penalties/bonuses EPC contractors
out of contractors control insurance insurance agency
Delay in Completion the risk of unable to complete the project on time within contractors' control certain date construction contract EPC contractorspenalties/bonuses
owners change order equitable adjustment on schedule project owner
hidden ground conditions stand-by financing lenders/sponsors
Cost Overrun the risk that the actual construction cost is within contractors' control fixed-sum turnkey contract EPC contractors
unexpectedly higher than the estimated cost penalties/bonuses
insured events insurance insurance agency
uninsured events stand-by financing lenders/sponsors
hidden ground conditions stand-by financing lenders/sponsors
Supply the risk of unavailability of supply items including within contractors' control supply agreement suppliers
building material, raw material and other supply fuel supply agreement
items such as power, coal, and other utilities power supply agreement
Plant Performance the risk of the plant's failure to meet specifications equipments' failure plant performance tests EPC contractors
at completion. within contractors' control plant general warranties
penalties/bonuses
insurance insurance agency
Contractors Default the risk of contractors' failure to continue abandonement of the work Irrevocable letter of credit EPC contractors
performing their obligations under the contract insolvency, bankruptcy parent companies' guarantee EPC contractors' parent companies
Force Majeure the risk of project disruption because of uncontrolled insured force majeure events force-majeure insurance Insurance agency
events including acts of war, public disorders, uninsured force majeure events stand-by financing lenders/sponsors
explotion or natural calamities, etc. remediable events project restoration sponsors/EPC contractors
non-remediable events negotiation, contract termination project parties
Operation Operators performance the risk of inability of the operator to perform lack of experience experienced O&M Operator sponsors
Maintenance the operation and maintenance obligations out of operators control insurance insurance agency
Repair successfully within operators control penalties/bonuses O&M Operatortraining program equipment suppliers, technical advisors
Cost Overrun the risk that the actual operating cost is within operators control penalties/bonuses O&M Operator
unexpectedly higher than the estimated cost changes in regulation tariff adjustment power purchaser / sponsors
operators compensation adjustment sponsors
uninsured events stand-by financing lenders/sponsors
insured events insurance insurance agency
Fuel Supply the risk of unavailability of fuel for the operation within suppliers control long-term fuel supply contract fuel supplier
of the plant out of suppliers control obtain other sources of fuel otherfuel suppliers
Plant Performance the risk of the plant's failure to generate the equipments failure plant general warranties equipment suppliers
amount of power agreed upon in the purchase within operators control monitoring and maintenance O&M Operator
agreement penalties/bonuses
out of operators control Insurance Insurance agency
Transportion of project output the risk that the electricity generated cannot be long-term transportation contract tranportation company
transported/transmitted to the market other means of transportation arrangement sponsors
Operators default the risk of operators failure to continue abandonement of the work contract termination sponsors
performing obligations under the contract insolvency, bankruptcy parent companies' guarantee O&M Operators parent companies
1
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Appendix 1: Project Risks and Possible Hedging Tools for Independent Power Producers (Continued)
Risk Project Risks Definition Reasons Hedging Tools/ Participants providing Hedge
Matrix Mechanism for Remedy
Force Majeure the risk of disruption of the plant operation because insured force majeure events force-majeure insurance insurance agency
of uncontrolled events including acts of war, public uninsured force majeure events tariff adjustment power purchaser / sponsors
disorders, explotion or natural calamities, etc operator's compensation adjustment sponsors
remediable events project restoration sponsors/O&M Operator
non-remediable events negotiation, contract termination project parties
B. Market Risks
Electricity Demand the risk that the actual demand of the project output demand vulnerability take or/and pay power purchase agreement power purchaser or off taker
is less than the projected demand other off-ake agreements sponsors/multibuyers
Electricity Price the risk of electricity price fluctuation market price vulnerability a put option sponsors/power purchaser
power purchase agreement power purchaserFuel Price the risk of fuel price fluctuation market price vulnerability tariff adjustment, fuel price pass through sponsors / power purchaser
C. ____ _ __ Risks__ _long-term fuel supply agreement fuel supplier
C. Economic Risks
Currency Exchange Rate Risk the risk of depreciation or appreciation of the local mix local and foreign currency loans sponsors, lenders
currency to the foreign currency exchange rate index output prices to exchange rate sponsors, purchasers
match currency of project loans to project revenue sponsors, lenders
swap currency financial institutions
establishing an escrow account financial institutions
Foreign Exchange Availability the risk of non availability and non convertibility changes in regulation obtain government guarantee of government
and Covertibility of foreign currency availability of foreign exchange
mix local and foreign currency loans sponsors, lenders
obtain contingency sponsor support sponsors
establishing an escrow account financial institutions
Interest Rate the risk of unexpected Increase or decrease in negotiate a fixed interest rate sponsors, lenders
the interest rates during the maturity period of the borrow at a floating rate to take sponsors, lenders
project loans advantage of later rate fall
swap interest rates financial institutions
Inflation Rate the risk of unexpected increase or decrease in long-term supply contract suppliers
inflation rate output prices indexed to inflation sponsors, power purchasers
D. Political Risks
Law and Regulatory the risk of unexpected changes in law and regulatory changes In law and regulation good working relationship with government sponsors
that materially affects the project government guarantee government
Country Risk the risk that unexpected events occur because of country's business feasibility study sponsors
imperfections of the country's business environments political risk insurance public or private insurance agency
environment direct government guarantee government
indirect government guarantee government, multilateral and bilateral agencies
government treaties host government and sponsors' government
Purchaser's Default the risk that the power purchaser is unable to sell to creditworthy purchaser sponsors
fulfill its payment obligation under certain power not creditworthy purchaser government guarantee government
purchase agreement uncontrolled events tariff adjustment sponsors / purchasers
good faith negotiation sponsors / purchasers
contract termination sponsors
Expropriation the risk that the government for some reasons government action participation of local sponsors and suppliers sponsors, suppliers
takes over the possession of the project borrowing from local lenders sponsors, local lenders
political risk insurance public and private insurance agency
involve multilateral development bank or sponsors, international lenders
other international agency in financing
government treaties host government and sponsors' government
Appendix 2: Risk Matrix for the Paiton I Project
Project I Project Participants Assuming the Risks
Phase Categories of Risk Evaluation Project company Leders Governent EPC Contactors MOperator Fuel supier Power Purchaser Hedging Tools MechanismstRemedy
I I PEC I Gol kwsson O&M BH-PPL
A. Development, DesIgn, Construction, Ope ation and Maintenance
Development Bid Risk Moderate X R well-crafted proposal feasibility study
local sponsors network
Financing Risk High X well-crafted proposal viability analysis
attractive financial return
Approval Risk High X R good working relationship local sponsors network
US govts support in the negotiation
Design Design Risk Low X experienced EPC Contractors feasibility study
design warranty
Technology Risk Low X experienced EPC Contractors use well-proven technology
Construction Site Availability Low R X land use agreement PLN grants PEC the site use
Contractors' Performance Low X experienced EPC Contractors construction contract
performance warranties
insurance
Delay in Completion Moderate X certain-date construction contract penalties/bonuses
equitable adjustment on schedule
PPA contract termination by PLN
Cost Overrun Moderate X fixed-price construction contract equitable adjustment on price
equity standby financing
insurance
Supply of Power Low X applicable tariff payable to PLN
and Other Utilities
Supply of Coal prior to COD Low X reliable coal reserves long-term fuel supply agreement
government coal support letter coal-supply plan
qualifying alternate coal obtain coal from other sources
Plant Performance Moderate X plant performance tests penalties/bonuses
plant general warranties
insurance
Contractor's Default Low X X irrevocable letter of credit contract termination
parent companies' guarantee
Force Majeure X R X project restoration, equitable adjustment
contract termination
Operation Operator's Performance Low X experienced O&M Operator O&M contract
Maintenance insurance training program
Repair Cost Overrun Moderate X X pre-commercial: fixed-lump sum fee penalties/bonuses
commercial: fixed monthly fee operators compensation adjustment
good utility practice tariff adjustment
insurance
Supply of Coal Low X reliable coal reserves long-term fuel supply agreement
government coal support letter coal supply plan
Plant Performance Moderate X good utility practice penalties/bonuses
plant general warranties maintenance and monitoring
insurance
Operators Default Low X X parent companies' guarantee contract termination
Force Majeure X R X X PLN's PPA payment obligation project restoration, tariff adjustment
I I_ I_ I Irenegotiation, contract termination
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Appendix 2: Risk Matrix for the Pafton I Project (Continued)
Project I Project Participants Assuming the Risks
Phase Categories of Risk Evaluation Project Company Lenders Govermwnt EPC Contractors Operator Fuel St4 pwser Power Purcheser Hedging Tools Mechanisms
I I I PEC GOI Mleion O&M BO-P PLN
B. Market Risks
Electricity Demand 1Moderate X fixed capacity payment obligation take-or-pay PPA
(components A and B)
Electricity Price Moderate X fixed capacity payment obligation take-or-pay PPA
(components A and B)
Fuel Price Increase Moderate X fuel price pass through tariff adjustment (component C)
annual price renegotiation
C. Economic Risks
Currency Exchange Risk High X price indexed to exchange rate tariff adjustment
Foreign Currency Availabilit High R X foreign exchange contracts foreign exchange contracts and the
and Convertibility remaining risks will be on PLN's expens
Interest Rate High X fixed interest rates on loans
swap interest rate agreements
Inflation Rate High X price indexed to Inflation rate tariff adjustment
D. Political Risks
Law and Regulatory High R X tariff adjustments
Country Risk High X R X PLN's PPA payment obligation project restoration, tariff adjustment
renegotiation, contract termination
Purchaser's Default High X X provisions in the PPA good faith negotiation
-govemment support letter dispute resolution: arbitration
Expropriation Low X X R participation of local sponsor compensation
involvement of ECAs and other
international financial institutions_
Notes X = The main project participant(s) who assume the associated risks
R = The party who is responsible for Legal and Regulatory Framework: the Government of Indonesia
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Appendix 3: Project Risks and Hed ging Tools for the Palton I Project
Project Risks Evaluation Remarks Reasons Hedging Tools/Mechanism Participants providing Hedge
A. Development, Design, Construction, and Operation Risks
Development Bid Risk Moderate Lack of competition and transparency unclear scope feasibility study PEC
US Government's high support In the negotiation unclear evaluation criteria well-crafted proposal
unclear bidding procedure local sponsors network
Financing Risk High ADB's concern of the first family involvement high uncertainties viability analysis PEC
well-crafted proposal
attractive financial return
Approval Risk High The first private power project: no prior experience conditions on approval good working relationship with government PEC
in laws and regulatory enforcements lengthy approval process local sponsors network
Laws and regulations for private power projects
are not fully developed
Design Design Risk Low The EPC contractors have a lot of experience in experienced EPC contractors PEC
designing similar power plants worldwide design warranty EPC contractors
Technology Risk Low The technology used have been well-proven worldwide well-proven technology EPC contractors
for example: GE's technology
Construction Site Availability Low PLN occupies the land with the consent of GOI land use agreement PLN
PLN grants PEC the right to use the site
Contractors Performance Low The EPC contractors have a lot of experience in experienced EPC contractors PEC
constructing similar power plants worldwide performance warranties EPC contractors
insurance insurance agency
Delay in Completion Moderate commercial operation date: May 21, 1999 within contractors' control certain date construction contract EPC contractors$325,000 bonus per day for early completion penalties/bonuses payable to EPC contractors PEC
payable from PEC to EPC Contractors owners change order equitable adjustment on schedule PLN
$575,000 penalty per day for late completion PPA contract termination by PLN
payable from the contractors to PEC
Cost Overrun Moderate stand-by financing: within contractors' control fixed-price construction contract EPC contractors$300 million of contingent overrun equity by sponsors owners change order equitable adjustment on price PLN$93.75 million of standby facility by commercial lenders insured events Insurance insurance agency
uninsured events stand-by financing PEC
hidden ground conditions stand-by financing PEC
Supply of Power and Other Utilitie. Low PLN Is responsible for the provision of power and other tariff payable to PLN PLN
utilities during construction at applicable tariff rate
Supply of Coal Low BHP acts as coal supplier under fuel supply agreement within suppliers control long-term fuel supply agreement BHP
suppliers failure government coal support letter
obtain coal from other sources
Plant Performance Moderate S02 air emission limits, minimum net electrical within contractors' control emission test, performance guarantee test, EPC contractors
output, maximum net heat rate, net dependable NDC test, and reliability test; each test
capacity (NDC) imposed liquidated damages payable to
PEC up to a certain limits
Equipment and Materials plant general warranties
Design and Engineering out of contractors' control insurance insurance agency
Contractors Default Low suspension/abandonment of the work, failure to irrevocable letter of credit EPC contractors
perform obligations, insolvency/bankruptcy etc. parent companies' guarantee EPC contractors' parent companies
Force Majeure acts of war, public disorders, explosion or natural remediable events equitable adjustment on price and schedule PEC
calamities, certain strikes, certain actions by the GOI, non-remediable events contract termination
certain termination of the PPA.
Operation Operators Performance Low The O&M Operator has a lot of experience in doing experienced O&M Operator PEC
Maintenance operation, maintenance, and repair of similar insurance insurance agency
Repair power plants worldwide training program O&M Operator
Cost Overrun Moderate within operator's control pre-commercial: a fixed lump-sum fee O&M Operator
commercial: a fixed monthly fee
penalties/bonuses
out of operators control insurance insurance agency
change in law or other events tariff adjustment PLN
operators compensation adjustment
Supply of Coal Low BHP acts as coal supplier under fuel supply agreement within suppliers control long-term fuel supply agreement BHP
BHP purchased the coal from Adaro under coal purchase suppliers failure government coal support letter
agreement; Adaro had the mining right in the Tutupan Area obtain coal from other sources
under coal cooperation agreement with TBA I
I
Appendix 3: Project Risks and Hedging Tools for the Paiton I Project (Continued)
Project Risks Reasons Hedging Tools Participants providing Hedge
Plant Performance Moderate bonus payment equal to 20% of PEC's bonus from PLN within operator's control penalties/bonuses O&M Operator
for performance in excess of the target availability maintenance and monitoring
factor plant general warranties O&M Operator
penalty Is equal to 10% of the shortfall in revenues Insurance insurance agency
derived from capacity component A
Operators Default Low suspension/abandonment of the work, failure to parent companies' guarantee O&M Operators parent companies
perform obligations, insolvency/bankruptcy etc. contract termination '
Force Majeure acts of war, insurrection, violent demonstrations, acts remediable events equitable adjustment on price and schedule PEC
of god, employee strikes or lockouts, failures to act non-remediable events tariff adjustment PLN
without justifiable cause by any instrumentality of up to certain limits project restoration O&M Operator
the Republic of Indonesia contract termination
B. Market Risks
Electricity Demand Moderate demand vulnerability take or pay Power Purchase Agreement PLN
(fixed capacity payment obligation)
Electricity Price Moderate market price vulnerability take-or-pay PPA PLN
Fuel Price Increase Moderate fuel price vulnerability tariff adjustment: fuel price pass through PLN
(component C)
annual price renegotiation PLN/BHP
C. Economic Risks
Currency Exchange Rate High prices indexed to exchange rate PLN
(tariff adjustment)
Foreign Exchange Availability High foreign exchange contracts PLN
and Covertibility
Interest Rate High fixed interest rates on loans PEC, lendersinterest rate swap agreements
Inflation Rate High index output prices to inflation PLN
I I_ I I I (tariff adjustment)
D. Political Risks
Law and Regulatory High changes in law and regulatior tariff adjustment PLN
Country Risk High country's business feasibility study PEC, lenders
environments local sponsors network
Purchasers Default High PLN's default PPA, government support letter PEC, lenders
renegotiation, international arbitration
Expropriation Low government action participation of local sponsors and suppliers PEC, lenders
involvement of ECAs and otherinternational financial institutions
L~J
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Chapter 5: Analysis on The Paiton I Project Deal
5.1. IPP Best Practice Analysis on the Paiton I Deal
Following the explanation in subchapter 2.4 about key success and best practice
for IPPs, the following sections provide the analysis of the Indonesian IPP program
related to the Paiton I project. The analysis covers the themes in subchapter 2.4: 1) the
legal and regulatory framework, 2) procurement process, and 3) power purchase
agreement.
5.1.1. The Indonesian Legal and Regulatory Framework
At the time the GOI initiated the development of the Paiton I project, the
Indonesian legal and regulatory framework for private power were not developed. A
review of the Paiton I project by Lahmeyer International, a Frankfurt-based engineering
firm, for the Directorate General for Electricity and Energy Development in December
1993, prior to the completion of negotiations between the GOI and the BMMG
consortium, stated that "the GOI initiated development of Paiton prior to establishing
either of these [policy and regulatory] frameworks".
Based on the the best practice features for legal and regulatory framework for
private power outlined in subchapter 2.4.1, the Indonesian frameworks can be evaluated
as follows:
1) The GOI did not have a clearly stated long-term framework for its private power
program. The GOI initiated the development of private power producers to
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answer the power shortage in the early 1990s. At that point, the GOI viewed the
process of defining comprehensive legal and regulatory frameworks for long-term
private participation in the power sector as unnecessary when the power capacity
was desperately needed by the country.
2) The GOI did not provide legal and regulatory frameworks in adequate detail.
Even though the GOI somehow issued regulations specific to private power such
as the Presidential Decree Number 37 of 1992214 and the Minister of Mines and
Energy (MME) Decree Number 2 of 19932, these regulations constitute more of
216
an outline than a detailed regulatory regime
3) The set of laws and regulations established to support the Indonesian private
power was incomplete. Prior to initiating the Paiton I project, the GOI had not
published a complete list of the permits, licenses, and the GOI consents that were
required to develop a power project.
4) The approval process to develop a private power plant was long and complicated.
The developers had to pass through numerous layers of bureaucracies before any
agreements can be reached.
5) The social and commercial objectives of the power sector were not clearly
separated. PLN as a public entity was expected to perform these two objectives
214 Several important features of the Presidential Decree 37/1992 are that the decree: 1) provides that
the development of private power projects is to supply electricity directly to PLN "where PLN cannot
satisfy the demand for electricity", 2) states that BOO delivery method is the government's preference for
the private power projects, 3) authorizes the Ministry of Mines and Energy to be responsible for regulating
private power industry, 4) obligates private power producers to be responsible for their own fuel supply,
prohibiting transferring the responsibility to PLN, 5) mandates that top priority should be given to domestic
fuel suppliers. (Gooding, 1995).
215 Several important features of the MME Decree 2/1993 are that the decree: 1) outlines the
negotiation procedures and evaluation criteria for both solicited and unsolicited private power projects, 2)
provides that imported fuel supplies can be used only with the approval of the Minister of Trade, upon the
advice of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, 3) Establishes the licensing system applicable to private power
producers (Gooding, 1995)
216 Gooding, 1995.
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simultaneously. The result was that while PLN could not function as a
commercially viable entity working under a set of commercial targets,
inefficiencies became an excuse for fulfilling its social objectives.
6) The GOI did not maintain a healthy power purchaser. PLN's financial condition
was not strong enough to accommodate IPPs on a take-or-pay basis. The
financial strength was vulnerable because of PLN's lack of control over its costs
and assets2 17 as well as the PLN's two conflicting objectives mentioned above.
Moreover, the effect of the GOI's financial support was difficult to assess because
of PLN's inability to measure and track the level of financial support actually
provided by the G012 18.
7) Security over project assets that applied fairly to all project participants was not
available. For example, the GOI did not clearly specify its preferred allocation of
sovereign risks including the risk of PLN's default; instead of providing a
guarantee, the GOI issued the letter of support whose status is unclear in case of
disputes. If the GOI's intention was not to provide a guarantee, instead of issuing
such an ambiguous support letter, the GOI should have clearly stated its
unwillingness to provide the guarantee. While the GOI's letter of support was not
a guarantee, the efforts by PEC to provide high level of security to the project by
transferring major risks to PLN turned out to be unfair for PLN.
8) There were no policies encouraging the development of domestic capital markets
and institutions and diversifying the sources of domestic capital for equity
investment in electricity projects.
217 Price Waterhouse LLP, 1995.
218 Ibid
-123-
Overall, during the inception of the Paiton I project, the legal and regulatory
framework specific to private power projects were not fully developed, thereby creating
uncertainties to the private participants. Because of these uncertainties, the PPA was
crafted in such a way that provides high level of securities to the project sponsors,
including the take-or-pay PPA mechanism.
5.1.2. The Paiton I Project Procurement Process
The procurement process for the Paiton I project did not considerably follow the
best practice features in the procurement process outlined in section 2.4.2. The major
inefficiencies of the Paiton I project procurement process can be synthesized as follows:
1) The GOI had not yet prepared comprehensive bid documents when the bids for
the Paiton I project were solicited in 1990219. Instead, the GOI issued a Terms of
Reference, which was also incomplete; it did not cover important issues such as
risk allocation, environmental standards, and tariff and payment mechanisms.
Drafts of PPA were issued only five days before the bid submission date. The
lack of the GOI's preparation also contributed to the long process of bid
solicitation.
2) The Paiton I project was supposed to be a solicited project; however, the bidding
process reflected the process for an unsolicited one since the project scope was
not a government-defined scope, but the participant-defined scope. Even though
the GOI provides the basic requirements for the project-i.e. the project was for
two units coal-fired power plants, located in the Paiton complex, etc-they lacked
219 Lahmeyer International, "Final Report: Lessons learned from Paiton One", Recommendationsfor
Improving Indonesia's Private Power Program, Volume 1, November 1993.
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in specifying the minimum requirements for the project. Therefore, the private
participants crafted their bidding documents based on their own definition of
project scope, which was obviously different from one consortium to the other
consortium. The lack of a government-defined scope, as a result, provided no
standard criteria for the government to base the proposal evaluation.
3) The evaluation criteria, if there actually were, did not assure a head to head
competition among bidders. There was no apple-to-apple comparison framework
on financial and technical qualifications because the GOI themselves lacked the
minimum requirements for the project. Since the GOI had no standard framework
that can serve as a base line to evaluate the proposals, the GOI simply put the
proposals (of the only two consortiums participating in the bidding process) side
by side and tried to assess which proposal was better than the other. However,
conducting such assessment on a fair basis was certainly very difficult, if not
impossible. Indeed, the government did not have comparison standards since the
proposals were actually crafted for projects that were entirely different from one
bidder to another bidder according to their own perceived set of project scope.
4) There were no pre-qualification process-whereby the prospective bidders submit
information concerning their technical capabilities and financial strength.
Lahmeyer International reported that no such pre-qualification was done in the
case of Paiton 2 .
5) The bidding process was not transparent. Even though the process might have
been announced publicly, the details were negotiated in secrecy. The fact that
220 Lahmeyer International, "Final Report: Lessons learned from Paiton One", Recommendationsfor
Improving Indonesia's Private Power Program, Volume 1, November 1993.
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during the negotiation process, the chairman of BHP intensively held several
meetings with Soeharto to discuss about the project provides the evidence of this
lack of transparency. Indeed, the procurement was not an open tender procedure,
the problem of which caused Dennis de Tray from the World Bank to send a
warning letter to the Minister of Mines and Energy at the end of 19972
Moreover, the GOI's changing decisions by initially awarding the project to the
BNIE consortium but eventually awarding it to the BMMG consortium is an
evidence that the overall procurement system itself was not reliable and
predictable.
6) No benchmarking by an independent engineering peer to ensure cost-effective
development. Despite the facts that competition was minimal and there was no
objective and rigorous bid evaluation, the procurement system did not ensure a
cost-effective development. For bid evaluation purpose, the GOI did not set up a
benchmarking mechanism by independent engineers to, at least, ensure that the
project cost offered by bidders reflects the market price and is not exceptionally
high if compared to other projects with similar size and capacity.
Overall, the procurement system conducted for the Paiton I project did not
encourage competition, transparency, and cost-effective development. Such system
would unlikely be sustainable unless the GOI would like to fear potential investors in the
future.
221 As previously mentioned, the chairman of BHP was closely related to the Suharto family.
222 Taufiqurohman, M., Wenseslaus Manggut, Jalil Hakim, "Perjalanan Proyek Paiton I?"(The
Chronology of the Paiton I Project), Tempo, 24 September 2000, page: 120.
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5.1.3. The Paiton I Model Power Purchase Agreement
The Paiton I model PPA somehow did not fully reflect the best practice features
outlined in subchapter 2.4.3 of the thesis, with the following analysis:
1) The PPA did not use the wholesale electricity tariff-that is, the PLN's tariff to
the electricity consumers-as a basis to set up the tariff payable from PLN to PEC
for the Paiton I-generated power. Instead, the PPA used the project cost, the debt
service requirements, and the rate of return on equity as a basis to negotiate the
PPA tariff structure.
2) The Paiton I model PPA tariff structure did not promote competition for cost-
effective development towards competitive electricity markets. Instead, the
structure provides a high security for the project's revenue streams even under its
reliance on the purchaser's ability to take-or-pay payments.
3) The risks profile indicated an imbalanced risk sharing, with PLN being in the
position to assume currency risks, market risks, and force majeure risks. Indeed,
PLN's ability to manage the risks was in question and it is a doubtful proposition
that says that PLN was in the position to control the currency risks, market risks,
and force majeure risks.
4) Dispute resolution was clearly outlined in the Paiton I model PPA, with the
International Arbitration being the final dispute resolution. Despite the fact that
the International Arbitration is perceived as a neutral party between the contracted
parties, the arbitration's decisions imposing payment obligations to the public
utility were ineffective to be implemented especially in times of crisis since the
utility simply did not have the cash to make the payment.
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In short, the Paiton I model PPA provide high level of security to the project
sponsors by transferring some of the major risks to PLN. This arrangement was greatly
favorable to the sponsors. However, in times of crisis, this arrangement has proved
ineffective, as has happened during the Asian crisis. Even if PEC were to seek solution
through the International Arbitration, the effectiveness of the arbitration's decisions
obligating PLN to pay certain amount in damages-as was the case with the Dieng
project and the Patuha project mentioned earlier in subchapter 3.7.3-is in question since
PLN simply did not have the cash to make the payment. Therefore, while such investor-
friendly arrangements are viewed as inappropriate to a certain extent, the dispute
resolution also could not provide a mutually acceptable solution.
5.2. The Analysis of the Paiton I Project Arrangement
This subchapter analyzes the Paiton I project deal with respect to the take-or-pay
PPA tariff structure, the risks mitigation efforts, and the "mistakes" of IPPs in Indonesia.
These arrangements were proved ineffective when the Asian crisis occurred. This section
serves as a detailed explanation of the analysis covered in section 5.1.3 and provides an
answer to the concerns outlined in section 2.3.
5.2.1. The Analysis of the Paiton I PPA Tariff Structure
The thesis author developed a financial model to calculate the PPA tariff
components for the 30-year contract period223 . This analysis takes into account any
publicly available financial information of the Paiton I project and the author's
223 The financial analysis is further explored in chapter 7
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reasonable assumptions224 . Several findings can be synthesized out of the tariff
projections, as follows:
1) The Level of the take-or-pay is high.
The fixed capacity charges (component A and component B) that PLN
must pay irrespective of dispatch levels amounts to an average of 71% of the
projected total payment225, under the coal price US$ 34.9 per tons (= Rp. 71.126
per kg, the coal price allowance in 1997, with the base exchange rate Rp. 2,038
per US$). The average US dollar term of these capacity payments for the first six
years is US$ 573 million. This amount closely confirmed PLN's press release
stating the PLN's take-or-pay payment obligations of approximately US$ 598
million per year226. A 71% fixed capacity payment regardless the delivery of
power is considered high. When demand is weak, as was the case during the
Asian crisis, such amount would be wasted for power that was actually
unnecessary. PLN was "forced" to utilize the power, thereby reducing the
operation of its own plants to accommodate the otherwise-wasted power from the
Paiton I plants.
2) The Demand Projection is over optimistic.
The Availability Factor (AF) agreed upon in the PPA is 83%. This high
percentage reflects an optimistic projection of the electricity demand, which
means the power is so desperately needed that the plants should be in operation
224 Assumptions include percentage of annual increase in exchange rate movement prior and after the
Asian crisis, the inflation rate projection of Indonesia and the US, the actual exchange rate projection, the
discount rate, the fuel cost is estimated the same for the whole contract year.
225 A complete analysis is explored in the appendix 2 of chapter 7
226 Adnan Buyung Nasution & Partners, "PLN filed a lawsuit against Paiton Energy", Press Release,
October 7, 1999.
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for the whole year except during the repair and maintenance period. An 83% was
over optimistic given the demand that actually materialized to be far from the
projection. To illustrate, PLN's own power plants usually have approximately
60% to 75% availability factor 2 .
A high AF should lead to a lower tariff rate because of the economy of
scale that should have been realized. The higher the AF, the lower the electricity
price should be. However, this was not the case with the Paiton I project since the
Paiton I plants' tariff rate with the 83% AF was relatively high if compared to the
tariff rate of the PLN's power plants with the 60% AF. It was reported that
PLN's power plants were much cheaper and more efficient228.
5.2.2. The Analysis of the Risk Mitigation Efforts
Certain types of risks mitigation efforts of the Paiton I project had been proved
ineffective when the initially anticipated conditions change. Those ineffective efforts are
as follows:
1) The imbalanced commercial risks arrangements embodied in the Paiton I model
PPA that had been greatly ineffective in times of crisis,
2) The politically well-connected local participant that was initially intended to
reduce political risks, but eventually increased the political risks itself when the
government changed.
3) The international arbitration's decisions that fail to provide a mutually acceptable
solution to be implemented in times of crisis.
227 An exclusive interview with Dr. Situmeang.
228 Taufiqurohman, M., Dewi Rina Cahyadi, I.G.G. Maha Adi, "Two Steps Forward, Three Steps
Back", Cover Story Tempo No. 29/XXIX/Sept. 18-24, 2000.
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Louis T. Wells, in his paper on managing non-commercial risks for private
investment in infrastructure, viewed the problems, of which this thesis refers as
imbalanced risks arrangements, as "the efforts by private firms to shed commercial risks
[that eventually] lead to political risks for the investor"229
1. The Imbalanced Commercial Risks Arrangement of the Paiton I PPA
The major concerns of the private, especially foreign, investment in infrastructure
are market risks and economic risks. As previously mentioned, under the Paiton I PPA
tariff pricing mechanisms, all the market risks, which include the electricity demand and
price risks and the fuel price risk, are transferred to PLN. The demand and price risks
were hedged by the take-or-pay mechanism, and the fuel price fluctuation risk was
hedged by the fuel price pass through mechanism. The economic risks, which include
exchange rate risk, currency convertibility/availability risk, and inflation rate risk, were
also transferred to PLN. The exchange rate risk and the inflation risk were transferred by
indexation factors being linked to the Rupiah/US Dollar exchange rate and the countries'
CPI respectively, and the convertibility/availability risks were hedged by using the
foreign exchange contracts by which PLN became ultimately responsible, under certain
PPA terms, if such contracts were not available. In short, with respect to the types of
risks mentioned above, the project sponsors assume no risk 3 .
229 Wells, Louis T., "Private Investment in Infrastructure: Managing Non-Commercial Risk", Private
Infrastructure for Development: Confronting Political and Regulatory Risks, 8-10 September 1999, Rome,
Italy.
230 Only the foreign element of the tariff components was protected against exchange risk since the
local element obviously did not need such protection. Moreover, only component B and D were protected
against inflation rate risk; component A and C actually did not need inflation protection. Component A did
not need inflation protection since component A was intended to cover the capital costs, which had been
spent prior to the COD, and there would be no further expense with respect to component A. Component C
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Such PPA arrangements place PEC in a very secured position while PLN would
be in a disadvantage position when the risks actually became very significant. Indeed,
PLN is not the party who can control such risks: PLN was unable to control currency
risks while PLN's ability to control electricity demand was also doubtful. Unfortunately,
PLN was not sophisticated enough to provide hedging mechanisms to handle such a high
level of risks. As a result, PLN would likely need to pass the risks to its consumers by
increasing the electricity tariff rates. This effort would be very difficult in times of crisis,
not only because the purchase power of the consumers are weak during that time, but also
because such tariff increase would eventually lead into a political friction.
2. The politically well-connected local participant
PEC might have believed that the involvement of local participants, especially
with the inclusion of high-level politically well-connected people, would greatly reduce
political risks. The local participants were expected not only to help in obtaining and
negotiating the initial deals but also to defend the project in case any governmental
actions threaten the project (i.e. nationalization) or reduce profitability. Indeed, the
involvement of BHP as a local shareholder as well as a local fuel supplier had effectively
helped PEC in obtaining the initial deals. Since all issues relating to infrastructure
development were set by presidential decree and there was no system in place to make
decision without the president's approval, the president's decision is critical for the
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also did not need protection against inflation risk since the fuel price would be renegotiated annually and
therefore, the fuel price risk would be automatically transferred to PLN.
project approval23 1 . Through its politically well-connected chairman, BHP was reported
to hold several meetings with President Suharto232 to expedite the negotiations.
BHP functioned very well during the initial stage of the project development.
Unfortunately, when the government changed in 1998, the drawback of having a
politically well-connected participant materialized. Critics on the price of the Paiton 1233
that became silent during the Suharto regime raised again when Suharto was not in
power, with allegations that the high project cost of the Paiton I project being the result of
cronyism and corruption practices during the regime.
Louis T. Wells concluded that partners chosen for their political connections can
turn out to be liabilities when governments change. In addition, Wells argues that the
evidence that local partners do decrease political risk is a bit shaky2 5 . He cited a study
that showed that the chances of nationalization are higher for foreign projects with joint
venture partners than for the projects where the foreign investors held all the equity236.
In short, with respect to the Paiton I project, the politically well-connected local
participant, which might be chosen for their political connections and was initially
intended to reduce political risks, actually increased the political risks itself when the
government changed.
231 The Paiton I project would produce significantly more expensive power than PLN does. Thomas,
Eapen, "A Beautiful Place to Develop", Infrastructure Finance, April/May 1995.
232 The Asian Wall Street Journal, February 14, 1994.
233 The Jakarta Post, "PLN Criticized over Pricing of Private Electricity", November 29, 1994; The
Jakarta Post, "PLN Under Fire for Cooperation", February 14, 1995.
234 Wells, 1999.
235 Ibid
236 David G. Bradley, "Managing Against Expropriation," Harvard Business Review, July/August
1977, pages 75-83. Problems that partners can cause with subsequent governments are dealt with in
Stephen J. Kobrin, "Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in the LDCs," International Organization,
Winter 1980 (Vol. 34, No. 1), pages 65-88. (Wells, 1999)
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3. The International Arbitration's decision
Even though International Arbitration was the agreed upon dispute resolution
under the PPA, the efforts of foreign investors to solve disputes in the International
Arbitration with respect to the public utility's default to perform obligations do not
always lead to best solution. The host government (and/or the public utility) often find
that the International Arbitration's decisions charging the public utility certain payments
in damages payable to the foreign investors to be unacceptable and very difficult to
enforce since the utility simply did not have the cash to make such payments. This
condition is perfectly illustrated by the experience mentioned earlier of the MidAmerican
Energy Holdings Co. with respect to the Dieng and Patuha project. So, it might not be
a coincidence that PEC agreed to pursue settlement out of international arbitration when
the renegotiation is inevitable.
Louis T. Wells assessed that the ineffectiveness of the International Arbitration's
decisions is because the value of arbitration in settling disputes has been so far limited to
interpretation of the letter of contracts238. In other words, International Arbitration limits
itself to the rigidity of the contracts agreed upon between parties, but it does not allow for
change. When the condition changes sharply and the initially agreed contract terms turn
out to be imbalanced and unable to satisfy the contracted party(s), the International
Arbitration would play a very useful if it allows changes that could be applied under the
prevailing economic conditions. Furthermore, the International Arbitration would play a
237 According to MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co. (formerly known as CalEnergy Company )of the
US, the majority owner of the Dieng project and the Patuha project, when the disputes were filed, the
Patuha project had began construction of an 80 MW power generation unit at its Patuha plant and had
developed proven geothermal resources of at least 170 MW (the Jakarta Post, May 1999)
238 Wells, Louis T., "Private Investment in Infrastructure: Managing Non-Commercial Risk", Private
Infrastructure for Development: Confronting Political and Regulatory Risks, 8-10 September 1999, Rome,
Italy.
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very useful role if it were available to handle conflicts over the appropriateness of the
contract terms2 3 9. Indeed, under the condition out of the Asian crisis, renegotiations are
inevitable; therefore, it would have been better if there is a mechanism that smooth
changes in contract terms instead of forcing the initial terms that are inappropriate under
such difficult condition.
5.2.3. The "Mistakes" of IPPs in Indonesia
Apparently, IPPs in Indonesia seem to make "mistakes" during the inception of
their projects. Such mistakes are with respect to the electricity market projection (the
projection of demand and tariff) and the IPPs equity arrangement.
1. Electricity Market Projection
1) Electricity demand is projected as a target, not a natural growth
At the time of the inception of the Paiton I project, the demand forecasting
was over optimistic within the range of 19% to 24% annual increase240. However,
the actual trend turned out to be the average of 14% annual increase, even before
the occurrence of the mid-1997 Asian crisis 241. Despite the fact that the natural
growth of electricity demand had actually materialized to be far from the
optimistic scenario, IPPs following the Paiton I project seemed to stick their
reference to the initial projection, not the one that actually materialized.
239 Wells, Louis T., "Private Investment in Infrastructure: Managing Non-Commercial Risk", Private
Infrastructure for Development: Confronting Political and Regulatory Risks, 8-10 September 1999, Rome,
Italy.
240 The 1994 National Electricity Plan
241 As shown in table 3.6, the actual demand increases were 14% in both fiscal year 1995/1996 and
1996/1997.
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Furthermore, IPPs might not have taken into account the boom of IPPs in
Indonesia that might eventually lead to a possibility of electricity overcapacity in
the near future, resulting in their plants might not be as necessary as initially
perceived.
2) Electricity tariff projection is a sole reference for the IPPs to assess the viability of
their tariffs to PLN
The IPPs refer solely to the projection of increase in PLN tariff to the
consumers. A World Bank study predicted a significant increase of the PLN
tariff; this increase was expected to exceed the Paiton I tariff after approximately
the first 8 years of operatio242. If the increase would not actually materialize, the
Paiton I tariff would significantly exceed the PLN tariff; as a result, PLN would
not be able to afford the Paiton I tariff.
To illustrate, the average PLN's electricity tariff to the consumers was Rp.
223 per kWh; with the exchange rate Rp. 7,000 per 1 US$, the tariff was
approximately US$ 3.2 cents/kWh2 43. However, the electricity tariffs that PLN is
obligated to pay under the PPA is estimated to be approximately US$ 8.5
cents/kWh for the first 6 years, US$ 8.3 cents/kWh for year 7 to 12, and US$ 5.5
cents/kWh for year 13 to 30244. PLN should increase its tariff significantly;
without an increase, PLN would not be able to afford the Paiton I power.
However, such increase would eventually lead into a political friction.
The reliance solely on the tariff projection is not sufficient. The IPPs
should also take into account the electricity purchase power of the various areas
242 World Bank Published Data
243 PLN Press Release, "Latar Belakang: Background", 1999.
244 Ibid.
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within the country. Even though some areas lacked of electricity, at the same
time, they cannot afford to buy it. To illustrate, the Java-Bali region experienced
electricity overcapacity while the other regions lacked the capacity and also
lacked the ability to pay for the electricity.
2. The Characteristics of the Equity Arrangement
1) The "debt-like" Equity Arrangement2
Louis T. Wells noticed that one of the most distinguished characteristics of
recent greenfield infrastructure investments is that the economic of many
arrangements look more like loans than like equity. According to Wells, the usual
equity arrangement outside infrastructure is strongly influenced by profits derived
as a function of market demand for the product or service, the resulting price that
can be charged, and the costs incurred by the investor in producing the product or
service. Furthermore, the amount of foreign exchange demanded by the investors
would vary with the profit and with the exchange rate. Therefore, for a project
whose output is sold locally, a local recession such as the Asian crisis, would
usually lead to a fall in demand, and therefore, a fall in profits and dividends, and
less demand for foreign currency exchange246. In short, in times of crisis, the
usual equity investors serving local market with local-currency-denominated
revenues would demand less foreign currency exchange.
245 For the origin of the concept, see Wells, Louis T., "Private Investment in Infrastructure: Managing
Non-Commercial Risk", Private Infrastructure for Development: Confronting Political and Regulatory
Risks, 8-10 September 1999, Rome, Italy.
246 The fall in demand for foreign currency exchange is even sharper since as the local currency
depreciated, the local currency-denominated profits would buy less foreign currency (Wells, 1999).
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Unlike the usual equity arrangement, the equity arrangements for
investments in infrastructure are more "debt-like" than "equity-like". Like loans,
the "debt-like" equity arrangement is denominated in foreign currency and is
unlikely to vary with economic conditions. Demand risk and/or foreign currency
risk are shifted away from the investors. As a result, in times of crisis, there will
be a little or no decrease in revenues, which are denominated in dollars. The
amount of foreign currency to be remitted abroad by the investors is fixed by the
agreements. Louis T. Wells confirmed that:
This is much like an arrangement under which the government simply
borrows in foreign currency to build the project; it would owe the lender a
fixed (say) dollar amount, regardless of the exchange rate and demand for
the output of the project (Wells, 1999).
Similarly, the equity arrangement of the Paiton I project was a "debt-like"
arrangement under the take-or-pay PPA obligating PLN to make fixed payments
regardless the country's economic condition and the demand condition for the
project output. As explored in previous sections, the impact of such arrangement
had been severe especially for the public utility.
2) The "loan-financed" Equity Arrangement of the Local Participant247
To facilitate the equity contribution of the Paiton I local partner (BHP),
the other three sponsors extended loans to BHP to be repaid out of BHP's
dividends from the project. Facilitating equity contribution by extending loan is a
common practice for power generation projects. Although BHP did not bring any
other expertise despite its coal supply expertise and local networks, BHP's shares
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in PEC was important for, at least, fulfilling the GOI's requirement as to the
minimum 5% of local ownership in the consortium.
The US Foreign Corrupt Practices states that it is illegal for US companies
to make direct (and certain indirect) payments to high-level public officials.
However, when the local participant-which was expected to help obtaining the
deals-includes a high level politically well-connected people, such arrangements
became vulnerable as to be alleged as "indirect payments" to smooth the project
deals. One might argue that this kind of arrangement is not "corruption" since the
recipient is not a government officer and the well-connected recipient would
eventually "pays" back the shares out of dividends from the projects. However,
the fact that the influential people eventually receive "free" shares is referred as
no more than a delayed gift, the benefits of which would accrue at some future
date, after the shares have generated enough dividends to pay off the "loan"24 .
Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain whether such delayed gifts are received or the
future paybacks actually accrue since even though the transaction is not secret, the
details were usually negotiated in secrecy.
In the case of the Paiton I project, such "loan-financed" equity
arrangement of BHP was suspected as a corruption practice. The US$ 2.5 billion
total project cost of the Paiton I project-which is perceived as high if compared
to other projects of similar size-have further fueled the allegations that the
equity-financing which consists of 27% of the total amount was actually
unnecessary; in other words, considering the fact that other projects of similar size
were much cheaper, one might argue that the US$ 1.82 billion debt-financing
248 Wells, 1999
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alone was considered enough to build the project. Apart from this factor,
however, the "loan-financed" type of equity arrangement, which was suspected as
a corruption practice, is widely believed to be one of the reasons behind PLN's
lawsuit to validate the contracts claiming that they were obtained through
corruption.
5.3. Recommendation
The analysis of the Paiton I project arrangement have led to several
recommendations, as follows:
5.3.1. The PPA Tariff Structure
1) Allow the private entity to assume part of the market risks
With respect to the market risks, demand risks should be partly allocated
to IPPs. The mechanism could probably be by reducing the high level of take-or-
pay to a certain level. Unlike the Paiton I PPA whose fixed capacity charges
amount to an average of approximately 70% of the total payment, such
arrangements could have been reduced into only 50%, for example. Another
example could be that the public utility is only responsible for part of the capacity
charge, and the remaining would be sold under the prevailing market price rate,
an arrangement that sounds to be very effective under a competitive electricity
generating business. This way, when economic condition of the host country
changes sharply, affecting the demand of the project output, the burden will not
be solely in the public utility, but also the investors.
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2) Reduce the Availability Factor (AF)
The AF should be reduced to commensurate with the actual demand
projection. To avoid being mistaken as a result of an over optimistic demand
projection, however, the availability factor could be reduced to a level comparable
with other power projects in the country. In the case of the Paiton I project, the
availability factor may be reduced to around 60% to 75%.
5.3.2. The Risk Mitigation Efforts
1) Encourage a balanced risk sharing
The risks arrangement embodied in the PPA should become more
balanced by allowing the private investors to assume certain level of risks. Such
major concerns as the market risks, the currency exchange risks, and the force
majeure risks should be well distributed equally among the contracted parties,
instead of putting the entire burden either to the government or the public utility
alone. The parties can arrange certain mechanisms to hedge the risks. If
compared to the public entity, the private sectors seem to be more sophisticated in
hedging such risks2 4 9.
1) Prepare an appropriate arrangement with local participants
Arrangements with local participants should be better prepared. The
hidden political risks beyond a sound local participant should be well understood.
Instead of arranging for the local participant to have "free" shares in the project
company, it would have probably reduced the risks if the local participant also
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contributed shares from the initial stage of the project. This way, the local
participant would be perceived as being fully involved in the project, thereby,
together with other project participants, assuming the risks and being more
committed to the project when the relations with the host government eventually
turn sour. In addition, local participant arrangements could also be diversified by
involving not only the politically well-connected people but also other companies
with regular arrangement.
2) The role of the International Arbitration
When the relationship with the host government deteriorated and
renegotiation is inevitable, as mentioned earlier, the international arbitration
would play a very useful role if it allows for changes and helps the risks
reallocation efforts that could be applied under the prevailing economic
conditions when such changes cannot be avoided250 . Instead of limiting its role to
interpreting the letter of contracts, the international arbitration would play a very
useful role if it were available to handle conflicts over the appropriateness of the
contract terms25 1 . In other words, instead of freezing the relationship between the
host government and the foreign investors under certain contract terms and
conditions for long period, which is usually around 20 to 30 years, the contract
itself would play a useful role if it allows certain changes under certain prevailing
conditions.
The contract may also allow profit and risks sharing under certain
conditions. For example, if the market turns out to be a windfall for the private
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entity, the government would be entitled to a certain tax increase. Another
example would be if economic condition changes sharply, the availability factor
of a power plant under a take-or-pay arrangement should be reduced accordingly.
In addition, contracts may need to be set to allow renegotiations after certain
period to update the initially agreed conditions that may be proved not valid
anymore under the prevailing conditions.
5.3.3. The "Mistakes" of IPPs in Indonesia
1. Electricity Market Projection
1) IPPs should rely on the natural growth of the electricity demand, and should also
take into account the purchasing power of the regions that desperately need
electricity.
2) Use the wholesale electricity tariff of the public utility, instead of the return on
equity, as a basis to set up the electricity tariff for the IPP-generated power.
2. The Equity Arrangement
1) Under the "debt-like" equity arrangement, risks should be properly allocated so
that the public entity would not assume such a high level of risk as to be
politically untenable. Even when the "debt-like" equity arrangement is secured
by a government guarantee, the guarantee should be specified in details to avoid
misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the guarantee intention.
2) Under the "loan-financed" equity arrangement, it is important to make sure that
the local participants, despite their political connections, have certain expertise
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that make them capable to be included in the project company. The fact that the
"loan-financed" shares could eventually be suspected as corruption practices lead
to an assumption that it may be better if the local participants share the risks from
the beginning of the project through their equity contribution. Otherwise, if loan-
financed equity arrangement cannot be avoided, it should be well announced
publicly to avoid controversy.
5.4. Chapter Summary
The Paiton I project deal has been analyzed to the extent that covers the PPA
tariff structure, the risks mitigation efforts, and the interpretation of IPPs with respect to
demand and price projection and the equity arrangements. The issues and
recommendation explored in this chapter are expected to provide the answers for the
concerns about the prevailing negative impacts of IPPs in developing countries.
However, even though the phenomenon can be explored and the recommendation can be
synthesized, the IPPs under renegotiation is in desperate need of solution. For example,
when the thesis was final, the Paiton I project had been renegotiating for almost two years
with no significant results. Therefore, this thesis does not stop at this point: a possible
approach for commercial solution for the Paiton I tariff negotiation would be explored in
the three chapters that follow.
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Chapter 6: Tariff Benchmarking
6.1. Tariff Benchmarking: Approach
The core problem in the case of the Paiton I project is that while PLN's tariff to
consumers was low, PEC's tariff to PLN was high as a result of a high project cost;
therefore, PLN could not afford PEC's tariff. Facing this problem, an approach to arrive
at a tariff of IPPs-generated power that would minimize the overall cost of power supply
while satisfying the consumers' demand within a utility's tariff constraint is developed in
this chapter. In other words, the purpose of this chapter is to develop tariff benchmarking
for project with the same capacity as the 2x615 MW Paiton I project.
Figure 6.1 shows the simple value chain of electricity generated by private power
plants until it reaches the end users. With reference to figure 5.1, Ta is the IPPs' tariff to
the utility while Tb is the utility's tariff to the consumers.
Ta Tb
IPPs Utility ZC->End Users
Figure 6.1: The Value Chain of the IPP-s generated Power
There are two approaches to arrive at Ta, the IPPs' tariff to the utility, as follows:
1) The ROE25 2-based Analysis
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In this analysis, the IPPs would arrive at Ta by considering the total
project cost, given a certain rate of ROE, in addition to the fuel cost, and the fixed
and the variable O&M cost. In this case, the IPPs do not take Tb into account.
2) The Wholesale Tariff-based Analysis
In this analysis, the IPPs would arrive at Ta by taking Tb into account, in
addition to the project cost, the fuel cost, and the fixed and variable O&M cost.
In other words, Tb is a variable of Ta; and this calculation does not base on a
certain rate of ROE.
As mentioned earlier in section 2.4.3, APEC Energy Working Group suggested
that one of the best practice feature for IPPs is to use the wholesale electricity tariff,
rather than the rate of return on equity, as the basis for negotiating PPAs25 3. Therefore,
according to APEC, the wholesale tariff-based analysis is an appropriate approach to
arrive at an IPP tariff.
While other books may refer the two approaches mentioned above as least-cost
analysis, the thesis calls the approaches as "tariff benchmarking" since in this thesis, the
IPP's tariff to the utility would actually be benchmarked against the utility's tariff to the
end consumers.
6.2. Financial Parameters
Financial parameters are being used to measure the viability of a project. Prior to
developing a financial model for the tariff benchmarking, it is important to review the
253 APEC Energy Working Group, "Manual of Best Practice Principles for Independent Power
Producers", The APEC Energy Working Group Secretariat: Energy Division, August 1997.
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definition of financial parameters to be derived from the financial models developed in
this thesis, as follows:
1) Net Present Value (NPV): The NPV of a project is the discounted value of the
net cash flows before financing less the initial investments25 4 . NPV indicates the
attractiveness of an investment: the project is desirable if its NPV is positive.
2) Internal Rate of Return (IRR) on Project: The IRR of a project is the discount
rate that makes the NPV zero. The IRR measures the return on the whole project.
The project is desirable if the IRR exceeds the cost of capital (discount rate),
which is about 13% in the US, and relatively higher in Asian countries.
3) Return on Equity (ROE): The ROE of a project is the internal rate of return for
the leveraged projected cash flows to be generated by the project 2 56. ROE is
calculated as the net cash flows after senior debt service divided by total equity
investment.
4) Return on Investment (ROI): The ROI of a project is the rate of return for the
un-leveraged projected cash flows to be generated by the projeCt257. ROI is
calculated as the net cash flows before financing divided by total investment.
5) Average Levelized Cost for power generation: Average levelized cost is
calculated as the present value of all costs involved in the project divided by the
present value of the net electricity generated throughout the project contract term.
6) Average Levelized Tariff for power generation: Average levelized tariff is
calculated as the present value of all revenues generated by the project divided by
Lang, 1998
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
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the present value of the net electricity generated throughout the project contract
term.
6.3. Tariff Benchmarking: Methodology
As a tool for tariff benchmarking analysis, a financial model for a power
generation plant is developed. The purpose of this model is to calculate the average
levelized cost of developing the plant, with the calculation being as follow 58 :
Average levelized cost = (Present Value of cost stream)/(Present Value of output stream)
It is important to remember that the average levelized cost is not a tariff, but it provides a
simple measure of the average costs of the power generation. Costs involved in a power
generation are as follows:
1) Capacity Cost which consists of Capital Cost (component A) and Fixed O&M
Cost (component B)
2) Energy Cost which consists of components Fuel Cost (component C) and
Variable O&M Cost (component D)
The Fixed and Variable O&M Costs are usually set as fixed values throughout the
contract year, and may vary with the exchange rate movement and inflation rate
depending on the pricing mechanism agreed upon in the contract. On the other hand, the
Fuel Cost is usually renegotiated annually to follow coal price movement259, and the
Capital Cost depends significantly on the project EPC cost and the project cost structure.
The majority of the tariff is usually comprised by the Capital Cost and the Fuel Cost;
therefore, it is important to understand the sensitivity of the tariff under various
258 Razavi, 1996
259 This assumption follows the arrangement in the Paiton I model PPA
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combination of Capital Cost and Fuel Cost. EPC cost, as mentioned earlier in chapter III,
comprises the majority of the total project cost. Furthermore, project cost structure (the
percentage of the project cost breakdown) is essential, not only to determine the
percentage of EPC Cost involved, but also to determine the significance of other
factors-such as development cost and debt-financing cost-that contribute to the total
project cost. Most importantly, cost structure can be compared to other projects of
similar size to figure out project characteristics that may differ26 .
The project average levelized cost would then be benchmarked against the
utility's tariff. Figure 6.2 shows the framework of the benchmarking analysis.
A. Capital Costs Set Tariff Get
Fixed Capital Costs
B. Fixed O&MT
y Tariff
IPP Tariff BenchmarkingtL C. Fuel Prices
D. aribleO&MSet ROE Fixed GetD. Vriale OM 
-Capital Costs
Figure 6.2: The Framework of Tariff Benchmarking Analysis
Given a set of Fixed and Variable O&M Costs and Fuel Cost assumptions, the
average levelized costs of Fuel and O&M can be derived. The tariff benchmarking
process would then take either one of the following two processes depending on the basis
of the initial negotiation between the IPP and the public utility, as follows:
260 For example, projects in developed country may need less development cost than those in
developing countries.
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1) The Wholesale Utility's Tariff
When the utility's tariff is the basis for negotiation by which there will be
no increase for this tariff, the utility's tariff would be set fixed as the maximum
tariff that could be charged by the IPP. The difference between the utility's tariff
and the average levelized costs for Fuel and O&M would serve as an average
levelized tariff for the Capital Cost component. This tariff component would
serve as a maximum value at which the project ROE would be determined. This
tariff component, together with the average levelized costs of Fuel and O&M,
would form the IPP tariff.
2) The ROE
When the ROE is the basis for negotiation, the ROE would be set fixed to
derive the average levelized tariff for the Capital Cost component (component A).
This tariff, together with the average levelized costs of Fuel and O&M, would
form the IPP tariff. The difference between the utility's tariff and the IPP tariff
would be the basis to adjust the utility's tariff. In this case, if the IPP's tariff is
higher than the utility's tariff, then the utility's tariff need to be increased.
In sum, the tariff benchmarking would utilize the average levelized cost for a
power plant to be benchmarked against the utility's tariff. As previously indicated, the
Capital Cost component of an IPP electricity tariff depends significantly on the project
EPC cost and the project cost structure. Therefore, prior to developing tariff
benchmarking for a project, it is important to first develop an EPC unit cost analysis
(US$/kW) and a cost structure analysis.
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As a case study, this thesis develops a tariff benchmarking analysis for a coal-
fired power generation project with a capacity of 2x615 MW, the same capacity as the
Paiton I project. While the EPC unit cost (US$/kW) can be used to determine the
approximate total project cost of a 2x615 MW power plant under a certain cost structure,
the cost structure can also be used to determine the dollar amount of the other cost items
such as the development cost and the debt-financing cost.
6.4. Project Cost Analysis
This section consists of two parts: the total unit cost (US$/kW) analysis and the
cost structure analysis. The purpose of the first part is to obtain the possible range of
total project unit cost (US$/kW) for a power plant with the capacity of 2x615 MW, the
same capacity as the Paiton I project. Following, the second part analyzed a certain cost
structure composition by which the possible range of EPC unit cost (US$/kW) can be
obtained. The range of EPC unit cost would be used in the tariff benchmarking
calculation to see the sensitivity of the tariff under various EPC unit costs possible and
also various fuel costs, which would be explained in later section.
6.4.1. The Total Unit Cost Analysis
A statistical analysis of the total project unit cost (US$/kW) of IPPs around the
world is developed. The data261 used in this analysis is gathered from 46 coal-fired
power generation projects that started construction between 1995-2000, excluding the
261 To preserve confidentiality, the name of the 46 projects, the unit cost of each individual project,
and the source of information have not been disclosed. Rather, the thesis reveals only the result of the
statistical analysis, in the form of a normal distribution curve of the total project unit costs.
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Paiton I project. It is reasonable to fit a normal distribution curve to the unit costs data2 62,
as shown in figure 6.3.
Total Project Unit Cost (US$IkW)
369.18 846.63 1,324.08 1,801.53 2,278.98
Figure 6.3: Normal Distribution Curve of the Total Project Unit Cost Data (US$/kW)
The statistical parameters derived from this curve include Mean US$ 1,324.08 per
kW, and Standard Deviation 318.30. The Paiton I total project unit cost is US$ 2,032.5
per kW, which is in the 98.7 percentile263 . Other parameters include the unit costs in the
25 percentile264 and the 75-percentile 265, which are US$ 1,109.39 per kW and US$
1,538.77 per kW respectively. It is reasonable to assume that the possible total unit cost
lies within the 25-percentile and 75-percentile range; however, for simplicity, let us take
262 To figure out which type of distribution curve best fits the data, curve fitting tests were conducted,
with the result being as follows: 1) Plotting the unit cost data as cumulative distribution suggests that fitting
a uniform or linear cumulative probability distribution to this data may not be quite right since there are
inflections around a straight line in the plot, and 2) Plotting the unit cost data as normal fractiles suggests
that it is reasonable to fit a normal distribution to the data. The inflection appeared in the straight line fit
(the uniform cumulative distribution fit) has disappeared.
263 This means that there are only 1.3 projects in a hundred projects that may exceed the value of the
Paiton I project unit cost.
264 This means that only 75% of a hundred projects may exceed the 25-percentile value.
265 This means that only 25% of a hundred projects may exceed the 75-percentile value.
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the mean value, US$ 1,324.08 per kW, to be a single total project unit cost derived from
this statistical analysis.
6.4.2. The Project Cost Structure Analysis
Table 6.1 shows the rearrangement of the Paiton I project cost breakdown
structure in table 3.1 to be compared with typical cost structures of other projects with
similar capacities and similar business environments. The comparison is demonstrated in
table 6.2. The cost structure of the 2x615 MW Paiton I project is compared to the cost
structure of two coal-fired power plants with the capacity of 2x660 MW (Project A) and
2x600 MW (Project B) 266. The cost structure of Project B is actually derived from an
international competitive bidding.
Table 6.1: The Paiton I Project Cost Structure
The Paiton I Project
Project Cost Breakdown Cost % Cf Total
US$Project Cost Bre n Cost
EPC Cost (special facility included) 1,772,300 70.9%
Development Cost 190,000 7.6%
Development Fee 11,800
Development Expense 43,200
Insurance 30,000
Administration Cost 26,000
Owner's Engineer 15,000
Pre-Completion Labor 6,600
Agency Fees 3,700
Value added Taxes 53,700
Initial Working Capital 40,300 1.6%
Working Capital 25,300
O&M Staffing 15,000
Contingency 3,300 0.1%
Financial Cost 494,100 19.8%
Interest During Construction 308,200
MITI Fee 12,300
Commitment Fee 29,300
Up front financing fees 144,300
Total Project Cost -T2,500,000 100.0%
266 To preserve confidentiality, the name of the projects, the actual cost of the projects, and the source of
information have not been disclosed. Rather, the thesis reveals only the cost structure in the form of the
cost percentage of the total project cost to be compared with the cost structure of the Paiton I project.
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Table 6.2: The comparison of the Paiton I project with two other projects of similar capacities
Project Cost Breakdown Project A The Paiton I Project B Average
2x660 MW 2x615 MW 2x600 MW
EPC Cost (Special Facility Incl.) 59.53% 70.89% 70.02% 66.81%
Development Cost 17.97% 7.60% 4.99% 10.19%
Initial Working Capital 1.35% 1.61% 4.99% 2.65%
Contingency 9.76% 0.13% 4.99% 4.96%
Financial Cost 11.39% 19.76% 15.00% 15.38%
Total Project Cost 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Figure 6.4 shows the percentage of the elements of the total project cost averaged
from the three projects in table .2. The two largest components are the EPC cost and the
financing cost, which are 66.8% and 15.4% of the total project cost respectively. The
remaining costs are development cost, contingency, and initial working capital cost.
Average Cost Structure Breakdown
Figure 6.4: The Average Cost Structure
The average of these three project cost structures will be used as the base project
cost structure for firther calculation in this thesis. Even though this averaging method is
considered as a rough approximation, the result shows a similarity in trend by which the
largest cost is the EPC cost, followed by financial cost and development cost
respectively. This averaging method is used because of the unavailability of cost
structure data from considerable number of coal-fired power plants with similar
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capacities. A more fine approach could be a statistical analysis of an adequate amount of
samples of historical project cost structure data of coal-fired power plants with similar
capacities. Similarity in capacity is important because of the economy of scale that the
projects may realize. A further research in this area is highly encouraged.
6.4.3. The EPC Costs for a 2x615 MW Power Plant
Up to this point, we have been incorporated results derived from the following
analyses:
1) The cost auditor report267 for the 2x615 MW Paiton I project, resulting in an EPC
benchmark cost of US$ 1,033 million.
2) The statistical analysis, resulting in a total project unit cost of US$ 1,324.08 per
kW.
3) The cost structure analysis, resulting in a cost structure approximation by which
66.8 1% of the total project cost is the EPC cost.
Based on these three results, the range of the possible EPC unit cost for a 2x615
MW can be determined, as shown in table 6.3. From 2) and 3), the EPC unit cost-the
66.81% of US$ 1,324.08 per kW-would be US$ 884.67 per kW. From 1), the EPC unit
cost-the value of US$ 1.033 billion divided by 1,230,000 kW-would be US$ 839.84
per kW.
267 An audit, conducted in late 1999 by a Canadian engineering and construction company SNC-
Lavalin Group, priced the Paiton I EPC cost at US$ 1.033 billion (with a + 20% tolerance)
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Table 6.3: The range of EPC unit cost (US$) for a 2x615 MW
EPC Unit Cost Total Project Unit Cost Capacity Total EPC Cost Total Project Cost
US$/kW US$/kW kW US$ US$
839.84 1,256.98 1,230,000 1,033,000,000 1,546,084,082
884.67 1,324.08 1,230,000 1,088,144,446 1,628,618,400
In short, it is reasonable to conclude that EPC unit cost for a 2x615 MW falls
approximately in the range between US$ 839.84 per kW and US$ 884.67 per kW.
6.5. Tariff Benchmarking
This section provides the tariff benchmarking analysis for a 2x615 MW power
plant. A financial model is developed for this purpose; figure 6.5 shows the project cost
structure breakdown for this model. The thesis author develops the model based on
certain financial parameters and technical parameters. The technical parameters closely
follow those of the Paiton I power project mentioned earlier268, as follows:
a) Availability Factor = 83%,
b) Net plant heat rate = 2447 kcal/kWh,
c) HHV coal = 5215 kg/kcal,
d) Contract terms = 30 years
e) Fixed O&M = 0.3220 c/kWh2 69
f) Variable O&M = 0.1552 cents/kWh270
On the other hand, with respect to financial parameters, the debt equity ratio is equal to
that of the Paiton I project, which is 72.8% : 27.3%, while the debt-financing scheme
varies according to the relative composition of commercial loan and soft loan.
268 in Chapter 3
269 The average levelized fixed O&M cost, with 14% discount rate.
270 The average levelized variable O&M Cost, with 14% discount rate.
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Figure 6.5. Total Project Cost Structure Breakdown
15.4% Financing Cost Financing Scheme
Debt-Financing Scheme
Total 66.8% EPC Cost e Fully Commercial Loan
Project Cost j Semi Commercial Loan
9 Fully Soft Loan
Development Cost
17.8% Initial Working Capital
Contingency Cost
Figure 6.5: The Components of Total Project Cost
Appendices 1-7 of this chapter show the result of the analysis. Each appendix
indicates the financial and technical parameters being used. The tariff components
follow those of the Paiton I project: the Capital cost (component A), the Fixed O&M cost
(component B), the Fuel cost (component C), and the Variable O&M cost (component
D). The sensitivity of the tariff is tested against the following variables:
1) The possible range of EPC Unit Costs: US$ 839.84 per kW and US$ 884.67 per
kW
2) The Coal Prices: US$ 21.0 per tons, US$ 23.0 per tons271, US$ 30.0 per tons272,
US$ 34.9273 per tons, US$ 39.7 per tons274.
271 US$ 23 per tons is the average of US$ 22 per tons, the Banjarmasin spot price in December 1998,
and US$ 24 per tons, the coal in the Asian market in 1999 (PLN Press Release, "Background", 1999).
272 US$ 30 per tons is included to serve as a middle number.
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3) The Debt-Financing Scheme scenario275.
a) 100% Soft Loan (fully soft loan)
b) 25% Commercial Loan and 75% Soft Loan (majority soft loan)
c) 50% Commercial Loan and 50% Soft Loan (semi commercial loan)
d) 75% Commercial Loan and 25% Soft Loan (majority commercial loan)
e) 100% Commercial Loan 27 6 (fully commercial loan)
The loan used in the calculation is estimated to carry interest rates of 11% and 5%
for the commercial loan and soft loan respectively.
While readers can view the results of the tariff benchmarking in the appendices,
the following section provides an example of the tariff benchmarking analysis using the
100% soft loan scheme in the appendix 1 and appendix 2 for the ROE-based negotiation
and for the Wholesale utility's tariff-based negotiation respectively.
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6.5.1. The ROE-based analysis
As shown in appendix 1-tariff benchmarking with fully soft loan scheme
whereby the ROE is set fixed-when the ROE is set fixed, the tariff derived would
experience the following trend:
273 US$ 34.9 per tons is equal to Rp. 71.126 per kg, the coal price allowance in 1997, under the
exchange rate Rp. 2.038 per US$ agreed upon in the Paiton I PPA.
274 US$ 39.7 per tons is the coal price in 1998 under the FSA negotiated with BHP (PLN Press
Release, "Background", 1999)
275 As shown in Figure 5.5, debt-financing scheme may significantly affect the financial cost.
276 The lenders follow those of the Paiton I project.
277 When the IRR is the basis for negotiation by which there could be certain increase in the utility's
tariff, the IRR would be set fixed to derive the average levelized tariff for the capital cost component. This
tariff, together with the average levelized costs of fuel and O&M, would eventually form the IPP tariff.
The difference between the utility's tariff and the IPP tariff would be the basis to adjust the utility's tariff.
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1) Tariff Sensitivity on Coal Price
The tariff increases as the coal price increases. The higher the fuel cost,
the higher the IPP needs to charge the utility, if the arrangement is that the utility
would assume the fuel price fluctuation risk. To illustrate, in appendix 1, under
the EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW and ROE 17%, the tariffs are US$ 4.0287
cents/kWh and US$ 4.8477 cents/kWh for the coal prices US$ 21 per tons and
US$ 39.7 per tons respectively, as shown in figure 6.6.
Tariff Sensitivity on Coal Price
EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW, ROE 17%
5.5000
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4.5000
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3.5000
20.0 22.0 24.0 26.0 28.0 30.0 32.0 34.0 36.0 38.0 40.0
Coal Price (US$/tons)
Figure 6.6: Tariff Sensitivity on Coal Price for EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW and ROE 17%
2) Tariff Sensitivity on ROE
The tariff increases as the ROE increases. The higher the ROE to
compensate the project sponsors' equity investments, the higher the Capital Cost
component (component A); as a result, the tariff that the IPP needs to charge the
utility would be higher. To illustrate, in appendix 1, under the EPC Cost US$
839.84 per kW and coal price US$ 21 per tons, the tariffs are US$ 3.8971
cents/kWh and US$ 4.0287 cents/kWh for ROEs 14% and 17% respectively, as
shown in figure 6.7.
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Tariff Sensitivity on ROE
EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW, Coal Price 21 $/tons
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Figure 6.7: Tariff Sensitivity on ROE for EPC Cost 839.84 $/kW and Coal Price 21 $/tons
3) Tariff Sensitivity on EPC Unit Cost
The tariff increases as the EPC unit cost increases. The more expensive
the IPP project is, the higher the Capital Cost component that the IPP needs to
charge. To illustrate, in appendix 1, under ROE 17% and the coal price US$ 21
per tons, the tariffs are US$ 4.0287 cents/kWh and US$ 4.1693 cents/kWh for
EPC Unit cost US$ 839.84 per kW and US$ 884.67 per kW respectively, as
shown in figure 6.8.
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Tariff Sensitivity on EPC Unit Cost
ROE 17%, Coal Price 21 $Itons
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Figure 6.8: Tariff Sensitivity on EPC Unit Cost for ROE 17% and Coal Price 21 $/tons
4) Tariff Sensitivity on Debt-Financing Scheme
The tariff increases as the magnitude of commercial loan increases. The
higher the magnitude of commercial loan, the higher the interest expenses; as a
result, the Capital Cost component would be higher as well. To illustrate, under
the EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW, coal price US$ 21 per tons, and ROE 17%, the
tariffs are US$ 4.0287 cents/kWh for 0% commercial loan, US$ 4.2309
cents/kWh for 25% commercial loan, US$ 4.2351 for 50% commercial loan, US$
4.3179 cents/kWh for 75% commercial loan, and US$ 4.4693 for 100%
commercial loan, as shown in figure 6.9.
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Tariff Sensitivity on Debt-Financing Scheme
EPC Cost 839.84 $/kW, ROE 17%, Coal Price 21 $/tons
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Percentage of Commercial Loan (%)
Figure 6.9: Tariff Sensitivity on Debt-Financing Scheme
Despite these trends, these results can be used by a state-owned utility to figure
out the level of tariff increase that allows an IPP to have a certain percentage of ROE. To
illustrate, if the current utility's tariff is US$ 3.2 cents/kWh?78 and the utility allows an
IPP developing a power project (with EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW under a fully
commercial debt-financing scheme and a coal price of US$ 21 per tons) to have 14%
ROE, the utility should increase its tariff to US$ 4.3378 cents/kWh to afford the IPP's
tariff to the utility. If the coal price materializes to be higher, for example to US$ 39.7
per tons, and the IPP under the PPA would pass through this increase to the utility, then
the utility eventually would pass this coal price increase to consumers by increasing its
tariff to approximately US$ 5.1568 cents/kWh. This dynamics is demonstrated in figure
6.10 that shows tariffs under combination of various ROEs and Coal Price, under an EPC
Unit Cost of US$ 839.84 per kW and fully soft loan-financing scheme (Appendix 1).
Figure 6.11 shows the same combination under a semi commercial debt-financing
scheme while figure 6.12 shows that under a fully commercial loan scheme.
278 This tariff is a subsidized tariff; the amount includes the transmission and distribution costs.
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Tariff Sensitivity on ROE and Coal Price
EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW - Fully Soft Loan
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Figure 6.10: Tariff Sensitivity for EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW and fully soft loan-financing scheme
Tariff Sensitivity on ROE and Coal Price
EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW - Semi Commercial Loan
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Figure 6.11: Tariff Sensitivity for EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW and semi commercial loan scheme
Tariff Sensitivity on ROE and Coal Price
EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW - Fully Commercial Loan
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Figure 6.12: Tariff Sensitivity for EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW and fully commercial loan scheme
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6.5.2. The Utility's Tariff-based Analysis 279
As shown in appendix 2-tariff benchmarking with fully soft loan scheme
whereby the tariff is set fixed-when the tariff is set fixed, the ROE derived would
experience the following trend:
1) ROE Sensitivity on Coal Price
The ROE decreases as the coal price increases. Under a fixed tariff, the
higher the fuel cost, the lower the Capital Cost component, thereby resulting in a
lower ROE that the IPP could realize. To illustrate, in appendix 2, under the EPC
cost US$ 839.84 per kW and Tariff US$ 4.1 cents/kWh, the ROE are 18.63% and
-0.05% for the coal prices US$ 21 per tons and US$ 39.7 per tons respectively, as
shown in figure 6.13.
Figure 6.13: Tariff Sensitivity on Coal Price for EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW and Tariff 4.1 c/kWh
279 When the utility's tariff is the basis for negotiation by which there will be no increase for this
tariff, the utility's tariff would be set fixed as the maximum tariff that could be charged by the IPP. The
difference between the utility's tariff and the average levelized costs of fuel and O&M would serve as an
average levelized tariff for the capital cost component. This tariff component would serve as a maximum
value at which the project IRR would be determined. This component, together with the average levelized
costs of fuel and O&M, would eventually form the IPP tariff.
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ROE Sensitivity on Coal Price
EPC Cost US$ 839 per kW, Tariff 4.1 cents/kWh
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2) ROE Sensitivity on Tariff
The ROE increases as the tariff increases. The higher the tariff, the higher
the Capital Cost component (component A); as a result, the ROE that the IPP
could realize would be higher. To illustrate, in appendix 2, under the EPC Cost
US$ 839.84 per kW and coal price US$ 21 per tons, the ROE are 11.79% and
18.63% for tariffs US$ 3.8 cents/kWh and US$ 4.1 cents/kWh respectively, as
shown in figure 6.14.
ROE Sensitivity on Tariff
EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW, Coal Price 21 $Itons
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Figure 6.14: ROE Sensitivity on Tariff for EPC Cost 839.84 $/kW and Coal Price 21 $/tons
3) ROE Sensitivity on EPC Unit Cost
The ROE decreases as the EPC unit cost increases. The more expensive
the IPP project is, the lower the ROE that the IPP could realize. To illustrate, in
appendix 2, under tariff 4.1 cents/kWh and the coal price US$ 21 per tons, the
ROEs are 18.63% and 15.50% for EPC Unit cost US$ 839.84 per kW and US$
884.67 per kW respectively, as shown in figure 6.15.
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Figure 6.15: ROE Sensitivity on EPC Unit Cost for Tariff 4.1 cents/kWh and Coal Price 21 $/tons
4) ROE Sensitivity on Debt-Financing Scheme
The ROE decreases as the magnitude of commercial loan increases. The
higher the magnitude of commercial loan, the higher the interest expenses; as a
result, under a fixed tariff, the ROE that the IPP could realize would be lower. To
illustrate, under the EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW, coal price US$ 21 per tons,
and Tariff 4.1 cents/kWh, the ROEs are 18.63% for 0% commercial loan, 14.01%
for 25% commercial loan, 13.92% for 50% commercial loan, 12.94% for 75%
commercial loan, and 8.58% for 100% commercial loan, as shown in figure 6.16.
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ROE Sensitivity on EPC Cost
Tariff 4.1 cents/kWh, Coal Price US$ 21 per tons
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ROE Sensitivity on Debt-Financing Scheme
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Figure 6.16: ROE Sensitivity on Debt-Financing Scheme
Despite these trends, these results can be used by a state-owned utility to figure
out the ROE that an IPP may realize if a fixed tariff were to be set or negotiated with the
IPP. To illustrate, in appendix 2, if the utility wants the IPP to lower down the IPP's
tariff to US$ 4.1 cents/kWh, the IPP should give up certain percentage of its ROE,
realizing only approximately 18.63%. In addition, to realize this 18.63%, the IPP should
also negotiate a lower coal price to approximately US$ 21 per tons; high expense in fuel
cost would significantly reduce ROE. Figure 6.17 shows ROEs under combination of
various tariffs and Coal Price, under an EPC Unit Cost of US$ 839.84 per kW and fully
soft loan-financing scheme (Appendix 2). Figure 6.18 shows the same combination
under a semi commercial debt-financing scheme while figure 6.19 shows that under a
fully commercial loan scheme.
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ROE Sensitivity on Tariff and Coal Price
EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW - Fully Soft Loan
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Figure 6.17: ROE Sensitivity for EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW and fully soft loan scheme
ROE Sensitivity on Tariff and Coal Price
EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW - Semi Commercial Loan
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Figure 6.18: ROE Sensitivity for EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW and semi commercial loan scheme
ROE Sensitivity on Tariff and Coal Price
US$ 839.84 per kW - Fully Commercial Loan
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Figure 6.19:Figure 5.19. ROE Sensitivity for EPC Cost US$ 839.84/kW and fully commercial loan
-168-
In sum, tariff-benchmarking analysis may be conducted with various scenarios
depending on the purpose of negotiation. This analysis can be used to assess whether a
tariff offered by an IPP to a utility is reasonable or whether an increase in the utility's
tariff to the consumers (and how high the increase should be) is needed to allow the
private entity to assume a certain ROE. In addition, this benchmarking analysis can be
used both during the initial contract negotiation between a utility and an IPP and during
contract renegotiation process if under certain conditions the agreed upon tariffs need to
be adjusted. This benchmarking analysis can also aid in figuring the most appropriate
combination of certain parameters (ROE, coal price, EPC unit cost, debt-financing
scheme, etc.) and which parameters should be adjusted to arrive at a desirable solution
regarding an increase or decrease in the utility's tariff to consumers and/or in the IPP's
tariff to the utility.
6.6. Chapter Summary
This chapter provides the tariff benchmarking analysis for a power plant of 2x615
MW capacity. The methodology of the analysis is outlined, supplemented with examples
of benchmarking process under various scenarios. This analysis should aid the
contracted parties, the power seller and purchaser, in the initial negotiation and/or in the
renegotiation to figure out the most appropriate combination of parameters under certain
constraints. The tariff benchmarking developed in this chapter would be used to identify
the critical parameters of an IPP tariff. For this purpose, the Paiton I project is still the
case study. The following chapters would provide the financial analysis for the Paiton I
project and an approach to arrive at a commercial solution for renegotiation purpose.
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Appendix 1: TARIFF BENCHMARKING: ROE SET FIXED (FULLY SOFT LOAN)
Financial Parameters Technical Parameters Variables
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27% 1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW 1. ROE Set Fixed
2. Loan 2. Availability Factor 83% 2. EPC Cost (US$/kW)
% of Total Loan Lender Repayment Interest 3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh 3. Coal Price ($/tons)
0% Commercial Loan 12 years 11% 4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
100% Soft Loan 12 years 5% 5. Contract Terms 30 years Notes:
3. Discount Rate 14% 6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh ALC = Average Levelized Cost
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
ROE Set Fixed 17%
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
_ $______ ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) .2_ (/kh C (c/kWh) __(_/kh_ To _ckWh)
21.0 3.2831 17.00% 2.6347 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0287 3.3839 17.00% 2.7764 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1693
23.0 3.3707 17.00% 2.6347 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1163 3.4715 17.00% 2.7764 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.2569
30.0 3.6772 17.00% 2.6347 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.4229 3.7781 17.00% 2.7754 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.5635
34.9 3.8918 17.00% 2.6347 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.6375 3.9927 17.00% 2.7754 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7781
39.7 4.1021 17.00% 2.6347 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.8477 4.2029 17.00% 2.7754 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.9883
ROE Set Fixed 16%
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($Itons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) ToaUc1kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.2831 16.00% 2.5908 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9848 3.3839 16.00% 2.7292 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1231
23.0 3.3707 16.00% 2.5908 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0724 3.4715 16.00% 2.7292 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.2107
30.0 3.6772 16.00% 2.5908 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.3790 3.7781 16.00% 2.7292 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.5173
34.9 3.8918 16.00% 2.5908 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.6936 3.9927 16.00% 2.7292 03220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7319
39.7 4.1021 16.00% 2.6908 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.8038 4.2029 16.00% 2.7292 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.9421
ROE Set Fixed 15%
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($Itons) ALC (c/kWh) R-E A (c/kWh) B c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) lkWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
,Atos) L Cfk ROE _____ B(7 W ___ ____ ____ -21.0 3.2831 15.00% 2.5470 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9410 3.3839 15.00% 2.6830 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0769
23.0 3.3707 15.00% 2.5470 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0286 3.4715 15.00% 2.6830 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1645
30.0 3.6772 15.00% 2.6470 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.3361 3.7781 15.00% 2.6830 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.4711
34.9 3.8918 15.00% 2.6470 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.5497 3.9927 15.00% 2.6830 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.6867
39.7 4.1021 15.00% 2.6470 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.7600 4.2029 15.00% 2.6830 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.8959
ROE Set Fixed 14%
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
________ ___________ 
__________ 
ROE A____ ________ C (c/kh) Wh) ckh oa c($ltons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C___/k___ /(c/kWh)
21.0 3.2831 14.00% 2.5031 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.8971 3.3839 14.00% 2.6368 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0307
23.0 3.3707 14.00% 2.6031 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.9847 3.4715 14.00% 2.6368 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1183
30.0 3.6772 14.00% 2.6031 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.2913 3.7781 14.00% 2.6368 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.4249
34.9 3.8918 14.00% 2.5031 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.5059 3.9927 14.00% 2.6368 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.6396
39.7 4.1021 14.00% 2.6031 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.7161 4.2029 14.00% 2.6368 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.8497
Appendix 2: TARIFF BENCHMARKING: TARIFF SET FIXED (FULLY SOFT LOAN)
Financial Parameters Technical Parameters Variables
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27% 1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW 1. Tariff Set Fixed (c/kWh)
2. Loan 2. Availability Factor 83% 2. EPC Cost (US$/kW)
% of Total Loan Lender Repayment Interest 3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh 3. Coal Price ($/tons)
0% Commercial Loan 12 years 11% 4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
100% Soft Loan 12 years 5% 5. Contract Terms 30 years Notes:
3. Discount Rate 14% 6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh ALC = Average Levelized Cost
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
Tariff Set Fixed 4.1
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) C kWh) 2cWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.2831 18.63% 2.7060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1 3.3839 15.50% 2.7060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1
23.0 3.3707 16.63% 2.6184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1 3.4715 13.60% 2.6184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1
30.0 3.6772 9.64% 2.3118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.1 3.7781 6.97% 2.3118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.1
34.9 3.8918 4.74% 2.0972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.1 3.9927 2.32% 2.0972 0.3220 1.5285 0 1522 4.1
397 4.1021 -0.05% 1.8870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.1 4.2029 -2.23% 1.8870 03220 1.7388 0.1522 4.1
Tariff Set Fixed 4.0 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (kWhWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.2831 16.35% 2.6060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0 3.3839 13.33% 2.6060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0
23.0 3.3707 14.35% 2.5184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0 3.4715 11.44% 2.5184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0
30.0 3.6772 7.36% 2.2118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.0 3.7781 4.80% 2.2118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.0
34.9 3.8918 2.46% 1.9972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.0 3.9927 0.16% 1.9972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.0
39.7 4.1021 -2.33% 1.7870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.0 4.2029 -4.39% 1.7870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.0
Tariff Set Fixed 3.9 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.2831 14.07% 2.5060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9 3.3839 11.17% 2.5060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9
23.0 3.3707 12.07% 2.4184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.9 3.4715 9.27% 2.4184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.9
30.0 3.6772 5.08% 2.1118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.9 3.7781 2.64% 2.1118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.9
34.9 3.8918 0.18% 1.8972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.9 3.9927 -2.01% 1.8972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.9
39.7 4.1021 -4.61% 1.6870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.9 4.2029 -6.56% 1.6870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.9
Tariff Set Fixed 3.8 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.2831 11.79% 2.4060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.8 3.3839 9.01% 2.4060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.8
23.0 3.3707 9.79% 2.3184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.8 3.4715 7.11% 2.3184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.8
30.0 3.6772 2.80% 2.0118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.8 3.7781 0.47% 2.0118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.8
34.9 3.8918 -2.10% 1.7972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.8 3.9927 -4.17% 1.7972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.8
39.7 4.1021 -6.89%j 1.5870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.8 4.2029 -8.72%1 1.5870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.8
-
Appendix 3: TARIFF BENCHMARKING: ROE SET FIXED (MAJORITY SOFT LOAN)
Financial Parameters Technical Parameters Variables
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27% 1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW 1. ROE Set Fixed
2. Loan 2. Availability Factor 83% 2. EPC Cost (US$/kW)
% of Total Loan Lender Repayment Interest 3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh 3. Coal Price ($/tons)
25% Commercial Loan 12 years 11% 4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
75% Soft Loan 12 years 5% 5. Contract Terms 30 years Notes:
3. Discount Rate 14% 8. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh ALC = Average Levelized Cost
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
ROE Set Fixed 17%
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67(stons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (ckWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh
21.0 3.4853 17.00% 2.8369 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.2309 3.5969 17.00% 2.9884 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.3824
23.0 3.5729 17.00% 2.8369 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.3185 3.6845 17.00% 2.9884 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.4699
30.0 3.8795 17.00% 2.8369 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.6251 3.9911 17.00% 2.9884 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.7765
34.9 4.0941 17.00% 2.8369 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.8397 4.2057 17.00% 2.9884 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.9911
39.7 4.3043 17.00% 2.8369 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.0499 4.4159 17.00% 2.9884 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.2014
ROE Set Fixed 16%
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kwh;
21.0 3.4853 16.00% 2.7931 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1870 3.5969 16.00% 2.9422 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.3362
23.0 3.5729 16.00% 2.7931 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.2746 3.6845 16.00% 2.9422 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.4237
30.0 3.8795 16.00% 2.7931 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.5812 3.9911 16.00% 2.9422 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.7303
34.9 4.0941 16.00% 2.7931 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7958 4.2057 16.00% 2.9422 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.9449
39.7 4.3043 16.00% 2.7931 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.0061 4.4159 16.00% 2.9422 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.1552
ROE Set Fixed 15%
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (kWhWh) ROE A (c/kWh) ____/k__) C___/k__) Dk)T____
21.0 3.4853 15.00% 2.7492 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1432 3.5969 15.00% 2.8960 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.2900
23.0 3.5729 15.00% 2.7492 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.2308 3.6845 15.00% 2.8960 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.3775
30.0 3.8795 15.00% 2.7492 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.5374 3.9911 15.00% 2.8960 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.6841
34.9 4.0941 15.00% 2.7492 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7520 4.2057 15.00% 2.8960 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.8987
39.7 4.3043 15.00% 2.7492 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.9622 4.4159 15.00% 2.8960 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.1090
ROE Set Fixed 14%
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWhB ALC (c/kWh) -
21.0 3.4853 14.00% 2.7054 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0993 3.5969 14.00% 2.8498 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.2437
23.0 3.5729 14.00% 2.7054 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1869 3.6845 14.00% 2.8498 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.3313
30.0 3.8795 14.00% 2.7054 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.4935 3.9911 14.00% 2.8498 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.6379
34.9 4.0941 14.00% 2.7054 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7081 4.2057 14.00% 2.8498 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.8525
39.71 4.3043 14.00% 2.7054 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.9183 4.4159 14.00% 2.8498 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.0628
Appendix 4: TARIFF BENCHMARKING: TARIFF SET FIXED (MAJORITY SOFT LOAN)
Financial Parameters Technical Parameters Variables
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27% 1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW 1. Tariff Set Fixed (c/kWh)
2. Loan 2. Availability Factor 83% 2. EPC Cost (US$/kW)
% of Total Loan Lender Repayment Interest 3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh 3. Coal Price ($/tons)
25% Commercial Loan 12 years 11% 4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
75% Soft Loan 12 years 5% 5. Contract Terms 30 years Notes:
3. Discount Rate 14% 6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh ALC = Average Levelized Cost
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
Tariff Set Fixed 4.1
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (ckWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.4853 14.01% 2.7060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1 3.5969 10.89% 2.7060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1
23.0 3.5729 12.02% 2.6184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1 3.6845 8.99% 2.6184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1
30.0 3.8795 5.03% 2.3118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.1 3.9911 2.36% 2.3118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.1
34.9 4.0941 0.13% 2.0972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.1 4.2057 -2.29% 2.0972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.1
39.7 4.3043 -4.66% 1.8870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.1 4.4159 -6.84% 1.8870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.1
Tariff Set Fixed 4.0 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.4853 11.73% 2.6060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0 3.5969 8.72% 2.6060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0
23.0 3.5729 9.74% 2.5184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4,0 3.6845 6.83% 2.5184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0
30.0 3.8795 2.75% 2.2118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.0 3.9911 0.19% 2.2118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.0
34.9 4.0941 .2.15% 1.9972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.0 4.2057 -4.45% 1.9972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.0
39.7 4.3043 -6.94% 1.7870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.0 4.4159 -9.00% 1.7870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.0
Tariff Set Fixed 3.9 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.4853 9.45% 2.5060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9 3.5969 6.56% 2.5060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9
23.0 3.5729 7.46% 2.4184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.9 3.6845 4.66% 2.4184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.9
30.0 3.8795 0.47% 2.1118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.9 3.9911 -1.97% 2.1118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.9
34.9 4.0941 -4.43% 1.8972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.9 4.2057 -6.62% 1.8972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.9
39.7 4.3043 -9.22% 1.6870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.9 4.4159 -11.17% 1.6870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.9
Tariff Set Fixed 3.8 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) Ac/kWh/kWh] ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.4853 7.17% 2.4060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.8 3.5969 4.39% 2.4060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.8
23.0 3.5729 5.18% 2.3184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.8 3.6845 2.50% 2.3184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.8
30.0 3.8795 -1.81% 2.0118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.8 3.9911 -4.14% 2.0118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.8
34.9 4.0941 -6.71% 1.7972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.8 4.2057 -8.78% 1.7972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.8
39.7 4.3043 .11.50% 1.5870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.8 4.41591 -13.33% 1.5870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.8
Appendix 5: TARIFF BENCHMARKING: ROE SET FIXED (SEMI COMMERCIAL LOAN)
Financial Parameters Technical Parameters Variables
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27% 1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW 1. ROE Set Fixed
2. Loan Follow Original Terms of Paiton 1 2. Availability Factor 83% 2. EPC Cost (US$/kW)
% of Total Loan Lender Repayment Interest 3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh 3. Coal Price ($/tons)
50% Commercial Loan 12 years 11% 4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
50% Soft Loan 12 years 5% 5. Contract Terms 30 years Notes:
3. Discount Rate 14% 6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh ALC = Average Levelized Cost
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
ROE Set Fixed 17% _______________ ____________________________________
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.8 per W EPC Cost US$ 584.67($Itons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Totalck ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh Whh D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh
21.0 3.4895 17.00% 2.8412 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.2351 3.6014 17.00% 2.9928 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.3868
23.0 3.5771 17.00% 2.8412 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.3227 3.6890 17.00% 2.9928 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.4744
30.0 3.8837 17.00% 2.8412 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.6293 3.9956 17.00% 2.9928 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.7810
34.9 4.0983 17.00% 2.8412 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.8439 4.2102 17.00% 2.9928 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.9956
39.7 4.3085 17.00% 2.8412 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.0542 4.4204 17.00% 2.9928 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.2068
ROE Set Fixed 16% _________________________
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.8 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67(/$tons) ALC(/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B/kWhD ( Total (c/kWh ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWht
21 3.4895 16.00% 2.7973 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1913 3.6014 16.00% 2.9466 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.3406
23.0 3.5771 16.00% 2.7973 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.2789 3.6890 16.00% 2.9466 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.4282
30.0 3.8837 16.00% 2.7973 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.6855 3.9956 16.00% 2.9466 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.7348
34.9 4.0983 16.00% 2.7973 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.8001 4.2102 16.00% 2.9466 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.9494
39.7 4.3085 16.00% 2.7973 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.0103 4.4204 16.00% 2.9466 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.1596
ROE Set Fixed _____ 15% ____ ____ ______________ ______________
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.8 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B/kWh C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC(c/kWh) ROE Wh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh
21.0 3.4895 15.00% 2.7534 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1474 3.6014 15.00% 2.9004 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.2944
23.0 3.5771 15.00% 2.7534 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.2350 3.6890 15.00% 2.9004 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.3820
30.0 3.8837 15.00% 2.7534 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.5416 3.9956 15.00% 2.9004 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.6886
34.9 4.0983 15.00% 2.7534 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7662 4.2102 15.00% 2.9004 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.9032
39.7 4.3085 15.00% 2.7534 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.9664 4.4204 15.00% 2.9004 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.1134
ROE Set Fixed 14% ____ ____ ______________ ______________
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.8 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) 21.0ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B C (c/kWh) D(/Wh) Total (c/kWh):ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B ckh C (c/kWh) D cEh) Total (c/kWh
3.4895 14.00% 2.7096 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1036 3.6014 14.00% 2.8642 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.2482
23.0 3.5771 14.00% 2.7096 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1912 3.6890 14.00% 2.8542 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.3368
30.0 3.8837 14.00% 2.7096 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.4977 3.9956 14.00% 2.8642 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.6424
34.9 4.0983 14.00% 2.7096 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7123 4.2102 14.00% 2.8642 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.8670
39.7 4.3085 14.00% 2.7096 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.9226 4.4204 14.00% 2.8542 0.3220 1.7388 0.15221 59,
Appendix 6: TARIFF BENCHMARKING: TARIFF SET FIXED (SEMI COMMERCIAL LOAN)
Financial Parameters Technical Parameters Variables
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27% 1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW 1. Tariff Set Fixed (c/kWh)
2. Loan 2. Availability Factor 83% 2. EPC Cost (US$/kW)
% of Total Loan Lender Repayment Interest 3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh 3. Coal Price ($/tons)
50% Commercial Loan 12 years 11% 4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
50% Soft Loan 12 years 5% 5. Contract Terms 30 years Notes:
3. Discount Rate 14% 6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh ALC = Average Levelized Cost
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
Tariff Set Fixed 4.1
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($Ltons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) TotalkWh) Wh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.4895 13.92% 2.7060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1 3.6014 10.79% 2.7060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1
23.0 3.5771 11.92% 2.6184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1 3.6890 8.90% 2.6184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1
30.0 3.8837 4.93% 2.3118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.1 3.9956 2.26% 2.3118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.1
34.9 4.0983 0.04% 2.0972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.1 4.2102 -2.39% 2.0972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.1
39.7 4.3085 -4.75% 1.8870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.1 4.4204 -6.94% 1.8870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.1
Tariff Set Fixed 4.0 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($ftons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.4895 11.64% 2.6060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0 3.6014 8.83% 2.6060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0
23.0 3.5771 9.64% 2.5184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0 3.6890 6.73% 2.5184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0
30.0 3.8837 2.65% 2.2118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.0 3.9956 0.09% 2.2118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.0
34.9 4.0983 -2.24% 1.9972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.0 4.2102 -4.55% 1.9972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.0
39.7 4.3085 -7.03% 1.7870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.0 4.4204 -9.10% 1.7870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.0
Tariff Set Fixed 3.9 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C /kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.4895 9.36% 2.5060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9 3.6014 6.46% 2.5060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9
23.0 3.5771 7.36% 2.4184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.9 3.6890 4.57% 2.4184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.9
30.0 3.8837 0.37% 2.1118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.9 3.9956 -2.07% 2.1118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.9
34.9 4.0983 -4.52% 1.8972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.9 4.2102 -6.71% 1.8972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.9
39.7 4.3085 -9.31% 1.6870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.9 4.4204 -11.26% 1.6870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.9
Tariff Set Fixed 3.8 centslkWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($Itons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (ckWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.4895 7.08% 2.4060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.8 3.6014 4.30% 2.4060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.8
23.0 3.5771 5.08% 2.3184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.8 3.6890 2.40% 2.3184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.8
30.0 3.8837 -1.91% 2.0118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.8 3.9956 -4.23% 2.0118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.8
34.9 4.0983 -6.80% 1.7972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.8 4.2102 8.88% 1.7972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.8
39.7 4.3085 -11.59% 1.5870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.8 4.4204 -13.43% 1.5870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.8
Appendix 7: TARIFF BENCHMARKING: ROE SET FIXED (MAJORITY COMMERCIAL LOAN)
Financial Parameters Technical Parameters Variables
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27% 1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW 1. ROE Set Fixed
2. Loan Follow Original Terms of Paiton 1 2. Availability Factor 83% 2. EPC Cost (US$/kW)
% of Total Loan Lender Repayment interest 3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh 3. Coal Price ($/tons)
75% Commercial Loan 12 years 11% 4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
25% Soft Loan 12 years 5% 5. Contract Terms 30 years Notes:
3. Discount Rate 14% 6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh ALC = Average Levelized Cost
17. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
ROE Set Fixed 17%
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.5723 17.00% 2.9240 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.3179 3.6886 17.00% 3.0800 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.4740
23.0 3.6599 17.00% 2.9240 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.4055 3.7762 17.00% 3.0800 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.5616
30.0 3.9665 17.00% 2.9240 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.7121 4.0828 17.00% 3.0800 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.8682
34.9 4.1811 17.00% 2.9240 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.9267 4.2974 17.00% 3.0800 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.0828
39.7 4.3913 17.00% 2.9240 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.1369 4.5076 17.00% 3.0800 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.2930
ROE Set Fixed 16%
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($Itons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C2(/kWh) . (/kWh T (/k)
21.0 3.5723 16.00% 2.8801 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.2741 3.6886 16.00% 3.0338 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.4278
23.0 3.6599 16.00% 2.8801 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.3617 3.7762 16.00% 3.0338 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.5154
30.0 3.9665 16.00% 2.8801 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.6682 4.0828 16.00% 3.0338 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.8220
34.9 4.1811 16.00% 2.8801 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.8829 4.2974 16.00% 3.0338 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.0366
39.7 4.3913 16.00% 2.8801 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.0931 4.5076 16.00% 3.0338 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.2468
ROE Set Fixed 15%
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C_/_ ) Dk)Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.5723 15.00% 2.8362 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.2302 3.6886 15.00% 2.9876 0,3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.3816
23.0 3.6599 15.00% 2.8362 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.3178 3.7762 15.00% 2.9876 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.4692
30.0 3.9665 15.00% 2.8362 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.6244 4.0828 15.00% 2.9876 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.7758
34.9 4.1811 15.00% 2.8362 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.8390 4.2974 15.00% 2.9876 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.9904
39.7 4.3913 15.00% 2.8362 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.0492 4.5076 15.00% 2.9876 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.2006
ROE Set Fixed 14%
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($ttons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.5723 14.00% 2.7924 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1864 3.6886 14.00% 2.9414 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.3354
23.0 3.6599 14.00% 2.7924 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.2739 3.7762 14.00% 2.9414 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.4230
30.0 3.9665 14.00% 2.7924 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.5805 4.0828 14.00% 2.9414 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.7296
34.91 4.1811 14.00% 2.7924 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7951 4.2974 14.00% 2.9414 0.32201 1.5285 0.1522 4.9442
39.71 4.3913 14.00% 2.7924 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.0054 4.5076 14.00%1 2.9414 0.3220 1.7388 0.15221 5.1644
Appendix 8: TARIFF BENCHMARKING: TARIFF SET FIXED (MAJORITY COMMERCIAL LOAN)
Financial Parameters Technical Parameters Variables
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27% 1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW 1. Tariff Set Fixed (c/kWh)
2. Loan 2. Availability Factor 83% 2. EPC Cost (US$/kW)
% of Total Loan Lender Repayment Interest 3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh 3. Coal Price ($/tons)
75% Commercial Loan 12 years 11% 4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
25% Soft Loan 12 years 5% 5. Contract Terms 30 years Notes:
3. Discount Rate 14% 6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh ALC = Average Levelized Cost
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
Tariff Set Fixed 4.1
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) . (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.5324 12.94% 2.7060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1 3.6886 8.90% 2.7060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1
23.0 3.6200 10.94% 2.6184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1 3.7762 7.01% 2.6184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1
30.0 3.9265 3.96% 2.3118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.1 4.0828 0.37% 2.3118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.1
34.9 4.1412 -0.94% 2.0972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.1 4.2974 -4.27% 2.0972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.1
39.7 4.3514 -6.73% 1.8870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.1 4.5076 .8.82% 1.8870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.1
Tariff Set Fixed 4.0 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.5324 10.66% 2.6060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0 3.6886 6.74% 2.6060 0,3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0
23.0 3.6200 8.66% 2.5184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0 3.7762 4.84% 2.5184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0
30.0 3.9265 1.67% 2.2118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.0 4.0828 -1.79% 2.2118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.0
34.9 4.1412 -3.22% 1.9972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.0 4.2974 -6.44% 1.9972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.0
39.7 43514 8.01% 1.7870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.0 45076 -10.99% 1.7870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.0
Tariff Set Fixed 3.9 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($Itons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) C kWh kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.5324 8.38% 2.5060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9 3.6886 4.68% 2.5060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9
23.0 3.6200 6.38% 2.4184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.9 3.7762 2.68% 2.4184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.9
30.0 3.9265 -0.61% 2.1118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.9 4.0828 -3.96% 2.1118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.9
34.9 4.1412 -6.50% 1.8972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.9 4.2974 -8.60% 1.8972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.9
39.7 4.3514 -10.29% 1.6870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.9 4.5076 -13.16% 1.6870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.9
Tariff Set Fixed 3.8 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($ltons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.5324 6.10% 2.4060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.8 3.6886 2.41% 2.4060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.8
23.0 3.6200 4.10% 2.3184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.8 3.7762 0.61% 2.3184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.8
30.0 3.9265 -2.89% 2.0118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.8 4.0828 -6.12% 2.0118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.8
34.9 4.1412 -7.78% 1.7972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.8 4.2974 -10.77% 1.7972 0.3220 15285 01522 3.8
397 4.3514 .12.57% 1.5870 0.32201 1.7388 0.1522 3.8 4.5076 -16.32% 1.5870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.8
Appendix 9: TARIFF BENCHMARKING: ROE SET FIXED (FULLY COMMERCIAL LOAN)
Financial Parameters Technical Parameters Variables
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27% 1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW 1. ROE Set Fixed
2. Loan Follow Original Terms of Paiton I 2. Availability Factor 83% 2. EPC Cost (US$/kW)
% of Total Loan Lender Repayment Interest 3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh 3. Coal Price ($/tons)
100% Commercial Loan 12 years 11% 4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
0% Soft Loan 12 years 5. Contract Terms 30 years Notes:
3. Discount Rate 14% 6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh ALC = Average Levelized Cost
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
ROE Set Fixed 17% _______________ ____________________________________
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.8 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALCkWh) A(c/kWh) B c/hc /kWh/kWh) D c/Dh Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3 7237 17.00% 3.0754 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.4693 3.8481 17.00% 3.2395 0.3220 0.9197 0 1522 4.6335
23.0 3.8113 17.00% 3.0754 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.5569 3.9357 17.00% 3.2395 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.7211
30.0 4.1179 17.00% 3.0754 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.8635 4.2423 17.00% 3.2395 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 5.0277
34.9 4.3325 17.00% 3.0754 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.0781 4.4569 17.00% 3.2395 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.2423
39.7 4.5427 17.00% 3.0754 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.2883 4.6671 17.00% 3.2395 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.4525
ROE Set Fixed 16% __________________________ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.8 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($Itons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.7237 16.00% 3.0315 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.4255 3.8481 16.00% 3.1933 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.5873
23.0 3.8113 16.00% 3.0315 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.5131 3.9357 16.00% 3.1933 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.6749
30.0 4.1179 16.00% 3.0316 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.8197 4.2423 16.00% 3.1933 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.9816
34.9 4.3325 16.00% 3.0315 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.0343 4.4569 16.00% 3.1933 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.1961
39.7 4.5427 16.00% 3.0315 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.24451 4.6671 16.00% 3.1933 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.4063
ROE Set Fixed _____ 15% ______________________________________________
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.8 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) -B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B(ckh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.7237 15.00% 2.9876 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.3816 3.8481 15.00% 3.1471 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.5411
23.0 3.8113 15.00% 2.9876 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.4692 3.9357 15.00% 3.1471 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.6287
30.0 4.1179 15.00% 2.9876 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.7758 4.2423 15.00% 3.1471 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.9353
34.9 4.3325 15.00% 2.9876 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.9904 4.4569 15.00% 3.1471 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.1499
39.7 4.5427 15.00% 2.9876 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.2006 4.6671 15.00% 3.1471 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.3601
ROE Set Fixed 14%____-_____
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.8 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($ltons) A=L___ ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.7237 14.00% 2.9438 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.3378 3.8481 14.00% 3.1009 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.4949
23.0 3.8113 14.00% 2.9438 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.4253 3.9357 14.00% 3.1009 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.5825
30.0 4.1179 14.00% 2.9438 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.7319 4.2423 14.00% 3.1009 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.8891
34.9 4.3325 14.00% 2.9438 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.94651 4.4569 14.00% 3.1009 0.3220 1.52851 0.1522 5.1037
39.7 4.5427 14.00% 2.9438 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.1568 4.6671 14.00% 3.1009 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.3139
00
Appendix 10: TARIFF BENCHMARKING: TARIFF SET FIXED (FULLY COMMERCIAL LOAN)
Financial Parameters Technical Parameters Variables
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27% 1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW 1. Tariff Set Fixed (c/kWh)
2. Loan Follow the Original Terms of the Paiton I 2. Availability Factor 83% 2. EPC Cost (US$/kW)
% of Total Loan Lender Repayment Interest 3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh 3. Coal Price ($/tons)
100% Commercial Loan 12 years 11% 4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
0% Soft Loan 12 years 5. Contract Terms 30 years Notes:
3. Discount Rate 14% 6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh ALC = Average Levelized Cost
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
Tariff Set Fixed 4.1
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.7237 8.58% 2.7060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1 3.8481 5.45% 2.7060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1
23.0 3.8113 6.58% 2.6184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1 3.9357 3.56% 2.6184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1
30.0 4.1179 -0.41% 2.3118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.1 4.2423 -3.08% 2.3118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.1
34.9 4.3325 -5.30% 2.0972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.1 4.4569 -7.73% 2.0972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.1
39.7 4.5427 -10.09% 1.8870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.1 4.6671 -12.27% 1.8870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.1
Tariff Set Fixed 4.0 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.7237 6.30% 2.6060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0 3.8481 3.29% 2.6060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0
23.0 3.8113 4.30% 2.5184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0 3.9357 1.39% 2.5184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0
30.0 4.1179 -2.69% 2.2118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.0 4.2423 -5.24% 2.2118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.0
349 4.3325 -7.58% 1.9972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.0 4.4569 -9.89% 1.9972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.0
39.7 4.5427 -12.37% 1.7870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.0 4.6671 -14.44% 1.7870 03220 17388 01522 40
Tariff Set Fixed 3.9 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67($tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh) ALC (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) - C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.7237 4.02% 2.5060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9 3.8481 1.12% 2.5060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9
23.0 3.8113 2.02% 2.4184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.9 3.9357 -0.77% 2.4184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.9
30.0 4.1179 -4.97% 2.1118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.9 4.2423 -7.41% 2.1118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.9
34.9 4.3325 -9.86% 1.8972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.9 4.4569 -12.05% 1.8972 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.9
39.7 4.5427 -13.47% 1.6870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.9 4.6671 -16.60% 1.6870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.9
Tariff Set Fixed 3.8 cents/kWh
Coal Price EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW EPC Cost US$ 884.67
($/tons) ALC c/kWh ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (C (c/Wh) (c/kWh) ROE A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.7237 1.74% 2.4060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.8 3.8481 -1.04% 2.4060 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.8
23.0 3.8113 -0.26% 2.3184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.8 3.9357 -2.94% 2.3184 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.8
30.0 4.1179 -7.25% 2.0118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.8 4.2423 -9.57% 2.0118 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 3.8
34.9 4.3325 -12.14% 1.7972 0,3220 1.5285 0.1522 3.8 4.4569 -14.22% 1.7972 0.3220 1.5285 0,1522 3.8
39.7 4.5427 -16.93% 1.5870 0.32201 1.7388 0.1522 3.8 4.6671 -18.77% 1.5870 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 3.8
-.1
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Chapter 7: Financial Analysis for the Paiton 1280
7.1. Financial Parameter Analysis
The author developed an approximation of the cash flow analysis for the Paiton I
project, as shown in Appendix 1. This analysis takes into account any publicly available
financial information of the Paiton I project and the author's reasonable assumptions281.
Even though the cash flow projection was developed to best reflect the cash flow of the
Paiton I project, the results of the analysis might deviate and are not intended to reveal
the original cash flow by any means.
The financial parameters derived from the cash flow analysis are as follows:
1) IRR on Project = 14.69%
As mentioned earlier, a project is attractive if the IRR exceeds the cost of
capital, which has been 13% in the US and even higher in Asian countries28 2.
Hossein Razavi states that private investors usually want an IRR of approximately
15% while Lang indicates that the normal practice for infrastructure projects in
Asia is 18%283. Therefore, the approximation of 14.69% IRR for the Paiton I
project is considered the normal practice.
280 The thesis author prepared this case under the supervision of Professor Massood V. Samii as the
basis for the thesis discussion, and not to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of infrastructure
development related issues. Data presented in the case analysis might have been altered to simplify, focus,
and to preserve individual confidentiality. The assistance of Dr. Hardiv Situmeang-the Planning Director
of PLN (July 31, 1998 - December 31, 1999) and later, the senior advisor to the PLN CEO-in the
preparation of this case is greatly appreciated. The remarkable contribution of Mr. Situmeang in the case
analysis is gratefully acknowledged.
281 Assumptions include percentage of annual increase in exchange rate movement prior and after the
Asian crisis, the inflation rate projection of Indonesia and the US, the actual exchange rate projection, the
discount rate, the fuel cost is estimated the same for the whole contract year.
282 Lang, 1998
283 Ibid
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2) ROE = 24.76%
Razavi provides an approximation formula to derive ROE based on the
IRR, the debt equity ratio, and the average interest rate on the debt, as follows:
Project IRR = (% of equity)(ROE) + (% of debt)(Average interest rate on debt)
Since the IRR of the Paiton I is approximately 14.69%, the debt equity ratio is
72.8%:27.2%, and the average interest rate on debt is approximately 11%, the
ROE would be approximately 24.57%, almost the same as the one derived from
the cash flow analysis.
According to Lang, a 30% ROE for infrastructure projects in Asia are
deemed acceptable by most players284 . Furthermore, Hossein Razavi states that
private investors usually want at least 25% to 35% ROE28 5 . Therefore, the
approximation of 24.76% ROE for the Paiton I project is considered the normal
practice.
3) Average Levelized Cost = 5.6596 cents/kWh286
The average levelized cost consists of the following components:
a) Component A = 3.6568 cents/kWh
b) Component B = 0.3220 cents/kWh
c) Component C = 1.5285 cents/kWh 87
d) Component D = 0.1522 cents/kWh
284 Lang, 1998
285 Razavi, Hossein, "Financing Energy Projects in Emerging Economies", Pennwell Books, Tulsa,
Oklahoma, 1996.
286 Under the coal price US$ 34.9 per tons
287 Under the coal price US$ 34.9 per tons
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4) Average Levelized Tariff = 7.2447 cents/kWh288
Despite the average levelized tariff, the total tariff 89 are:
a) Years 1-6 = 8.1706 cents/kWh
b) Years 7-12 = 8.1241 cents/kWh
c) Years 13-30 = 5.4889 cents/kWh
As previously mentioned in chapter III, the average PLN's electricity tariff to the
consumers was approximately US$ 3.2 cents/kWh2 90.
5) Sensitivity Analysis
Appendix 2 shows the sensitivity analysis of the tariff, average levelized
cost, total charge, capacity charge, and percentage of the capacity charge to the
total charge, with respect to the coal price. As previously mentioned in chapter 5,
the fixed capacity charges (component A and component B) that PLN must pay
irrespective of dispatch levels amounts to an average of 71% of the total payment,
under the coal price US$ 34.9 per tons. The average dollar term of these capacity
payments for the first 6 years is US$ 573 million. This capacity payment shows
the take-or-pay level of the Paiton I PPA.
7.2. Analysis on ROE trend
Based on the successes of the early players, private power projects in developing
countries are expected to provide ROE in the range of mid-20s or higher291. As
288 Under the coal price US$ 34.9 per tons
289 Tariff is derived from the present value of total costs (discounted to COD) during the associated
years divided by the present value of net energy output (discounted to COD) during those years. The result
is slightly different from those derived by PLN, which are US$ 8.5 cents/kWh for the first 6 years, US$ 8.3
cents/kWh for year 7 to 12, and US$ 5.5 cents/kWh for year 13 to 30 (PLN Press Release, 1999).
290 The tariff was Rp. 223 per kWh with the exchange rate Rp. 7,000 per 1 US$ (PLN Press Release,
"Latar Belakang: Background", 1999)
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mentioned earlier, Lang and Razavi advocated a 30% and a 25% to 35% ROE
respectively. However, Jacob J. Worenklein argues that in general the expectations have
not been realized, for the following reasons292:
1) Only small numbers of projects have actually moved forward.
2) Greater numbers of project developers are competing for these projects.
3) Unrealistic nature of these expectations. With greater supply of capital and less
demand for capital, the price of capital (the ROE) should be lowered.
The Paiton I model PPA protect the project company from market risks, currency
risks, and political force majeure risks. In other words, the equity and debt for the Paiton
I project are highly secured. Its capital markets tranche were re-financed at an early stage
of construction at approximately 9.5% interest rate. The question becomes apparent:
what is then the appropriate ROE if the debt return is 9.5%?293. Although there are
significant risks especially during the development and the construction stages, after
these stages, the risks proved to be simultaneously lower because of high protections
under the take-or-pay PPA, providing certainty in the revenue stream. Therefore, it is
logical that the project investors should consider a lower than the mid-20s range ROE to
compensate for the risks that they perceived as high, but had been highly secured.
In addition, the private power market is becoming more competitive with the
inclusion of merchant plants. As the market is getting more competitive, various
countries will move towards new facilities financed on a merchant basis, even without
any guarantees from government or public utility. To illustrate, figure 7.1 shows the
291 Worenklein, Jacob J., "Project Finance: Adapts to Changing Power Market", Private Power
Executive, May-June 1996.
292 Ibid
293 Worenklein, Jacob J., "Project Finance: Adapts to Changing Power Market", Private Power
Executive, May-June 1996.
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lifetime ROE for a combined-cycle plant from the US examples. When the market is
oligopoly294 , the private investors demand a high ROE and therefore sell the electricity at
a higher tariff rate. This phenomenon is the initial case in most developing countries. As
the market is becoming more competitive, the private investors should agree to expect a
lower ROE and therefore sell the electricity at a lower price.
PROFITABILITY HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO PRICES
US Examples
Lifetime ROE for
a combined-cycle
plant
21
19 .............................. ..................... ............ ... ............
Upside (oligopoly, limited entry)
17
Expected Return
15 -
13
11
Downside (high
market entry-
9 competitive)
7 _Combined energy and
capacity price for years
20 25 30 35 two till seven ($/MWh)
Figure 7.1: Profitability Highly Sensitive to Prices: US Examples 295
The Indonesia's electricity sector had been analyzing the possibility for a
competitive electricity business. In 2007, the sector was expected to start restructuring
the business towards a competitive industry under the merchant plants scheme, namely
294 Oligopoly is a market condition in which sellers are so few that the actions of any one of them will
materially affect price and then the costs that competitors must pay (The American Heritage Dictionary).
295 The Boston Consulting Group, "Deconstruction for the New Millennium: Building the
Competitive Utility Company", 2000 Asian Utility CEO Conference, Singapore, March 9-10, 2000.
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the Multiple Buyers/Multiple Sellers (MB/MS) scheme2'. Under this MB/MS scheme,
the industry would be highly competitive; the producers are allowed to sell power to
several purchasers at the same time while the purchasers would purchase power from
purchasers with the lowest bid. Since the market is not an oligopoly anymore, the
producers that offer the least electricity tariff are likely to attract more buyers. The
highly competitive nature of the industry under this bidding scheme would demand lower
tariff. The producers would likely to undertake a cost-effective development and expect
a lower ROE297. As a result, under this MB/MS scheme, there would be more projects
demanding lower ROE. The question would be to what level the ROE can be lowered.
In some situations in Chile, and elsewhere, there have been bids for power projects with
surprising single-digit returns 2 98. In addition, figure 7.1 shows that in the high market
entry competitive, the expected ROE could fall to approximately 16.5%, and the extreme
downside could be 7%.
Worenklein addresses the entire phenomenon of the increasing competition in the
electricity business, as follows:
... we will see more projects, more demand for capital, but not materially higher
rates of return in view of the large supply of capital poised to invest and the
perception that the level of project risk does not warrant returns higher than those
currently being obtained in most countries. (Worenklein, 1996).
296 Interview with Dr. Situmeang
297 With a low ROE, the producers' tariff would approach the average levelized cost, the cost to
generate the power.
298 Worenklein, Jacob J., "Project Finance: Adapts to Changing Power Market", Private Power
Executive, May-June 1996.
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7.3. Chapter Summary
This chapter provides an approximation of the financial analysis for the Paiton I
project. The IRR and ROE derived from the analysis reflect the normal practice for
infrastructure projects in developing countries. However, there has been a tendency that
the high expectation of ROE for power projects would decrease as the competition in the
electricity generating business increases with the inclusion of merchant plants (multi-
buyers and multi-sellers) scheme.
The only problem was that the Paiton I's tariff to PLN significantly exceeded
PLN's subsidized tariff to the end consumers, despite the appropriateness issues
addressed in chapter 4. When the thesis was final, the contracted parties had been
renegotiating the PPA for almost two years with no significant results. The next chapter
would propose a commercial approach to arrive at a competitive tariff by taking into
account the tariff benchmarking analysis outlined in chapter 6 as well as the tendency of
decreasing ROE expectation because of the increasing competition in the electricity
generating business.
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Appendix 1: Cash Flow Analysis for the Paiton I Power Generation Project
(all numbers in $1,000 unless indicated otherwise)
F ;Date 29-Dec-00ile Nam Fton 01
Pre-Conatruction Start Date 1993
Construction Start Date 1995 Jul-95
Construction months including Start Up 48 months
Commercial Operations 1999 Jul-99
Project Life (years) 30
Operating Availability PPA Attachment A 83% 1
Start-Up Availability PPA Attachment A 83%
Total Annual Hours normal years 8,760 hours
Total Annual Hours leap years 8,784 hours
Project Cost Breakdown (In US$ 1000) % of Total Cost Cost Breakdown 0rginal Paiton
Construction Cost
EPC Cost (including Special Facility) 1,772,300 1,772,300 E
Contingency 3,300 3,300
Development Cost 190,000 190,000
Development Fee 11,800
Development Expense 43,200
Insurance 30,000
Administration Cost 26,000
oo Owners Engineer 15,000
Pre-Completion Labor 6,600
Agency Fees 3,700
Value Added Taxes 53,700
Initial Working Capital 40,300 40,300
Working Capital 25,300
O&M Staffing 15,000
Financial Cost 494,100
Debt Instrument Fee: MITI Fee 185,900 12,300
Commitment Fee 29,300
Up-front Financing Fees 144,300
Interest During Construction 12.33% 308,200 308,200
Total Project Cost 100.00% 2,500,000 2,500,000
Repayment Years
1999-2011
1999-2011
1999-2011
1999-2011
2008-2014
Financing Amount (in USS 1,000)
US Exim Loan
J Exim - Tranche A: Loan
J Exim - Tranche B: Co-financing
OPIC Loan
Bonds
Equity
Total Sources
Interest Rates-
US Exim Loan
J Exim - Tranche A
J Exim - Tranche B
OPIC Loan
Bonds
12
12
12
6
72.8%
27.2%
100.0%
W-- 4 A W ra
111V rr-M MYIWuu 0025 CAw;af1YO raOe k' b
Annual Increase in Exchange Rate prior to Asian Crisis (up to 1997)
Exchange Rate (RDm 1999 1999
Projected Annual Exchange Rate movement after the Asian Crisis (after 1997
Years 1-10 increase
Years 11-20 decrease
Years 21-30 steady
Tax
Inflation - Indonesia
Years 1-10
Years 11-20
Years 21-30
Inflation - the US
Years 1-30
IPlants Life years
Component A
Capital Cost Recovery Charge Rate CCR
Years 1-6 CCR1
Years 7-12 CCR 2
Years 13-30 CCR3
Component B
Fixed O&M non-Indonesian FOMRF
Fixed O&M Indonesian FOMRL
Component C
Weighted Average Specific Heat Rate SHRw
Specific Heat Rate at Full Load 5l1cc
Higher Heating Value of Coal HHV
Price Allowance in 1997 Po
Adjusted Price Allowance In 1997 P
Coal Price In 1997
The exchange rate Immediately preceding the cris
Fraction of P attributable to foreign currency costs DP,
Component D
Variable O&M non-Indonesian VOMR,
Variable O&M Indonesian VOMRL
Rp per kW-year
Rp per kW-year
Rp per kW-year
Rp per kW-year
Rp per kW-year
kilocalorie/kWh
kilocalorle/kWh
kcal/kg
Rp/kg
Rp/kg
$/tonnes
Rp/$
Rp per kWh
Rp per kWh
1997
00
MOMMIAM-11111111-1 M
. . ................................................ ................................................ 
................................ ................................................   ..... .  . ..... . ..... . ..... .. ...... .. ..... ..
REVENUE CALCULATION (in US$) COD
DCR1 -Discount Factor to adjust for the US Inflation 1.000
DCR 2 - Discount Factor to adjust for Indonesian Inflation 1.000
Contract Capacity - CC (kW): PPA Attachment A 615,000 1,230,000
Availability Factor - AF (%): PPA Attachment A 83.00% 83.00%
Total Annual Hours (hours) 8,760 8,760
The US Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Indonesian Consumer Price Index (ICPI)
Currency Exchange Rate (Rp/$) 2,038 2,109 2,183 2,260 10,000 9,000
CCR (Rp per kW-year) 1,092,596
Pm (Rp/kg) 71.126 78.86 349.00 314.10
P($/tonnes) 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90
Component A (Rupiah term) 4,925,849,513,052
Component A (Dollar term) 547,316,613
Dollar portion (Dollar term) 547,316,613
Rupiah portion (Dollar term) 0
Component B (Rupiah term) 214,702,353,183
Component B (Dollar term) 23,855,817
Dollar portion (Dollar term) 19,451,201
Ruplsh portion (Dollar term) 4,404,616
Component C (Ruplah term) 732,255,087,752 1,318,059,157,953
Component C (Dollar term) 73,225,509 146,451,018
Dollar portion (Dollar term) o o
Rupiah portion (Dollar term) 73,225,509 146,451,018
Component D (Ruplah term) 96,300,638,041
Component D (Dollar term) 10,700,071
Dollar portion (Dollar term) 6,371,618
Ruplah portion (Dollar term) 4,328,453
Total Components A+B+C+D (Dollar Term) 73,225,509 728,323,518
Total Dollar Portion (Dollar term) - 573,139,431
Total Rupiah Portion (Dollar term) 73,225,509 155,184,087
% Dollar 0% 79%
% Rupiah 100% 21%
Capacity Charge Components A+B (Dollar Term) 571,172,430
Dollar portion (Dollar term) 566,767,813
Rupiah portion (Dollar term) 4,404,616
% Dollar 99%
% Ruplah 1%
TOTAL REVENUE (Components A, B, C, D) 73,225,509 728,323,518
Tarif (centalk1h) 1.8376 8.1440
Capacity Charge (Components A+B)(c ntB/k 0.0000 6.3868
I
I.WO 1.081 1.UV,1 1.1zo 1.1ow 1. 1 b4 i.z~U 1.ZoW 1.SUD 1.,444.10
1.080 1.166 1.260 1.360 1.469 1.587 1.714 1.851 1.999 1.791 1.898
1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000
83,00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00%
8,784 8,760 8,760 8,760 8,784 8,760 8,760 8,760 8,784 8,760 8,760
9,180 9,364 9,551 9,742 9,937 10,135 10,338 10,545 10,756 10,328 9,913
1,092,598 1,092,596 1,092,596 1,092,596 1,092,596 1,065,816 1,065,816 1,065,816 1,065,816 1,065,816 1,065,816
320.38 326.79 333.33 339.99 346.79 353.73 360.80 368.02 375.38 360.36 345.95
34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90
5,024,366,503,313 5,124,853,833,379 5,227,350,910,047 5,331,897,928,248 5,438,535,886,813 5,411,339,723,039 5,519,586,517,500 5,629,957,847,850 5,742,557,004,807 5,512,854,724,815 5,292,340,535,630
547,316,613 547,316,613 547,316,613 547,316,613 547,316,613 533,901,646 533,901,646 533,901,646 533,901,648 533,901,646 533,901,646
547,316,613 547,316,613 547,318,613 547,316,613 547,316,613 533,901,848 533,901,646 533,901,646 533,901,646 533,901,846 533,901,848
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
226,731,753,735 239,463,078,875 252,939,304,938 267,206,179,582 282,312,409,748 298,309,862,959 315,253,782,925 333,203,020,513 352,220,281,218 340,911,280,042 342,147,702,193
24,698,448 25,573,826 26,483,373 27,428,579 28,411,005 29,432,291 30,494,154 31,598,397 32,746,908 33,016,124 34,516,528
20,034,737 20,635,779 21,254,852 21,892,498 22,549,273 23,225,751 23,922,523 24,640,199 25,379,405 26,140,787 26,925,011
4,663,711 4,938,047 5,228,521 5,536,081 5,861,733 6,206,540 8,571,631 6,958,198 7,367,503 6,875,338 7,591,517
1,348,103,684,513 1,371,308,747,935 1,398,734,922,893 1,428,709,621,351 1,459,230,783,131 1,484,348,690,054 1,514,035,663,855 1,544,316,377,132 1,579,518,328,523 1,512,194,596,488 1,451,706,812,628
146,852,253 146,451,018 146,451,018 148,451,018 148,852,253 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,852,253 146,451,018 146,451,018
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
146,852,253 146,451,018 148,451,018 146,451,018 146,852,253 148,451,018 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,852,253 146,451,018 146,451,018
102,599,084,266 108,733,021,358 115,570,800,158 122,861,441,599 130,994,318,188 138,929,446,612 147,776,737,377 157,217,097,915 167,750,504,018 158,181,702,007 161,377,291,884
11,176,371 11,612,310 12,100,550 12,611,665 13,182,843 13,707,264 14,294,283 14,909,253 15,596,235 15,319,372 16,280,056
6,580,747 6,759,650 6,962,439 7,171,312 7,406,689 7,608,045 7,836,287 8,071,375 8,336,293 8,562,922 8,819,810
4,595,824 4,852,680 5,138,110 5,440,352 5,776,155 6,099,218 6,457,996 6,837,878 7,259,942 6,758,450 7,460,247
730,043,885 730,953,766 732,351,553 733,807,873 735,762,714 723,492,218 725,141,100 726,860,313 729,097,043 728,688,159 731,149,248
573,932,096 574,712,041 575,533,904 576,380,423 577,272,574 564,735,442 565,660,456 566,613,220 567,617,344 568,605,355 569,646,467
156,111,588 156,241,725 158,817,649 157,427,450 158,490,140 158,756,776 159,480,644 160,247,093 161,479,698 160,082,804 161,502,781
79% 79% 79% 79% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78%
21% 21% 21% 21% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22%
572,015,061 572,890,439 573,799,985 574,745,191 575,727,618 563,333,937 584,395,800 565,500,043 566,648,554 566,917,770 568,418,174
567,351,349 587,952,391 568,571,465 569,209,110 569,865,885 557,127,397 557,824,169 558,541,845 559,281,051 560,042,433 560,826,657
4,663,711 4,938,047 5,228,521 5,536,081 5,861,733 6,206,540 6,571,631 6,958,198 7,367,503 6,875,336 7,591,517
99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99%
1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
730,O43,685 730,963,766 732,351,553 733,807,873 735,762,714 723,492,218 726,141,100 726,860,313 729,097,043 728,68,159 731,149,248
8.1409 8.1734 8.1890 8.2053 8.2047 8.0900 8.1084 8.1278 8.1304 8.1481 8.1755
8.3787 6.4060 6.4161 6.4267 6.4201 6.2991 6.3110 6.3233 6.3189 8.3392 6.3580
....... ....... .... ................ ................................  ................ .............. .............. 
1.426 1.469 1.513 1.558 1.605 1.653 1.702 1.754 1.806 1.860 1.915
2.012 2.133 2.261 2.397 2.540 2.693 2.854 3.026 2.191 2.279 2.370
1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000
83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00%
8,760 8,784 8,760 8,760 8,760 8,784 8,760 8,760 8,760 8,784 8,760
9,516 9,135 8,770 8,419 8,082 7,759 7,449 7,151 7,151 7,151 7,151
553,439 553,439 553,439 553,439 553,439 553,439 553,439 553,439 553,439 553,439 553,439
332.11 318.83 306.07 293.83 282.08 270.79 259.96 249.56 249.56 249.56 249.56
34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90
2,638,192,847,124 2,532,665,133,239 2,431,358,527,910 2,334,104,186,794 2,240,740,019,322 2,151,110,418,549 2,065,066,001,807 1,982,463,361,735 1,982,463,361,735 1,982,463,361,735 1,982,463,361,735
277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464
277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,484 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,484
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
343,673,554,124 345,503,790,886 347,654,291,830 350,141,915,768 352,984,559,438 356,201,219,487 359,812,058,169 363,838,472,999 338,075,510,036 349,086,370,447 360,462,300,476
36,115,062 37,820,201 39,641,253 41,588,442 43,673,000 45,907,272 48,304,830 50,880,601 47,277,807 48,817,609 50,408,464
27,732,761 28,564,744 29,421,686 30,304,337 31,213,467 32,149,871 33,114,367 34,107,798 35,131,032 36,184,963 37,270,512
8,382,300 9,255,457 10,219,567 11,284,105 12,459,533 13,757,401 15,190,463 16,772,803 12,146,775 12,632,646 13,137,952
1,393,638,540,123 1,341,558,458,788 1,284,377,278,577 1,233,002,187,434 1,183,682,099,937 1,139,448,062,011 1,090,881,423,302 1,047,246,166,370 1,047,246,166,370 1,050,115,333,949 1,047,246,166,370
146,451,018 146,852,253 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,451,018 148,852,253 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,852,253 146,451,018
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
146,451,018 146,852,253 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,852,253 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,852,253 146,451,018
164,835,124,650 169,031,981,210 172,598,203,949 176,936,111,106 181,601,694,125 187,125,129,508 191,992,653,167 197,759,337,357 167,648,230,429 174,006,680,983 179,624,909,053
a 17,321,760 18,502,904 19,680,497 21,015,756 22,468,662 24,116,717 25,775,047 27,655,443 23,444,587 24,333,778 25,119,453
9,084,404 9,382,572 9,637,644 9,926,774 10,224,577 10,560,167 10,847,254 11,172,671 11,507,851 11,885,561 12,208,679
8,237,356 9,120,332 10,042,852 11,088,983 12,244,085 13,556,550 14,927,793 16,482,771 11,936,736 12,448,217 12,910,773
477,123,302 480,410,822 483,008,231 486,290,680 489,828,143 494,111,706 497,766,358 502,222,525 494,408,876 497,239,104 499,214,398
314,052,629 315,182,779 316,294,794 317,466,574 318,673,508 319,945,502 321,197,084 322,515,933 323,874,347 325,305,988 326,714,655
163,070,674 165,228,042 166,713,437 168,824,105 171,154,635 174,166,204 176,569,274 179,706,592 170,534,529 171,933,116 172,499,743
66% 66% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 64% 66% 65% 65%
34% 34% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 36% 34% 35% 35%
313,350,525 315,055,664 316,876,717 318,823,906 320,908,463 323,142,735 325,540,294 328,116,065 324,513,271 326,053,073 327,643,928
304,968,225 305,800,208 306,657,150 307,539,801 308,448,931 309,385,335 310,349,831 311,343,262 312,366,496 313,420,427 314,505,976
8,382,300 9,255,457 10,219,567 11,284,105 12,459,533 13,757,401 15,190,463 16,772,803 12,146,775 12,632,646 13,137,952
97% 97% 97% 96% 96% 96% 95% 95% 96% 96% 96%
3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4%
477,123,302 480,410,822 483,008,231 486,290,680 489,828,143 494,111,706 497,766,358 502,222,526 494,408,876 497,239,104 499,214,398
5.3351 5.3572 5.4009 5.4376 5.4772 5.5100 5.5659 5.6158 5.5284 5.5448 5.5821
3.5038 3.5133 3.5433 3.5650 3.5883 3,6035 3.6401 3.6689 3.6287 3.6359 3.6637
I.W(4 Z.Ujj Z.VtF4 Z.1of Z.za I.1doo Z.00r
2.465 2.563 2.666 2.772 2.883 2.999 3.119
1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000
83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00%
8,760 8,760 8,784 8,760 8,760 8,760 8,784
7,151 7,151 7,151 7,151 7,151 7,151 7,151
553,439 553,439 553,439 553,439 553,439 553,439 553,439
249.56 249.56 249.56 249.56 249.56 249.56 249.56
34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90
1,982,463,361,735 1,982,463,361,735 1,982,463,361,735 1,982,463,361,735 1,982,463,361,735 1,982,463,361,735 1,982,463,361,735
277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,484 277,235,464 277,235,464
277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464 277,235,464
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
372,215,641,962 384,359,162,591 396,906,070,894 409,870,031,783 423,265,182,649 437,106,150,038 451,408,066,925
52,052,097 53,750,295 55,504,904 57,317,835 59,191,066 61,126,641 63,126,677
38,388,627 39,540,286 40,726,495 41,948,290 43,206,738 44,502,940 45,838,029
13,663,470 14,210,009 14,778,409 15,369,546 15,984,328 16,623,701 17,288,649
1,047,246,166,370 1,047,246,166,370 1,050,115,333,949 1,047,246,166,370 1,047,246,166,370 1,047,246,166,370 1,050,115,333,949
146,451,018 146,451,018 146,852,253 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,852,253
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
146,451,018 146,451,018 146,852,253 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,451,018 146,852,253
185,936,883,641 192,475,146,558 199,793,848,452 206,283,907,700 213,531,870,309 221,061,073,612 229,488,099,567
26,002,144 26,916,481 27,939,957 28,844,755 29,861,136 30,914,049 32,092,517
12,574,940 12,952,188 13,377,304 13,740,976 14,153,206 14,577,802 15,056,273
13,427,204 13,964,293 14,562,653 15,103,779 15,707,930 16,336,247 17036,244
501,740,723 504,353,257 507,532,578 509,849,072 512,738,683 515,727,171 519,306,911
328,199,031 329,727,938 331,339,262 332,924,730 334,595,408 336,316,206 338,129,765
173,541,692 174,625,319 176,193,315 176,924,342 178,143,275 179,410,965 181,177,146
65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65%
35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35%
329,287,561 330,985,759 332,740,368 334,553,299 336,426,529 338,362,105 340,362,141
315,624,091 316,775,750 317,961,958 319,183,753 320,442,202 321,738,404 323,073,492
13,663,470 14,210,009 14,778,409 15,369,546 15,984,328 16,623,701 17,288,649
96% 96% 96% 95% 95% 95% 95%
4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5%
501,740,723 504,353,267 507,532,578 509,849,072 512,738,683 515,727,171 519,306,911
5.6104 5.6396 5.6596 5.7010 5.7334 5.7668 5.7909
3.6820 3.7010 3.7105 3.7409 3.7619 3.7835 3.7955
...... ......... ................ ................ .. ................ ................. .
Contract Capacity (MW) 0 0 0 0 0 615
Availability Factor (%) 0 0 0 0 0 83.00%
Net Electricity Generated (MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 4,471,542
Total Coal Volume (tonnes/year) 0 0 0 0 0 2,098
1,230
83.00%
8,943,084
4,196
Prices
Coal Price ($/tonnes) 34.90 34.90
Cash Inflows
Electricity Sales
Total Operating Inflows
Cash Outflows
Fixed O&M
Variable O&M
Coal Payment
Depreciation
Total Operating Outflows
Net Cashflow from Operations
EPC Construction Cost
Contingency
Development Cost
Initial Woridng Capital
Financial Cost
Interest During Construction
Taxation
Net Cashflow Before Financing
Financing
Drawdown
1. US Exim Loan
2. J Exim - Tranche A: Loan
3. J Exim - Tranche B: Co-financing
4. OPIC Loan
5. Bonds
Interest Expense
Interest I
Interest 2
Interest 3
Interest 4
Interest 5
Repayment
Repayment 1
Repayment 2
Repayment 3
Repayment 4
Repayment 5
Senior Debt Service
Not Cash Flow After Senior Debt Service
Equity
Total Financing
n n n 0 0 73.226 728324
0 0 0 0 0 73,226 728,324
0 0 0 0 0 0 23,856
0 0 0 0 0 0 10,700
0 0 0 0 0 73,226 146,451
71,429
0 - - - - 73,226 252,435
0
1,772,300
3,300
190,000
40,300
185,900
308,200
22,420
3,300
167,580
185,900
248,122
25,105
1,027,934 265,845
20,150
111,23844,330
(0)
230,399
20,150
127,527
547,317
0 - - - - - -
2,500,000
540,000
540,000
360,000
200,000
180,000
$540,000
$540,000
$360,000
$200,000
$180,000
680,000
Net Cash After Financing
Net Cash Available for Distribution
Distribution
Closing Cash Balance
(22,420) (356,780) (273,227)
267,585 204,920
267,585 204,920
(22,420)
22,420
22,420
(89,195) (68,307)
89,195 68,307
356,780 273,227
(397,233)(1,072,264)
67,495
540,000
196,703
804,198
(268,066)
268,066
1,072,264
(378,076)
163,297
134,628 65,372
180,000
245,372297,925
(99,308)
99,308
397,233
(132,704)
132,704
378,076
547,317
(62,100)
(50,976)
(40,068)
(24,576)
(18,828)
(196,548)
_ -35076
350,769
(196,548)
350,769
- - - - - - 350,769
- - - - - 350,769
... ............ .............................. ................... ...................................... .... ....
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1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230
83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00%
8,943,084 8,967,586 8,943,084 8,943,084 8,943,084 8,987,586 8,943,084 8,943,084 8,943,084 8,967,586 8,943,084
4,196 4,208 4,196 4,196 4,196 4,208 4,196 4,196 4,196 4,208 4,196
34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90
477,123 480,411 483,008 486,291 489,828 494,112 497,766 502,223 494,409 497,239 499,214
477,123 480,411 483,008 486,291 489,828 494,112 497,766 502,223 494,409 497,239 499,214
36,115 37,820 39,641 41,588 43,673 45,907 48,305 50,881 47,278 48,818 50,408
17,322 18,503 19,680 21,016 22,469 24,117 25,775 27,655 23,445 24,334 25,119
146,451 146,852 146,451 148,451 146,451 146,852 146,451 146,451 146,451 146,852 146,451
71,429 71,429 71,429 71,429 71,429 71,429 71,429 71,429 71,429 71,429 71,429
271,316 274,604 277,201 280,484 284,021 288,305 291,959 296,416 288,602 291,432 293,408
277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235
277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235
(5,175) (0) (0) (0) (0)(4,248) (0) (0) (0) (0)(3,414) (0) (0) (0) (0)(2,048) 0 0 0 0
(12,552) (9,414) (6,276) (3,138) -
($45,000)
($45,000)
($30,000)
($16,667)
($30,000) ($30,000) ($30,000) ($30,000)
(194,104) (39,414) (36,276) (33,138) (0) - - - - - -
83,132 237,821 240,959 244,097 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235
($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000)
(194,104) (79,414) (76,276) (73,138) (40,000) (40,000) (40,000) (40,000) (40,000) (40,000) (40,000)
83,132 197,821 200,959 204,097 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235
83,132 197,821 200,959 204,097 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235
83,132 197,821 200,959 204,097 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235
CASH PLOW CALCULATION (ContInud) (in uss 1,000)
1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230
83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00% 83.00%
8,943,084 8,943,084 8,967,586 8,943,084 8,943,084 8,943,084 8,967,586
4,196 4,196 4,208 4,196 4,196 4,196 4,208
34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90 34.90
501,741 504,353 507,533 509,849 512,739 515,727 519,307
501,741 504,353 507,533 509,849 512,739 515,727 519,307
52,052 53,750 55,505 57,318 59,191 61,127 63,127
28,002 28,916 27,940 28,845 29,861 30,914 32,093
148,451 148,451 146,852 148,451 148,451 146,451 146,852
71,429 71,429 71,429 71,429 71,429 71,429 71,429
295,934 298,546 301,726 304,042 308,932 309,920 313,500
277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235
277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235
277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235 277,235
($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000) ($40,000)
(40,000) (40,000) (40,000) (40,000) (40,000) (40,000) (40,000)
237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235
237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235
237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235 237,235
...............  ....... ... ..
Appendix 2: Sensitivity Analysis on Coal Price
Coal Price Tariff (c/kWh) I Average Levelized
(US$/tons) Years 1-6 Years 7-12 Years 13-30 Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 7.5184 7.4719 4.8367 6.5925
23.0 7.6123 7.5657 4.9306 6.6863
30.0 7.9407 7.8942 5.2590 7.0148
34.9 8.1706 8.1241 5.4889 7.2447
39.71 8.3959 8.3493 5.7142 7.4700
Coal Price Total Charge (Component A, C, D)
(US$/tons) Years 1-6 Years 7-12 Years 13-30
21.0 673,491,955 669,049,417 440,119,900
23.0 681,892,227 677,445,858 448,518,895
30.0 711,293,183 706,833,401 477,915,380
34.9 731,873,851 727,404,680 498,492,919
39.7 752,034,507 747,556,138 518,650,508
Coal Price Capacity Charge (Component A and B) in US$
(US$/tons) Years 1-6 Years 7-12 Years 13-30
21.0 573,391,787 565,869,046 326,819,022
23.0 573,391,787 565,869,046 326,819,022
30.0 573,391,787 565,869,046 326,819,022
34.9 573,391,787 565,869,046 326,819,022
39.7 573,391,787 565,869,046 326,819,022
Coal Price Percentage Capacity Charge of the Total Charge
(US$/tons) Years 1-6 Years 7-12 Years 13-30 1Weighted Average
21.0 85.14% 84.58% 74.26% 78.50%
23.0 84.09% 83.53% 72.87% 77.25%
30.0 80.61% 80.06% 68.38% 73.17%
34.9 78.35% 77.79% 65.56% 70.56%
39.7 76.25% 75.70% 63.01% 68.20%
Coal Price Average Levelized Cost
(US$/tons) A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total (c/kWh)
21.0 3.6568 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.0508
23.0 3.6568 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 5.1384
30.0 3.6568 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 5.4450
34.9 3.6568 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.6596
39.7 3.6568 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.8698
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8.1. Problems
As previously mentioned in chapter 6, the core problem in the private power
development in Indonesia was that the IPPs' tariff to PLN was relatively high if
compared to the PLN's tariff to the end consumers. Table 8.1 shows the disparity of the
electricity tariffs of some private IPPs in Indonesia. While the bulk tariffs are widely
spread, PLN's tariff to the consumers is far more less, around US$ 3.2 cents/kWh. As a
result, PLN could not afford the IPPs' tariff.
Table 8.1: The bulk electricity tariffs from the IPPs to PLN (Source: PLN, July 1999)30
Power Generation Capacity Tariff
I (MW) (US cen!tskWh
Steam Coal Power Plants
Paiton I 1,230 8.47
Paiton II 1,220 6.59
Tanjung Jati B 1,320 5.73
Amurang 110 6.70
Sibolga A 200 6.55
Geothermal Power Plant
Dieng 1,2,3 95 7.65
Salak 4,5,6 165 8.46
Wayang Windu 220 8.40
This chapter would propose an approach to arrive at a reasonable renegotiated
tariff For this purpose, the Paiton I still serves as the case study. This approach would
299 The thesis author prepared this case under the supervision of Professor Massood V. Samii as the
basis for the thesis discussion, and not to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of infrastructure
development related issues. Data presented in the case analysis might have been altered to simplify, focus,
and to preserve individual confidentiality. The assistance of Dr. Hardiv Situmeang-the Planning Director
of PLN (July 31, 1998 - December 31, 1999) and later, the senior advisor to the PLN CEO-in the
preparation of this case is greatly appreciated. The remarkable contribution of Dr. Situmeang in the case
analysis is gratefully acknowledged.
30 Husein, Ahmad, Andi Setia Gunawan, and Wuri Hardiastuti, "Impian Adhi Pupus di Tengah
Jalan", Gamma, January 2, 2000.
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take into account PLN's affordability and would follow the trend of the increasing
competition in the electricity generating business, thereby demanding a lower ROE. The
tariff benchmarking analysis outlined in chapter 6 would be used for the Paiton I tariff
benchmarking analysis.
8.2. Proposed Approach for Remedy
Figure 8.1 shows the graphical representation of a proposed framework for
renegotiation of PLN's payment obligations. Xo is the current PLN's tariff to the
customers, which is US$ 3.2 cents/kWh and will be increased annually, as shown by the
blue line in figure 8.1. Still with respect to figure 8.1, the letter "A" in this figure
represents the annual tariff increase, which could be 20% annual increases, for example,
while X 1, represented by the horizontal black line, is the renegotiated tariff. The
renegotiated tariff is a tariff that is perceived as reasonably represents the market price;
this tariff should be renegotiated between PLN and PEC.
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Figure 8.1: The framework of how to fulfill PLN's payment obligation
With this approach, PLN would delay the payment for the first few years while it
increases the tariff by 20% each year to exceed the renegotiated tariff. After a certain
point, when the tariff is higher than the renegotiated tariff, the difference can be used to
pay back the arrears and the delayed payment during the previous period until all the
previous arrears are paid back in full.
With respect to the approach shown in figure 8.1, there are two matters that
should be resolved, as follows:
1) What is the value of the reasonable tariff that should be renegotiated between
PLN and PEC? In other words, how to determine X1?
2) Since the current PEC's tariff is relatively high, what should PEC do if PEC were
to agree on X1?
-201-
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8.2.1. How to determine X1?
To answer this question, this thesis would take the following assumptions:
1) Since the Paiton- I project was obtained through a bidding process whose
competition is questionable, it is reasonable to assume that the US$ 2.5 billion
project cost for the 2x615 MW power plants might not assure a cost-effective
development; therefore, it might not reflect the market price for projects with
similar size.
2) The US$ 1.772 billion EPC cost (US$ 1440.89 per kW), which comprises 71% of
the total project cost, is likely to be attributable to the high project cost of the
Paiton I project.
3) An audit mentioned earlier, conducted in late 1999 by a Canadian engineering and
construction company SNC-Lavalin Group, priced the Paiton I EPC cost at US$
1.033 billion (with a ± 20% tolerance) 30 1, which is equal to an EPC unit cost of
US$ 839.84 per kW. This audit strengthens the assumption that the EPC cost
cited by PEC might not reflect a market-based price.
4) For the purpose of the case study, let us assume that the US$ 1.033 billion EPC
cost for the Paiton I project by SNC-Lavalin Group is the EPC cost benchmark
that reflects a market-based price302
5) With respect to ROE, instead of using the 24.76% ROE derived from the financial
analysis in chapter 7, let us use an assumption of 17% ROE as an upper bound
301 Taufiqurohman, M., Dewi Rina Cahyadi, I.G.G. Maha Adi, "Two Steps Forward, Three Steps
Back", Cover Story Tempo No. 29/XXIX/Sept. 18-24, 2000. See also Solomon, Jay, "Indonesian Audit
Uncovers Inflated Cost of Power Plant", The Wall Street Journal, December 26, 2000.
302 This assumption is made to simplify and focus the case study.
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and 14% as a lower bound. This assumption takes into account the take-or-pay
PPA mechanism that provides a relatively high level of protections to the project
company. In addition, because the Indonesian electricity generating business was
expected to start the MB/MS scheme in 2007 whereby the business would be
highly competitive, as mentioned earlier, it would be reasonable to assume that
the private investors would reduce their ROE expectations of mid-20s or higher.
The ROE would be lowered to around 15% to 20% or probably to a single-digit
ROE, as illustrated by the experience of Chile303. Therefore, an assumption of
14% to 17% ROE is perceived as reasonable for the purpose of the case study,
despite the fact that the Paiton I project is the first IPP in Indonesia.
Based on these assumptions, a tariff benchmarking analysis with ROEs set fixed
is developed for the market-based EPC cost, which is US$ 839.84 per kW. The
benchmarking uses ROEs ranging from 14% to 17% to derive the associated tariffs, with
the technical and financial parameters closely following those of the Paiton I project.
The results are presented in appendix 10 of chapter 6 and appendix 1 of this chapter.
303 Worenklein, Jacob J., "Project Finance: Adapts to Changing Power Market", Private Power
Executive, May-June 1996. It is true that we have recently seen in some situations in Chile, and elsewhere,
bids for power projects with surprising single-digit returns (Worenklein, 1996)
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Figure 8.2 shows the graphical representation of the sensitivity of the tariffs with
the EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW and the project cost structure follows that developed in
the subchapter 6.4.2 (appendix 10 of chapter 6). For the upper bound, the 17% ROE, the
maximum tariff would be US$ 5.2883 cents/kWh (the tariff when the coal price is US$
39.7 per tons), while the minimum tariff would be US$ 4.4693 cents/kWh (the tariff
when the coal price is US$ 21.0 per tons). For the lower bound, the 14% ROE, the
maximum tariff and the minimum tariff would be US$ 5.1568 cents/kWh and US$
4.3378 cents/kWh respectively.
Tariff Sensitivity on ROE and Coal Price
EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW - Fully Commercial Loan
The Cost Structure in subchapter 6.4.2
.54
5 -- ROE=14%
-- ROE=15%
4.6 =.--ROE=16%
4.2~ 
-- ROE=17%
3.8-
20 25 30 35 40
Coal Price (US$Itons)
Figure 8.2: Tariff Sensitivity for EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW
Figure 8.3 shows the graphical representation of the sensitivity of the tariffs with
the EPC cost US$ 839.84 per kW and the project cost structure follows that of the Paiton
I project. For the upper bound, the 17% ROE, the maximum tariff would be US$ 5.0471
cents/kWh (the tariff when the coal price is US$ 39.7 per tons), while the minimum tariff
would be US$ 4.2281 cents/kWh (the tariff when the coal price is US$ 21.0 per tons).
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For the lower bound, the 14% ROE, the maximum tariff and the minimum tariff would be
US$ 4.9231 cents/kWh and US$ 4.1041 cents/kWh respectively.
Tariff Sensitivity on ROE and Coal Price
EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW - Fully Commercial Loan
The Paiton I Cost Structure
. 5.4_
-- ROE=14%
~.5.0-
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Figure 8.3: Tariff Sensitivity for EPC Cost US$ 839.84 per kW with the Paiton I cost structure
To determine the most appropriate renegotiated tariff, the results with the Paiton I
cost structure represented in figure 8.3 (appendix 1) would be used. Deciding on a single
tariff depends on the renegotiation process between PLN and PEC. If PLN allows PEC
to realize 17% ROE, and PEC agrees on reducing its ROE from 25% to 17%, then the
renegotiated tariff, X 1, would be in the range from US$ 4.2281 cents/kWh to US$ 5.0471
depending on the agreed coal price. However, if PLN allows PEC only to realize 14%
ROE, and PEC agrees on reducing its ROE from 25% to 14%, then the renegotiated
tariff, X1, would be in the range from US$ 4.1041 cents/kWh to US$ 4.9231 cents/kWh
depending on the agreed coal price. Indeed, reducing ROE is probably a tough effort for
the private sponsors.
Let us assume that PLN allows PEC to realize only 14% ROE and the parties
agree on the coal price of US$ 21 per tons; therefore, the renegotiated tariff, X1, would be
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US$ 4.1041 cents/kWh. This assumption is made to see the bottom line of the tariff that
is possible. The 14% ROE is a bottom line since the calculation used a 14% discount rate
assumption: having a 14% ROE means that the sponsors obtain no profits. The coal price
of US$ 21 per tons is assumed as the bottom line of the coal price that can be negotiated.
After arriving at the possible renegotiated tariff of US$ 4.1041 cents/kWh, the
next question is: what PEC should do to arrive at this tariff?
8.2.2. How to arrive at X1?
The author developed a tariff sensitivity analysis using the Paiton I project cost
structure with the total project cost of US$ 2.5 billion. This analysis is to figure out
which of the Paiton I original arrangements should be restructured to yield a tariff of US$
4.1041 cents/kWh. Appendix 2 to 7 of this chapter shows the results of the sensitivity
analysis. These results are explained in the following sections.
1. Coal Price
Figure 8.4 shows the tariff sensitivity under various ROEs if the coal price is
reduced (appendix 2).
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Tariff Sensitivity on ROE and Coal Price
Total US$ 2.5 billion, Coal Price Reduced
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Figure 8.4: Coal Price Reduced
As shown in this figure, if only the coal price is reduced, the minimum tariff derived is
US$ 6.0437 cents/kWh, which is the tariff when ROE 14% and the coal price is US$ 21
per tons. This value is still far from the renegotiated tariff of US$ 4.1041 cents/kWh.
Therefore, despite the coal price reduction, other arrangement should be restructured.
2. Interest on Loans
Figure 8.5 shows the tariff sensitivity under various ROEs if the coal price is
reduced, and the interests on loans are reduced to 6%, from the original interests of
around 11% (appendix 3).
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Tariff Sensitivity on ROE and Coal Price
Total US$ 2.6 billion, Interest on Loans Reduced
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Figure 8.5: Coal Price and Interest on Loans Reduced
As shown in this figure, when the coal price is reduced, and the interests on loans are
reduced to 6%, the minimum tariff derived is US$ 5.4774 cents/kWh, which is the tariff
when ROE 14% and the coal price is US$ 21 per tons. This value is still far from the
renegotiated US$ 4.1041 cents/kWh. Therefore, despite the reduction on coal price and
loan interests, other arrangement should be restructured.
3. Debt Repayment Periods I
Figure 8.6 shows the tariff sensitivity under various ROEs if the coal price is
reduced, the interests on loans after COD are reduced to 6%, and the debt repayment
periods are stretched out to 20 years (from the original 12 years) for the US and Japan
lenders and 14 years (from the original 6 years) for the bonds (appendix 4).
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Tariff Sensitivity on ROE and Coal Price
US$ 2.6 billion, Debt Repayment Period Stretched I
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Figure 8.6: Coal Price and Interest on Loans reduced, and Debt Repayment Periods stretched out
As shown in this figure, under this arrangement, the minimum tariff derived is US$
5.2963 cents/kWh, which is the tariff when ROE 14% and the coal price is US$ 21 per
tons. This value is still far from the renegotiated US$ 4.1041 cents/kWh. Therefore,
despite renegotiation of the coal price, the interest on loans, and the debt repayment
periods, other arrangement should also be restructured.
4. Debt Repayment Periods 11
Figure 8.7 shows the tariff sensitivity under various ROEs if the coal price is
reduced, the interests on loans after COD are reduced to 6%, and the debt repayment
periods are stretched out to 29 years (from the original 12 years) for the US and Japan
lenders and 20 years (from the original 6 years) for the bonds (appendix 5). As shown in
this figure, under this arrangement, the minimum tariff derived is US$ 5.1816 cents/kWh,
which is the tariff when ROE 14% and the coal price is US$ 21 per tons. This value is
still far from the renegotiated US$ 4.1041 cents/kWh. Therefore, other arrangements
should also be restructured.
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Tariff Sensitivity on ROE and Coal Price
US$ 2.5 billion, Debt Repayment Period Strechted I
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Figure 8.7: Coal Price and Interest on Loans reduced, and Debt Repayment Periods stretched out
5. Equity Right Off
Figure 8.8 shows the tariff sensitivity under various ROEs if the coal price is
reduced, the interests on loans after COD are reduced to 6%, and the debt repayment
periods are stretched out to 20 years for the US and Japan lenders and 14 years for the
bonds, and the equity contributions are right off (appendix 6).
Tariff Sensitivity on ROE and Coal Price
US$ 2.5 billion, Debt Repayment Period Strechted I
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Figure 8.8: Equity Right Off
As shown in this figure, under this arrangement, the minimum tariff derived is US$
3.9717 cents/kWh, which is the tariff when ROE is 14% and the coal price is US$ 21 per
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tons, and the maximum tariff is US$ 5.0035 cents/kWh, which is the tariff when ROE
17% and the coal price is US$ 39.7 per tons. The renegotiated US$ 4.1041 cents/kWh is
within this tariff range. For example, under this arrangement, when ROE 16% and the
coal price is US$ 21 per tons, the tariff would US$ 4.1136 cents/kWh.
In sum, to arrive at the renegotiated tariff of US$ 4.1041 cents/kWh, the following
project original arrangements should be restructured, as follows:
1) Coal Price Renegotiation: the coal price should be reduced
2) Debt Restructuring Renegotiation:
a. The interest on loans after COD should be reduced to approximately 6%
b. The loan repayment periods should be stretched out to approximately 20
years for the US and the Japan lenders and to approximately 14 years for
the bonds.
3) Equity right off: under the equity-right-off arrangement, the equity expenses of
the project sponsors during the project development and construction stages are
deemed void.
Renegotiation on coal price reduction, debt restructuring arrangement, and equity
right off is tough efforts. Lenders are usually reluctant to reduce the interest rates and to
stretch out the repayment periods. Similarly, project sponsors are reluctant to reduce
their ROEs and deem void their equity contributions. Indeed, renegotiating the current
PEC's average levelized tariff of US$ 7.2447 cents/kWh to US$ 4.1041, if possible,
requires a hard renegotiation effort.
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Such an approach for renegotiation purpose is still not impossible, however hard
it is. This approach seems reasonable: the renegotiated tariff uses the assumed market-
based project cost and the ROE follows the trend of the increasing competition in the
electricity generating business. In addition, while PEC is expected to reduce its tariff to
the level of the renegotiated tariff, PLN is also expected to increase its tariff to exceed
this renegotiated tariff. In addition, even though the IPP renegotiation process towards
the MB/MS scheme is beyond the scope of this thesis, PEC's tariff reduction would at
least have the following long-term advantages:
1) PLN can afford the tariff, thereby fulfilling its payment obligations,
2) PEC's tariff is competitive when the MB/MS Scheme starts, in case
another arrangements are required whereby PEC should "re-compete"
with other IPPs.
8.3. Chapter Summary
The results derived from this chapter are for the purpose of suggesting an
approach for remedy to be negotiated between PLN and PEC. This approach might not
be a perfect approach given the author's limitation of access to information; however, this
approach is expected to serve as an input that may generate a more creative approach as
to the most appropriate solution. Based on the results of this chapter, to arrive at a
market-based renegotiated tariff, which is approximately US$ 4.1 cents/kWh, PEC
should undertake hard renegotiation: coal price reduction, debt restructuring, and equity
right off. Unless the tariff is reduced to the level affordable to PLN, the renegotiation
process between PEC and PLN would not come to the end.
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Appendix 1: Tariff Sensitivity on Coal Price and ROE
Financial Parameters
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27% EPC Cost: 839.84 US$/kW
2. Loan 100% Commercial Loan Project Cost Structure Follows the Paiton I Project
% of Total Loan Lender Interest Repayment
29.7% US Exim Loan Original 12
29.7% J Exim - Tranche A: Loan Original 12
19.8% J Exim - Tranche B: Co-financing Original 12
11.0% OPIC Loan Original 12
9.9% Bonds Original 6
3. Discount Rate 14%
Technical Parameters
1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW
2. Availability Factor 83%
3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcallkWh
4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
5. Contract Terms 30 years
6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
8. EPC Unit Cost 839.84 US$/kW
ROE 17%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,061 million Equity: US$396 nIllion
{$!2ns ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (c/kWh) B (ckWh) C (ckWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh
21.0 5.0508 17.00% 466,222,970 2.8341 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.2281
23.0 5.1384 17.00% 466,222,970 2.8341 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.3157
30.0 5.4450 17.00% 466,222,970 2.8341 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.6223
34.9 5.6596 17.00% 466,222,970 2.8341 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.836939.7 5.8698 17.00% 466,222,970 2.8341 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.0471
ROE 16%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,061 million, Equity: US$396 miRion($ftns ALC (clkWh) ROE CCR A (cfkWh) B (clkWhJ C k D (c/kWh) Total Tariff Wh
21.0 5.0508 16.00% 459,424,984 2.7928 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1868
23.0 5.1384 16.00% 459,424,984 2.7928 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.2744
30.0 5.4450 16.00% 459,424,984 2.7928 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.5810
34.9 5 6596 16.00% 459,424,984 2.7928 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7956
39.7 5.8698 16.00% 459,424,984 2.7928 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.0058
ROE 15%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,061 million, Equity: US$396 mllion($MS) ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (ckWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 5.0508 15.00% 452,617,409 2.7515 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1454
23.0 5.1384 15.00% 452,617,409 2.7515 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.2330
30.0 5.4450 15.00% 452,617,409 2.7515 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.5396
34.9 5.6596 15.00% 452,617,409 2.7515 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7542
39.7 5.8698 15.00% 452,617,409 2.7515 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.9645
ROE 14%
Coal Price Dob: -US$ 1,061 million Equity: US$396 million($tonsl ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (ckWh) B (ckWh) C (ckWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 5.0508 14.00% 445,819,423 2.7101 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1041
23.0 5.1384 14.00% 445,819,423 2.7101 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1917
30.0 5.4450 14.00% 445,819,423 2.7101 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.4983
34.9 5 6596 14.00% 445,819,423 2.7101 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7129
39.7 5.8698 14.00% 445,819,423 2.7101 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.9231
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Appendix 2: Tariff Sensitivity on Coal Price and ROE
Financial Parameters
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%127%
2. Loan 100% Commercial Loan
%of Total Loan Lender Interest Repayment
29.7% US Exim Loan Original 12
29.7% J Exim - Tranche A: Loan Original 12
19.8% J Exim - Tranche B: Co-financing Original 12
11.0% OPIC Loan Original 12
9.9% Bonds Original 6
3. Discount Rate 14%
Technical Parameters
1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW
2. Availability Factor 83%
3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh
4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
5. Contract Terms 30 years
6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 cIkWh
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
8. EPC Unit Cost 1440.89 US$IkW
ROE 17%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,820 million, Equity: US$ 680 million($/tons) ALC c/kWh ROE CCR A (c/kWh) B (cfkWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWhj Total Tariff (c/kWh
21.0 5.0508 17.00% 466,222,970 4.8625 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 6.2565
23.0 5.1384 17.00% 466,222,970 4.8625 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 6.3440
30.0 5.4450 17.00% 466,222,970 4.8625 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 6.6506
34.9 5.6596 17.00% 466,222,970 4.8625 0.3220 1.5285 0.15221 6.8652
39.7 5.8698 17.00% 466,222,970 4.8625 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 7.0755
ROE 16%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,820 million. Equity: US$ 680 million($tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 5.0508 16.00% 459,424,984 4.7916 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 6.1855
23.0 5.1384 16.00% 459,424,984 4.7916 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 6.2731
30.0 5.4450 16.00% 459,424,984 4.7916 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 6.5797
34.9 5.6596 16.00% 459,424,984 4.7916 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 6.7943
39.7 5.8698 16.00% 459,424,984 4.7916 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 7.0045
ROE 15%
Coal Price Debt US$ 1,820 million, Equity: US$ 680 million
ALC (c/kWh) ROE - CCR A (c/kWh) B (clkWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh
21.0 5.0508 15.00% 452,617,409 4.7206 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 6.1146
23.0 5.1384 15.00% 452,617,409 4.7206 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 6.2022
30.0 5.4450 15.00% 452,617,409 4.7206 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 6.508834.91 5.6596 15.00% 452,617,409 4.7206 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 6.7234
39.7 5.8698 15.00% 452,617,409 4.7206 0.32201 . 1.7388 0.15221 6.9336
ROE 14%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,820 niflion, Equity: US$ 680 million(S/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh
21.0 5.0508 14.00% 445,819,423 4.6497 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 6.0437
23.0 5.1384 14.00% 445,819,423 4.6497 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 6.1313
30.0 5.4450 14.00% 445,819,423 4.6497 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 6.4379
34.9 5.6596 14.00% 445,819,423 4.6497 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 6.6525
39.7 5.8698 14.00% 445,819,423 4.6497 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.8627
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Appendix 3: Tariff Sensitivity on Coal Price, Interest on Loans, and ROE
Financial Parameters
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27%
2. Loan 100% Commercial Loan
%of Total Loan Lender Interest Repayment
29.7% US Exim Loan 6% 12
29.7% J Exim - Tranche A: Loan 6% 12
19.8% J Exim - Tranche B: Co-financing 6% 12
11.0% OPIC Loan 6% 12
9.9% Bonds 6% 6
3. Discount Rate 14%
Technical Parameters
1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW
2. Availability Factor 83%
3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh
4. HHV Coal 5215 kglkcal
5. Contract Terms 30 years
6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
B. EPC Unit Cost 1440.89 US$/kW
ROE 17%
Coal Price Debt US$ 1,820 nillion Equity: US$ 680 million
ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (ckWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh
21.0 4.4845 17.00% 411,925,372 4.2962 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.6901
23.0 4.5721 17.00% 411,925,372 4.2962 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 5.7777
30.0 4.8787 17.00% 411,925,372 4.2962 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 6.0843
34.9 5.0933 17.00% 411,925,372 4.2962 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 6.2989
39.7 5.3035 17.00% 411,925,372 4.2962 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.5092
ROE 16%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,820 million, Equity: US$ 680 million
LCLROE CCR A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh Total Tariff ckWh
21.0 4.4845 16.00% 405,117,798 4.2252 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.6192
23.0 4.5721 16.00% 405,117,798 4.2252 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 5.7068
30.0 4.8787 16.00% 405,117,798 4.2252 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 6.0134
34.9 5.0933 16.00% 405,117,798 4.2252 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 6.2280
39.7 5.3035 16.00% 405,117,798 4.2252 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.4382
ROE 15%
Coal Price Dob: US$ 1,820 mnillion Equity: US$ 680 millon_($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 4.4845 15.00% 398,319,812 4.1543 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.5483
23.0 4.5721 15.00% 398,319,812 4.1543 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 5.6359
30.0 4.8787 15.00% 398,319,812 4.1543 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 5.9425
34.9 5.0933 15.00% 398,319,812 4.1543 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 6.1571
39.7 5.3035 15.00% 398,319,812 4.1543 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.3673
ROE 14%
Coal Price DeA LS$ 1,820 illion, Equity: S$ 680 m__llion
_$____s__ALC (ck____ROE _CCR_ A (ckh__ B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (ckWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 4.4845 14.00% 391,521,825 4.0834 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.4774
23.0 4.5721 14.00% 391,521,825 4.0834 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 5.5650
30.0 4.8787 14.00% 391,521,825 4.0834 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 5.8716
34.9 5.0933 14.00% 391,521,825 4.0834 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 6.0862
39.7 5.3035 14.00% 391,521,825 4.0834 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.2964
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Appendix 4: Tariff Sensitivity on Coal Price, Interest on Loans, Loan Repayment Period, and ROE
Financial Parameters
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27%
2. Loan 100% Commercial Loan
%of Total Loan Lender Interest Repayment
29.7% US Exim Loan 6% 20
29.7% J Exim - Tranche A: Loan 6% 20
19.8% J Exim - Tranche B: Co-financing 6% 20
11.0% OPIC Loan 6% 20
9.9% Bonds 6% 14
3. Discount Rate 14%
Technical Paramters
1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW
2. Availability Factor 83%
3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcallkWh
4. HHV Coal 5215 kg/kcal
5. Contract Terms 30 years
6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 clkWh
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 cikWh
8. EPC Unit Cost 1440.89 US$/kW
ROE 17%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,820 million, Equity: US$ 680 million
$0 s ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (c/kWh B c/Wh) C DckWh (c/kW Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 4.3034 17.00% 394,551,675 4.1150 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.5090
23.0 4.3910 17.00% 394,551,675 4.1150 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 .5966
30.0 4.6975 17.00% 394,551,675 4.1150 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 5.9032
34.91 4.9121 17.00% 394,551,675 4.1150 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 6.1178
39.7 5.1224 17.00%1 394,551,675 4.11501 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.3280
ROE 16%
Coal Price Debt US$ 1,820 million, Equity: US$ 680 million
$ )_ALC (ckWh) ROE CCR A c/kWh) B (cPkWh) C (c/kWh) D (ckWh) Tota Whar hl)
21.0 4.3034 16.00% 387,753,689 4.0441 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.4381
23.0 4.3910 16.00% 387,753,689 4.0441 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 5.5257
30.0 4.6975 16.00% 387,753,689 4.0441 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 5.8323
34.9 4.9121 16.00% 387,753,689 4.0441 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 6.0469
39.7 5.1224 16.00% 387,753,689 4.0441 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.2571
ROE 15%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,820 million. Equity: US$ 680 uullion($hOns) ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) 0 (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 4.3034 15.00% 380,955,703 3.9732 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.3672
23.0 43910 15.00% 380,955,703 3.9732 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 5.4548
30.0 4.6975 15.00% 380,955,703 3.9732 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 5.7614
34.9 4.9121 15.00% 380,955,703 3.9732 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.9760
39.7 5.1224 15.00%1 380,955,703 3.9732 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.1862
ROE 14%
Coal Price Debt US$ 1,820 million. Equity: US$ 680 million
J$Ltons ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (ctkWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 4.3034 14.00% 374,157,716 3.9023 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.2963
23.0 4.3910 14.00% 374,157,716 3.9023 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 5.3838
30.0 4.6975 14.00% 374,157,716 3.9023 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 5.6904
34.9 4.9121 14.00% 374,157,716 3.9023 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.9050
39.7 5.1224 14.00% 374,157,716 3.9023 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.1153
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Appendix 5: Tariff Sensitivity on Coal Price, Interest on Loans, Loan Repayment Period, and ROE
Financial Parameters
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%/27%
2. Loan 100% Commercial Loan
%of Total Loan Lender Interest Repayment
29.7% US Exim Loan 6% 29
29.7% J Exim -Tranche A: Loan 6% 29
19.8% J Exim - Tranche B: Co-financing 6% 29
11.0% OPIC Loan 6% 29
9.9% Bonds 6% 20
3. Discount Rate 14%
Technical Parameters
1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW
2. Availability Factor 83%
3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcalIkWh
4. HHV Coal 5215 kgikcal
5. Contract Terms 30 years
6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 clkWh
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 clkWh
8. EPC Unit Cost 1440.89 US$1kW
ROE 17%
Coal Price SDebt U$ 1,820 million. Equity: US$ 680 million($mons ALC (cikWh) ROE CCR (US$/year) A (c/kWh) B (cikWh) C (kWhWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (clkWh)
21.0 4.1887 17.00% 383,908,848 4.0004 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.3944
23.0 4.2763 17.00% 383,908,848 4.0004 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 5.4819
30.0 4 5829 17.00% 383,908,848 4.0004 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 5.7885
34.9 4.7975 17.00% 383,908,848 4.0004 03220 1.5285 0.1522 6.0031
39.7 5.0077 17.00% 383,908,848 4.0004 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.2134
ROE 16%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,820 million Equity: US$ 680 million($_tns) ALC (ckWh) ROE CCR (US$year) A (cikWh) B (kcAWh) C (clkWh) D (clkWh) Total Tariff (cikWh
21.0 4.1887 16.00% 376,765,688 3.9295 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.3234
23.0 42763 16.00% 376,765,688 3.9295 0.3220 1.0073 0 1522 5.4110
30.0 4.5829 16.00% 376,765,688 3.9295 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 5.7176
34.9 4.7975 16.00% 376,765,688 3.9295 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.9322
39.7 5.0077 16.00% 376,765,688 3.9295 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.1424
ROE 15%
Coal Price Debt UIS$ 1,820 million Equity: US$ 680 miRion($ltmns ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR (US$Iear) A (c/kWh) B (ckWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 4.1887 15.00% 369,958,114 3.8585 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.2525
23.0 4.2763 1500% 369,958,114 3.8585 0.3220 1.0073 0 1522 5.3401
30.0 4.5829 15.00% 369,958,114 3.8585 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 5.6467
34.9 4.7975 15.00% 369,958,114 3.8585 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.8613
39.7 5.0077 15.00% 369,958,114 3.8585 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.0715
ROE 14%
Coal Price Debt U3S$ 1,820 million, Equity: US$ 680 miDion
($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR (US$Iyear) A (clkWh) B (clkWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 4.1887 14.00% 363,160,128 3.7876 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 5.1816
23.0 4.2763 14.00% 363,160,128 3.7876 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 5.2692
30.0 4.5829 14.00% 363,160,128 3.7876 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 5.5758
34.9 4.7975 14.00% 363,160,128 3.7876 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 5.7904
39.7 5.0077 14.00% 363,160,128 3.7876 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 6.0006
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Appendix 6: Tariff Sensitivity on Coal Price, Interest on Loans, Loan Repayment Period, and ROE
Equity Right Off
Financial Parameters
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%127%
2. Loan 100% Commercial Loan
% of Total Loan Lender Interest Repayment
29.7% US Exim Loan 6% 20
29.7% J Exim - Tranche A: Loan 6% 20
19.8% J Exim - Tranche B: Co-financing 6% 20
11.0% OPIC Loan 6% 20
9.9% Bonds 6% 14
3. Discount Rate 14%
Technical Parameters
1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW
2. Availability Factor 83%
3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcal/kWh
4. HHV Coal 5215 kglkcal
5. Contract Terms 30 years
6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 cikWh
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
8. EPC Unit Cost 1440.89 US$/kW
ROE 17%
Coal Price Debt US$ 1,820 nilnion Equity: US$ 680 million($1tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (ckWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 4.3034 17.00% 267,556,853 2.790 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.1845
23.0 4.3910 17.00% 267,556,853 2.7905 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.2721
30.0 4.6975 17.00% 267,556,853 2.7906 03220 1.3139 0.1522 4.5787
34.9 4.9121 17.00% 267,556,853 2.7905 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7933
39.7 5.1224 17.00% 267,556,853 2.7906 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 5.0035
ROE 16%
Coal Price Debt US$ 1,820 mnillion, Equity: US$ 680 million
$L ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (ckWh) B (ckWh) C (ckWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (clkWh)
21.0 4.3034 16.00% 260,758,867 2.7196 0.3220 0.9197 0 1522 4.1136
23.0 4.3910 16.00% 260,758,867 2.7196 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.2012
30.0 4.6975 16.00% 260,758,867 2.7196 0.3220 1.3139 01522 4.5078
34.9 4.9121 16.00% 260,758,867 2.7196 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.7224
39.7 5.1224 16.00% 260,758,867 2.71961 0,3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.9326
ROE 15%
Coal Price Debt US$ 1,820 nillion, Equity: US$ 680 million
M$ton) ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (ckWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 4.3034 15.00% 253,960,880 2.6487 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0427
23.0 4.3910 15.00% 253,960,880 2.6487 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1303
30.0 4.6975 15.00% 253,960,880 2.6487 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.4368
34.9 4.9121 15.00% 253,960,880 2.6487 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.6515
39.7 5.1224 15.00% 253,960,880 2.6487 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.8617
ROE 14%
Coal Price Debt US$ 1,820 nillion Equity: US$ 680 mIllion
($tosI ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR A (c/kWh) B (ckWh) C (c/kWh) D Wh) Total Tariff (c/kWh
21.0 4.3034 14.00% 247,162,894 2.5778 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9717
23.0 4.3910 14.00% 247,162,894 2.5778 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0593
30.0 4.6975 14.00% 247,162,894 2.5778 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.3669
34.9 4.9121 14.00% 247,162,894 2.5778 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.5805
39.7 5.12241 14.00%1 247,162,894 2.5778 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.7908
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Appendix 7: Tariff Sensitivity on Coal Price, Interest on Loans, Loan Repayment Period, and ROE
Equity Right Off
Financial Parameters
1. Debt Equity Ratio 73%127%
2. Loan 100% Commercial Loan
% of Total Loan Lender Interest Repayment
29.7% US Exim Loan 6% 29
29.7% J Exim - Tranche A: Loan 6% 29
19.8% J Exim - Tranche B: Co-financing 6% 29
11.0% OPIC Loan 6% 29
9.9% Bonds 6% 20
3. Discount Rate 14%
Technical Parameters
1. Net Dependable Capacity 2x615 MW
2. Availability Factor 83%
3. Net Plant Heat Rate 2447 kcallkWh
4. HHV Coal 5215 kgikcal
5. Contract Terms 30 years
6. Fixed O&M 0.3220 c/kWh
7. Variable O&M 0.1522 c/kWh
8. EPC Unit Cost 1440.89 US$1kW
ROE 17%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,820 rnillion Equity: US$ 680 million
M$tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR (US$/year) A (c/kWh) j (cjkWhj C (c/kWh D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh
21.0 4.1887 17.00% 256,568,852 2.6759 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 4.0698
23.0 4.2763 17.00% 256,568,852 2.6759 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.1574
30.0 4.5829 17.00% 256,568,852 2.6759 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.4640
34.9 4.7975 17.00% 256,568,852 2.6759 0.3220 1.5285 0,1522 4.6786
39.7 5.0077 17.00% 256,568,852 2.6759 0.3220 1.7388 0.1522 4.8889
ROE 16%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,820 million, Equity: US$ 680 million
($tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR (US$fyear) A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh
21.0 4.1887 16.00% 249,761,278 2.6049 0.3220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9989
23.0 4.2763 16.00% 249,761,278 2.6049 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 4.0865
30.0 4.5829 16.00% 249,761,278 2.6049 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.3931
34.9 4.7975 16.00% 249,761,278 2.6049 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.6077
39.7 5.0077 16.00% 249,761,278 2.6049 0.32201 1.7388 0.15221 4.8179
ROE 15%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,820 million Equity: US$ 680 millIon
ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR (US$/year) A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (c/kWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 4.1887 15.00% 242,963,292 2.5340 03220 0.9197 0.1522 3.9280
23.0 4.2763 15.00% 242,963,292 2.5340 03220 1.0073 0.1522 4.015630.0 4 5829 15.00% 242,963,292 2.5340 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.3222
34.9 4.7975 15.00% 242,963,292 2.5340 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.5368
39.7 5.00771 15.00% 242,963,292 2.5340 0.32201 1.73881 0.1522 4.7470
ROE 14%
Coal Price Debt: US$ 1,820 million Equity: US$ 680 million
($/tons) ALC (c/kWh) ROE CCR (US$/year) A (c/kWh) B (c/kWh) C (ckWh) D (c/kWh) Total Tariff (c/kWh)
21.0 4,1887 14.00% 236,165,305 2.4631 0.3220 0.9197 01522 3.8571
23.0 4.2763 14.00% 236,165,305 2.4631 0.3220 1.0073 0.1522 3.9447
30.0 4 5829 14.00% 236,165,305 2.4631 0.3220 1.3139 0.1522 4.2513
34.9 4.7975 14.00% 236,165,305 2.4631 0.3220 1.5285 0.1522 4.4659
39.7 5.0077 14.00% 236,165,305 1 2.4631 0.3220 1.7388, 0.15221 4.6761
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Chapter 9: Conclusion
9.1. Regarding the Paiton I Project Deal
With respect to the Paiton I project deal, the thesis arrives at the following
conclusions:
1. The Best Practice Analysis
The inception of the Paiton I project was not fully prepared. The Indonesian legal
and regulatory framework for private power was not fully developed. The procurement
bidding process did not promote competition and transparency. The Paiton I model
power purchase agreement also did not promote competition for cost effective
development towards competitive electricity market.
The IPP best practice feature is outlined in subchapter 2.4. Competition, risk
mitigation, and transparency should be embodied in the legal and regulatory framework,
procurement process, and power purchase agreement. The use of benchmarking analysis
during renegotiation process is very important to assure the cost-effective development of
the project.
2. The Power Purchase Agreement
The PPA tariff structure places demand risks, currency risks, inflation risk, and
coal price fluctuation risk to the public utility. Force majeure risks and change of law
risks are also transferred to the utility under certain PPA terms and conditions. The level
of the take-or-pay in the pricing mechanism is high, with the fixed capacity charges being
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an average of 71% of the total payment and the availability factor being an average of
83%.
For better arrangement, the risks arrangement embodied in the PPA should be
balanced by allowing IPPs to assume certain level of risks. Such major concerns as
market risks, currency risks, and force majeure risks should be well distributed equally
among the contracted parties, instead of putting the entire burden either to government or
public utility alone.
With respect to market risks, demand risks should be partly allocated to IPPs.
The mechanism could probably be by reducing the level of take-or-pay payment and the
availability factor and/or selling part of the capacity charge at the prevailing market price
rate while the public utility is only responsible for part of the charge. This way, when
economic condition of the host country changes sharply, thereby affecting the demand of
the project output, the burden will not be solely in the public utility, but also in the
private investors.
3. The Equity Arrangement
The equity arrangement of the Paiton I was considered as a "debt-like"
arrangement, with the take-or-pay PPA obligating the public utility to make fixed
payments regardless the country's economic condition and demand condition for the
project output.
For better arrangement, even under the "debt-like" arrangement, risks should be
properly allocated so that the public entity would not assume such a high level of risk as
to be politically untenable. Most importantly, any government guarantee securing the
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"debt-like" equity arrangement should be specified in details to avoid misunderstanding
or misinterpretation of the guarantee intention.
4. The Local Participant
The politically well-connected local participant, who might have been intended to
reduce political risk, eventually increased the political risk itself when the government
changed. The lack of transparency during the procurement and the negotiation process
has fueled the allegations that the high project cost of the Paiton I project is the result of
cronyism and corruption practices. Furthermore, the "loan-financed" equity arrangement
of the local participant has fueled the allegation that contracts were obtained through
corruption.
For better arrangement, the hidden political risks beyond a sound local participant
should be well understood. If possible, local participant arrangements could be
diversified by involving not only the politically well-connected people but also those
perceived as ordinary companies. With respect to the "loan financed" equity
arrangement for local participants, it would have probably reduced the political risk if the
local participants also contribute shares from the project initial stage. This way, the local
participants would be perceived as being fully involved in assuming project risks and
being more committed to the project when relations with the host government eventually
turns sour.
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5. The Dispute Resolution
The international arbitration's decisions imposing payment obligations to the
public utility were difficult to implement especially in times of crisis since the utility
simply did not have the cash to make the payments.
For better arrangement, the international arbitration would play a very useful role
if it allows for changes and helps risk re-allocation efforts that could be applied under the
prevailing economic condition of the host country when such changes are actually
inevitable. In other words, instead of freezing the host government and the private
investors under certain contract terms and conditions for long period, the contract itself
would play a useful role if it allows certain changes under certain prevailing conditions
when changes are indeed inevitable; the international arbitration can help in making the
changes appropriate and smooth.
6. Electricity Market Projection
The electricity demand projection was over optimistic. The demand was
projected as a target, not a natural growth. With respect to electricity tariff, to assess the
viability of IPPs' tariff to the utility, the IPPs refer solely to the projection of increase in
public utility's tariff to the end consumers. If the increase does not actually materialize,
the tariff would significantly exceed the utility's tariff. In addition, the electricity
purchase power varies in various areas within the country; even though some areas lack
electricity, at the same time, they cannot afford it.
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For better practice, IPPs should rely on the natural growth of electricity demand,
taking into account the effect of the IPP boom in the country. IPPs also should take into
account the purchasing power of the surrounding regions where the IPPs operate.
7. The Project Financial Parameters
The approximation of the cash flow analysis for the Paiton I project shows the
common practice of infrastructure in developing countries with a 15% IRR on project and
a 25% ROE.
According to one of the IPP better practice features, IPPs should use the
wholesale electricity tariff of the utility, instead of the return on equity, as a basis to set
up tariff for the IPP-generated power. In addition, the increasing competition of the
electricity generating business demands lower ROE, with some cases showing a
surprisingly single digit ROE.
9.2. Regarding the Tariff Benchmarking Analysis
The core problem in the case of the Paiton I project is that while public utility's
tariff to consumers was low, the IPP's tariff to the utility was high as a result of a high
project cost; therefore, the utility could not afford the IPP's tariff.
With respect to the proposed renegotiation approach, the IPP's tariff would be
benchmarked against the utility's tariff. This approach is in accord with the suggestion of
the APEC Energy Working Group that one of the best practice features for IPPs is to use
the wholesale electricity tariff, rather than the rate of return on equity, as the basis for
negotiating PPA.
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The benchmarking analysis for the Paiton I tariff takes into account several
assumptions including the Paiton I EPC cost benchmark result (the EPC cost of US$
839.84 per kW) by the SNC-Lavalin Group and the increasing competition in the
electricity generating business that demands lower ROE. The results of the
benchmarking for the Paiton I project are: with 17% ROE, the tariff could be reduced to
the range from US$ 4.2 cents/kWh to US$ 5.0 cents/kWh depending on the coal price,
while with 14% ROE, the tariff could be reduced to the range from US$ 4.1 cents/kWh to
US$ 4.9 cents/kWh also depending on the coal price.
If the public utility is willing to increase its current tariff of US$ 3.2 cents/kWh to
US$ 4.1 cents/kWh, since the IPP's tariff is benchmarked against the utility's tariff, in the
renegotiation, the IPP is expected to arrive at the utility's tariff of US$ 4.1 cents/kWh.
To arrive at this tariff value, the IPP need to undertake a hard renegotiation efforts, as
follows: 1) ROE reduction to 14%; 2) Coal Price Renegotiation to US$ 21 per tons; 3)
Debt structuring negotiation: interest rate reduction to approximately 6% and loan
repayment period stretched out to approximately 20 years for the main lenders and 14
years for bonds; and 4) Equity Right Off.
The thesis's conclusions and results with respect to the Paiton I project
arrangement and the tariff benchmarking analysis are expected to serve as an input that
may generate a more creative approach as to the most appropriate solution for the
contracted parties.
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